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Political communication scholars have long been interested in why people seek 
out the media content they do. Media choice is a complex decision influenced by a 
multitude of factors; and linking media consumption and behavior is difficult in regions 
without detailed information about individual media diets and consumption patterns. 
Yet those same areas are where scholars know the least about the link between media 
and political engagement. This dissertation endeavors to fill that void in research, using 
a method more efficient than traditional content analysis. With a focus on Latin 
America, my study is one of the few large-N comparative studies of media and politics 
within comparative politics. 
I posit that the public uses media reputation, the accumulation of years of 
interactions between the press and government, as a cue about the independence of any 
medium. I contend that media reputation, earned over time, acts as a signal about how 
close a media entity is to government, thereby guiding consumers interested in news 
outside the mainstream toward media that promote ideas that challenge the status quo. 
I expect that consumers of media that criticize the status quo will be more likely to 
engage in activities to change the status quo. 
To show this, I draw on the work of others across a variety of disciplines—
including history, communications, anthropology, economics, sociology, media studies, 
journalism studies, area studies and ethnography—to categorize how media in different 
countries are both similar and different in reputation or relationship with government. I 
present a detailed classification scheme for institutional status quo bias that acts as a 
work-around for some of the language and scope problems associated with content 
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analysis, which is most commonly used to link media consumption and political 
behavior.   
I then look for associations between consumption of different media and political 
behavior. Using data from the World Values Survey, AmericasBarometer and original 
data collected for this dissertation, I show that more frequent consumption of media 
with less status quo bias is associated with increased political participation. This is 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Edmund Burke first used the “Fourth Estate” as a slur when referring to the 
media. Since then, however, the term has evolved to encompass the press’s role as a 
watchdog, a check on government and the defender of the people’s rights (Hirst 2013). 
The codification of the free press can be traced to Sweden in 1766 (Cunningham 2018); 
and there is wide consensus that freedom of the press matters for good governance, as 
articulated by the third and forty-fourth Presidents of the United States and a Nobel 
Laureate: 
“The basis of our governments being the opinion of the people, the very 
first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers 
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.” 
— Thomas Jefferson1 
 
“Journalists give all of us as citizens the chance to know the truth about 
our countries, ourselves, our governments …That makes us better, it 
makes us stronger, it gives voice to the voiceless, it exposes injustice, and 
holds leaders like me accountable.” — Barack Obama2 
 
“A critical, independent and investigative press is the lifeblood of any 
democracy. The press must be free from state interference. It must have 
the economic strength to stand up to the blandishments of government 
officials. It must have sufficient independence from vested interests to be 
bold and inquiring without fear or favor. It must enjoy the protection of 
                                                          
1 The full quote is: “The people are the only censors of their governors: and even their errors will tend to 
keep these to the true principles of their institution. To punish these errors too severely would be to 
suppress the only safeguard of the public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the 
people is to give them full information of their affairs thro’ the channel of the public papers, & to contrive 
that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our governments being the 
opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I 
should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. But I should mean that every man should receive those 
papers & be capable of reading them.” http://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/302 (December 29, 2016) 
2 The full quote, from CBS News in 2015 is: “Journalists give all of us as citizens the chance to know the 
truth about our countries, ourselves, our governments …That makes us better, it makes us stronger, it 
gives voice to the voiceless, it exposes injustice, and holds leaders like me accountable … Unfortunately, in 
too many places around the world, a free press is under attack by governments that want to avoid the 
truth … Journalists are harassed, sometimes even killed, independent outlets are shut down, dissent is 
silence, and freedom of expression is stifled.” http://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-press-freedom-
vital-to-democracy/ (April 7, 2017) 
2 
the constitution, so that it can protect our rights as citizens. — Nelson 
Mandela3  
 
The importance of the press is not limited to democracies. In Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 
2013, 64% of the adult population still read a newspaper (WAN-IFRA 2014). Even in 
China, where the Committee to Protect Journalists says the government has the tightest 
hold over the media,4 the concept of or a belief in the superiority of a free press exists.5 
No matter what form of government, the news is how citizens find out about what is 
going on in their country and the world.  
"The Fourth Estate," both in its original usage as well as how it is currently 
interpreted by scholars, implies media independence. In general terms, that means the 
absence of control by external forces (Karppinen and Moe 2016, 106). UNESCO explains 
media independence as dual-faceted: 
“Evaluations of media independence can be categorised around two 
significant and distinct components. The first element concerns the role of 
regulatory authorities as to whether they ensure editorial independence or 
not… The second element is about resistance to political and commercial 
interference in the autonomy of the media sector. This entails the presence 
and strength of actors who fight for editorial independence and integrity” 
(2017, 3). 
 
But media independence need not be the norm. The media may be subservient to the 
government or choose to collude with it. Alternately, the media may only protect those 
persons and groups with sufficient power to influence the media (Donohue, Tichenor 
and Olien 1995). These different possible roles for the media –as watchdog, lapdog or 
guard dog (Donohue, Tichenor and Olien 1995) – would beget very different outcomes 
in the content of news. After all, a press acting as a government lapdog may be perceived 
                                                          
3 http://allafrica.com/stories/201805040316.html (June 6, 2018) 
4 https://cpj.org/blog/2018/01/press-oppressor-awards-trump-fake-news-fakies.php (June 6, 2018) 
5 See West (2014) for an overview of freedom of the press in Asia 
3 
by citizens as spreading propaganda, or the press that only presents the views of those in 
power as oligarchic. In such instances, the credibility of those sources could be 
undermined in the minds of citizens, leading to some media having reputations as less 
critical of those in power even when real political or social injustices exist.  
The work of the press is not always an easy or safe job.6 Even where the press’s 
official role is somewhat codified, as it was in Brazil in the last century (de Albuquerque 
2005), governments use both carrots and sticks to induce favorable coverage (Waisbord 
2000, 2015). The interplay between governments and news institutions (Cook 1998, 
2006; Sparrow 2006; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Wolfsfeld 2004) likely shapes an 
outlet’s public reputation with regard to media propensity to criticize government.  
What the public observes about the relationship between the government and the 
media may sometimes give the impression of state-media collusion, as depicted on 
Facebook7 in February 2017 (Figure 1.1): 
                                                          
6 The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Reporters Without Borders (RWB) both exist because 
shining a light on government corruption, malfeasance or scandal comes with risk. As of June 6, 
according to RWB, 30 journalists have already been killed in 2018 and 170 are imprisoned Those numbers 
increase to 39 and 320 if other media workers are added. Most have been killed in Afghanistan, but six of 
those deaths occurred in Latin America. Egypt leads the pack for imprisonments with 26. Eritrea, 
Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Bangladesh follow, accounting for another 38. In Latin America, only Venezuela 
and Cuba currently have journalists in prison (two each). https://rsf.org/en/barometer (June 6, 2018) 
7 By the group Mexicambios Recargado 
https://www.facebook.com/395138617502587/photos/a.395181947498254.1073741828.3951386175025
87/408134019536380/?type=3&theater (June 5, 2018) 
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Figure 1.1: Mexican political cartoon (2017) 
 
Source: Mexicambios Recargado 
In this image, the Mexican media (TV Azteca, Televisa) is depicted as working alongside 
the political parties (PRI, PAN) and international conglomerates (Coca-Cola, TelMex, 
Wal-Mart) to stymie progress, justice, economic well-being and change. In other words, 
the cartoon presents the media as enforcers of the status quo, boulders that plug the 
possibility of change.  
In other instances, the media and state may be seen as being at odds with one 
another. Figure 1.2 presents a response to a tweet from Bolivian President Juan “Evo” 
Morales Ayma: 
5 
Figure 1.2: Tweet and response about Bolivian 
government spending on media (20170504) 
 
Source: Twitter (@raulpenaranda1) 
Though it may be strange for some in well-functioning democracies to imagine a head of 
state blatantly threatening the press publicly, journalist Peñaranda points out that 
Morales does exactly this in this tweet.8  More importantly, Morales’ tweet exposes one 
of the methods that governments use to exert soft control over the media: advertising 
funds. Political scientist Ian Bremmer illustrates the pervasiveness of this mechanism of 
control in a 2017 tweet in Figure 1.3: 
                                                          
8 Translation: “Press in which the government does not publish are those that lie, insult, defame and 
discredit the authorities. Do they do it for the money?” (Translation confirmed by Branko Marinkovic, 
personal correspondence, June 1, 2018) 
6 
Figure 1.3: Tweet about government spending 
on advertising in Africa (20170427) 
 
Source: Twitter (@ianbremmer) 
Overt censorship seems inefficient relative to strangling news organizations’ funding, 
which, as these two tweets show, can be fairly easily accomplished in many parts of the 
world. To return to the Mexican political cartoon, media seen as being in bed with 
government are not likely to be perceived as independent, much less critical. 
Drawing heavily from economics, this dissertation considers reputation as the 
dynamic result of scores of years of interactions, the details of which most of the 
population are unaware. As a function of their history of interaction, different types of 
media may have differential willingness and ability to criticize the government. This 
willingness or ability to challenge the government or status quo would ultimately be 
reflected in the stances the press takes and in the information it presents or conceals. 
Citizens understand these constraints, and they may select media or assess the 
believability of its content differently based on the reputations that develop as a result of 
these constraints. The differences in selection or believability of content may then be 
reflected in political behavior, even potentially dangerous behavior such as political 
protest. 
7 
In this dissertation, I apply comparative methodology to the study of news media 
to link news and political engagement to half the countries in the Western Hemisphere 
with a method less reliant on translation or content analysis. Both the approach and the 
geography are novel within political communication. In line with Hallin and Mancini 
(2004), I look at how government and media are aligned, disaggregated cross-nationally 
at the level of the media platform: newspaper, television, radio, Internet. Specifically, I 
argue that the modern relationship between government and news depends on each 
medium’s unique historic relationship with government and the different pressures felt 
by actors working in each medium.  
I revisit Newton (1999), who found that an association exists between media 
platform and mobilization, from a comparative perspective. While he posited that it was 
the content of the news, not its form, which was important to stimulating or depressing 
participation, form was a reasonable proxy for content in his study.9 I expect the same 
here. After categorizing different media as being more or less aligned with the status quo 
in each country, I look for associations between different kinds of media and political 
behavior. After all, the political import of news expressed in the quotes earlier in this 
chapter is not about the existence of the news media, but about how the news media 
stimulates or stymies citizen participation.  
                                                          
9 Newton’s study related directly to media malaise theory – the idea that increased exposure to news that 
is all bad or negative begets cynicism, distrust and lack of faith in politics and politicians (1999, 578). In 
that way, we tackle different questions. But his analysis compares users of broadsheet (hard news) papers 
with readers of tabloid (soft or sensationalists) news readers and television news viewers. He confronts 
scholars who have argued that there is no hope for mobilization from television:  
“If it is form that counts most, then there is little hope for the modern mass media, especially 
television, which is doomed by its very nature to have a corrupting influence. If it is content that 
matters, then there is room for both good and bad in each type of mass media and, therefore, for 
different kinds of effects caused by the same type of media” (Newton 1999, 580).  
But he uses form as a proxy for depth or seriousness of content, similar to what I do in forthcoming pages.  
8 
I take an institutionalist approach to show that there exists a relationship 
between political participation and consumption of media perceived as not aligned with 
government. This relationship can be observed in some countries with radio, but it is 
most obvious among consumers of Internet news. This association exists above and 
beyond traditional demographic markers, political interest or ideology. I show that in 
most countries, understanding the types of relationships that may exist between 
government and media and then how these different relationships may impact 
consumers will explain more about political participation than analyses that do not 
include media.  
My dissertation presents a generalizable, cross-national approach to advance 
knowledge about the association between news consumption and political behavior by 
accounting for the institutional history of news organizations and the resulting 
systematic differences in content. I present a method more resource-efficient for 
expanding the study of political communication and behavior across linguistic and 
national boundaries.  
Methodologically, I take a different approach to connecting media and behavior 
than most scholars of political communication. The modal approach is content analysis 
or experiments. Both have their strong suits: the former shows what the news actually 
reports and measures what information is actually available to those interested in 
politics in the real world. The latter allows us to know, with a greater degree of certainty, 
how information affects people’s political engagement. However, language and scope 
limit their utility. Both are resource-intensive, which means they cannot be large in 
scope, nor can they look across much time. Research for both is also often done at the 
individual level, meaning that though researchers know a lot about the impact of news 
9 
on people, that understanding is somewhat disconnected from political context. The 
analysis of citizen behavior is all but divorced from the political opportunity structures10 
in which those individuals live. And the context of politics, across both space and time, 
matters. Comparative political scientists have shown that political repertoires11 are 
bounded by the realities of each country. In other words, options available to people in 
country A may not be available in country B; but purely atomized analysis may not 
capture that. 
I treat media as a comparative institution like any other, be it a central bank or a 
police force or a legislature. I draw on the work of others across a variety of disciplines—
including history, communications, anthropology, economics, sociology, media studies, 
journalism studies, area studies and ethnography—to categorize how media in different 
countries are both similar and different. Unlike most scholars of political 
communication, especially Hallin and Mancini and those who have followed them, I 
categorize media at a lower level—here, platform—using a method that could also be 
applied at other levels as well, for example different media outlets within the same 
country. This method of analysis also acts as a work-around for some of the language 
and scope problems discussed earlier with regard to the modal approaches.   
                                                          
10 “Political opportunities can be defined broadly as ‘consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or 
national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their 
internal resources to form social movements’ (Tarrow 1996: 54, emphasis in original). More specifically, 
they refer to those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have 
to mobilize effectively… Four main dimensions of political opportunity have been stressed in the literature 
(McAdam 1996): (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the 
stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the 
presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression” (Giugni 
2009, 361). 
11 “A repertoire of contention comprises what people know they can do when they want to oppose a public 
decision they consider unjust or threatening” (Della Porta 2013) 
10 
In terms of a substantive contribution, my dissertation is one of the few studies to 
look at multiple media platforms across an entire continent. Most cross-national studies 
look at one platform (e.g., Iyengar et al 2010) or at news consumption in general (e.g., 
Norris and Inglehart 2009) and those rare studies that investigate multiple platforms 
usually do so in only a few countries (e.g., Curran et al 2009). This is also one of the few 
comparative political communication studies that includes an analysis of radio, which is 
still an important news medium in much of the world.12  
This dissertation also expands the geography covered by political 
communication. There are very few researchers working on issues related to media in 
Latin America, even fewer in English, the lingua franca of Western scholarship. “The 
wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual tools that are able to 
travel” (Sartori 1970, 1035). Testing ideas developed largely in the United States and 
Europe on Latin America is one way to see if existing theories extend to other regions or 
not.  
Finally, examining the connection between media and behavior in the 
comparative context represents an attempt at reconciling disparate literatures on 
comparative behavior and comparative political communications. Charles Berger, a 
former president of the International Communication Association (ICA), commented in 
an interview that, for much of its existence, ICA had been international in name only 
(Mehen 2012, 1494). Similarly, Gurevitch and Blumer called for the internationalization 
                                                          
12 To give a few examples, despite 43 million Twitter followers (as of June 2018) and his own YouTube 
channel, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi thinks radio essential to his political success (Economic 
Times 2014) and gives a monthly radio address (Adhikary 2015a) broadcast simultaneously on all 413 
stations of All India Radio (BBC 2015), reaching 99.19% of the country’s 1.3 billion people (NDTV.com 
2015). In earthquake-stricken Nepal, the local government prioritized supplying electricity to community 
radio stations after earthquakes, as radio was the sole reliable news source in areas hardest hit (Adhikary 
2015b). 
11 
of political communication in a series of books and articles over the past 40 years 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1975, Gurevitch and Blumler 1990, Gurevitch 2004). Yet a 
staggering amount of “comparative” political communication research is limited to 
Europe, often to one-country studies (Esser and Pfetsch 2004, Thussu 2009, Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). There are, of course, exceptions (e.g., Voltmer 2006, Hallin and 
Mancini 2012) and the field of comparative political communication is expanding, but 
cross-national research in the developing world is still lacking.  
Political communication also remains largely detached from studies of 
comparative political behavior and even more so from studies of comparative 
institutions. This may be an artifact of any one or many of several factors: comparative 
political science has not traditionally included much about media; cross-national 
research requires language skills not all scholars have; data on media content is sparse 
outside of industrial democracies; methods in political communication have often 
focused on the content of individuals’ media consumption, which is resource-intensive 
to track; and variation in news consumption by country undoubtedly explains less 
variation in behavior than structural, economic or cultural differences between 
countries. But, as the world continues to globalize and the digital divide between the 
Global North and Global South closes, those previous impediments become more 
important to overcome, if scholars truly want to understand the role of media in 
developing countries.  
 
Outline for the dissertation 
In the next chapter, I present my general theory. I argue that consumers use 
reputation—which the public observes but about which it is not fully informed—as a 
12 
means to guide them toward media that either reinforces or challenges the status quo. A 
medium’s path-dependent reputation, earned over time, is sticky.13 Because some 
segments of the media are more dependent than others on government for their well-
being, this limits their ability to criticize the government. By extension, their readers, 
viewers or listeners are exposed to less change-oriented political information and, I 
argue, are therefore less likely to engage in change-oriented political activities. 
The third, fourth, and fifth chapters test this theory empirically. In Chapter 
Three, I detail the process by which I categorized media across the region. I describe all 
steps in this process and discuss the categorization of Mexican media in depth as an 
example. I then use data from the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey 
(WVS) to examine how media consumption impacts petitioning, boycotting, 
demonstrating and striking. Results show that the importance of news consumption is 
not the same for considering political action as for actually engaging in it.14 
Consumption of news from the Internet has a bigger impact on all forms of engagement 
than consuming news via television, newspaper or radio. However, there are no uniform 
effects across countries or across time. 
In Chapter Four, I use data from three waves of the AmericasBarometer to 
expand the analysis to more of Latin America and focus on one activity: protest. I 
examine where news consumption is associated with having protested. I find little 
relationship overall between the reputation of most media and consumers’ protesting, 
except in consumption of radio. Radio does register a relationship with protest, as it is 
                                                          
13 “Institutions are conservative with respect to change” (Taggart 2011). They are “sticky,” to use 
Fukuyama’s (2011) term: i.e., risk-averse, change-resistant. 
14 In other words, the decision between saying one would “never” do something and “might” do so is 
substantively different than the transition from “might” consider doing something to actually doing it. 
13 
positively and significantly associated with protesting in one-third of the countries in 
the region. That said, looking at up to three points in time for some countries, only in 
one country for one media platform is the impact of any media duplicated between 
survey waves. That inconsistency over time limits the inferences I can draw for most 
countries, as a significant finding at one point in time should carry no more weight than 
an insignificant finding for the same medium in the same country at another point in 
time. 
In Chapter Five, I present an extreme test of the theory. Most scholarship on 
political communication has been developed in the United States and Europe. I exploit 
an opportunity to field a new survey in a country unlike those areas: Bolivia. Using 
original data collected for this dissertation, I investigate whether media choice and vote 
choice might be linked in the hemisphere’s least developed Iberian nation. For the 2014 
presidential election and surprisingly for a country with a strong history of community 
radio, news consumption, even when disaggregated by platform, mattered little for vote 
choice. Given the paucity of research on media and politics in the world’s poorest 
countries, even a non-finding here adds to the body of knowledge about media and 
politics in the Global South.  
The sixth chapter concludes by examining the substantive implications from my 
three quantitative analyses.15 Overall, I find further support, in line with existing 
literature, that there is something special about consuming news on the Internet for 
participation. This supports my expectation that media that developed absent or 
contrary to government influence are associated with increased political behavior 
                                                          
15 There are also two appendices: the first details how each media platform in each country was coded; and 
the second is justification for modeling decisions in Chapter Five. 
14 
among the consumers of that media. I also find, across the board largely, that television 
news consumption does not matter for participation in Latin America. I show that 
different media in the same country are associated with different forms of political 
engagement; and that the same media platform in different countries can have different 
effects. Such nuance is currently missing from research looking at media, especially in 
the developing world, where merely overlaying theories and assumptions from 
industrialized democracies has been shown insufficient (de Albuquerque 2005). 
The next chapter draws heavily from economics and sociology. I present a new 






Chapter 2: THEORY 
Political communication scholars have long been interested in why people seek 
out the media content they do. Media choice, though, is a complex decision influenced 
by a multitude of factors. We know that partisanship, for example, guides some 
decisions (Iyengar and Kahn 2009), while available options in the media diet and 
technological development guide others (Basil 1990).16 We know that one medium 
rarely fully replaces another and that different mechanisms may be at work when 
decisions comparing different media platforms are made (Gaskins and Jerit 2012). 
Social scientists further know that such differences in media exposure and attentiveness 
affect a citizen’s successive choices (Eveland, Hutchens and Shen 2009; Iyengar et al 
1984; McCombs and Shaw 1972) and political knowledge (Aarts and Semetko 2003; 
Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). New insight into what guides media selection, then, 
should be of interest to scholars of both political communication and political behavior.  
This chapter introduces the theory in my dissertation. I draw from existing 
literature, which is largely based on television and newspapers in industrialized 
democracies, to showcase expectations and tie those back to institutional development. I 
then posit that different historical trajectories might yield different expectations. I 
contend that media reputation, earned over time, acts as a signal about how close a 
                                                          
16 The term “media diet” describes how people address media: Our available choices determine our 
outcomes. In the late 1970s, an overwhelming majority of Americans watched the evening news on the 
three broadcast networks, but the introduction of cable television in the 1980s saw those numbers quickly 
decline (Webster 2006, Prior 2007). If given the choice between news and entertainment, most people 
choose entertainment (Prior 2007). The same is true with news. To use an example widely 
understandable, captive audiences in airports used to have to watch CNN (Davis 2017). Given the choice, 
the persons who made up those airport audiences may have all preferred other things. But their available 
media diet was limited to CNN. In many gyms, there are a variety of televisions showing a mix of news, 
sports, music and ads; and gym-goers can plug in their headphones to hear whatever channel they want, 
among those available choices.  
16 
media entity is to government,17 thereby guiding consumers interested in news outside 
the mainstream toward media that promote ideas outside the status quo. Consumer 
decisions are manifested not just in media choice but also in increased participation in 
change-oriented political behaviors. 
 
The struggle for power 
To understand politics, we have to understand contention. All politics is, after all, 
a discussion about or struggle for recognition, rights, or some voice in decision-making 
(Machiavelli 1950, Marx 1973, Laswell 1936, Klandermans 1997). What represents 
contention and how citizens resolve contention have varied across space and time, but at 
the heart of political struggles is a disagreement between the status quo and those who 
benefit from it and those attempting to disrupt the status quo that does not benefit or 
sometimes even hurts them.18 
In the modern age, the most common means of resolving contention is voting.19 
But it is by no means the only way. Social scientists have been looking at non-voting 
behavior such as contacting a representative or volunteering on a political campaign in 
comparative contexts for over forty years (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978). After the civil 
rights revolution in the United States 1960s, the range of what was considered political 
engagement was amended to include unconventional or protest participation as well 
(Barnes, Kasse et al 1979). Voting may be an expression of a desire for change, and 
participation beyond voting is even more likely to be, as it is almost inherently change-
                                                          
17 I use the term “government” to signal the political class or elite, not any particular administration. 
18 “In every republic there are two parties, that of the nobles and that of the people; and all the laws that 
are favorable to liberty result from the opposition of these parties to each other” (Machiavelli 1950, 119) 
19 There are few countries in the world that do not hold at least some local elections (Lynch 2013, Tovrov 
2011). 
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motivated (van Stekelenburg 2015).20 For scholars of contentious politics, why people 
protest – a form of political performance – has been of particular interest (See van 
Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2013 for review). 
People tend to act within an accepted repertoire of political behaviors (Tilly 
1983). The available diet of political repertoires may vary by time or location; and there 
may be debate about whether aggregate engagement (which may take many forms) is 
increasing or decreasing (Putnam 2000, Dalton 2008, Dalton 2017); but there is some 
regularity in how citizens speak to their governments.  
Most political participation requires more than one person and, therefore, 
require information, coordination and mobilization. People require sometimes only 
contact to participate in low-cost and/or low-risk activities, but much more information 
and nudging to participate in higher threshold activities (McAdam 1984 and Briet, 
Klandermans and Kroon 1987, both cited in Klandermans 1986, McAdam 1986). Simple 
issues, like where and when to assemble, are critical to any public political event 
(Valenzuela 2013, 925), and modern communications allow for more expedient 
negotiations among participants about what form any public protests should take 
(Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Encouragement from acquaintances and via social 
networks has repeatedly been shown to be an important motivating factor in 
participation (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt 1998, McClurg 2003, Opp and Gern 1993).  
Not all information about politics is passed interpersonally. The news media is an 
important conduit of information as well, since most people will never interact with 
                                                          
20 People of course express commitment to the status quo at times, but presumably only when the issue 
has become a topic of contention or matter on the public agenda (Schulz 2017). 
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their representatives or political campaigns directly (Lippmann 1922).21 When given the 
choice, people tend to consume a media diet that aligns with pre-existing beliefs 
(Chaffee and Miyo 1983, Gaskins and Jerit 2012, Stroud 2008, Stroud 2010, Knobloch-
Westerwick and Meng 2009).22 That choice is guided by what they know about the 
options in their available media diet. 
Given the dual realities that information is important to spur any action and that 
people gravitate toward information they want to hear, access to information that 
challenges the status quo should, therefore, increase political participation in change-
oriented events.23 But exposure to such information will not depend on personal factors, 
but rather on the available media diet from which consumers choose. Consumers know 
what aligns with their existing beliefs, in part, because of the reputations of various 
media earned over time.24 
 
                                                          
21 News media is not one thing.  For the purposes of this dissertation, I limit discussion to news media that 
transmits political news, the type of media that would help someone learn about the goings-on of her 
country. Such news may follow a broadcast or niche business model and could, theoretically, be soft news. 
But I exempt non-political news, for example about sports, celebrities, health, etc. Variation in news is 
considered at the level of news media platform: newspapers, radio, television and Internet. 
22 That said, the available media diet may not be – likely is not – equal across space and time. News 
consumers must choose from available options before them. In some countries, that will be a partisan 
press, in others a publicly-funded television station with public service responsibilities, in others a 
market-oriented system in which news organizations struggle to stay alive. Most likely, media 
environments will be hybrid mixes. There is no guarantee that a citizen’s preferred option will even exist 
in a given locale. For example, a progressive or liberal in the United States will be hard-pressed to find 
many talk radio options that mirror her political stances available to her without paying for satellite radio 
(Weinger 2013). 
23 This assumes the presence of an alternative press as well as consumers opting to partake of it. 
24 Once satisfied with an outlet, consumers may, of course, cease to search out further alternatives. That 
could mean that there exists new media one is not consuming that would better suit her preferences. 
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Media is an institution 
“Political science has never extended to the news media the lovingly 
detailed attention it has lavished on legislatures, parties, presidents, and 
prime ministers. Journalism is a constituent of political life that political 
science for the most part has neglected” (Schudson 2002, 249). 
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society… that shape human 
interaction” (North 1990, 3). Institutions25 provide the context within which political 
decisions are made, effectively limiting what citizens consider possible and leading them 
to behave in predictably different ways in different institutional settings (Jackman 
1987). Institutional variation has been correlated with systematic variation in turnout 
(Powell 1986), satisfaction or belief in democracy (Anderson and Guillory 1997), and 
personal happiness or contentment (Frey and Stutzer 2000).26  
Given that definition, media is an institution, despite the relatively small role it 
plays in political science. The media “has its own degree of autonomy, its own 
institutional values, which differ from the agendas of politicians” (Kaplan 2006, 176) 
and exhibits longevity. It has power27 (van Dijk 1995).28 It therefore fits the definition of 
an institution, despite not being codified29 or bound by the same rules everywhere. The 
                                                          
25 When codified institutions are considered formal. When accepted as normal but not written down, they 
are regarded as informal institutions. See Helme and Levitsky (2004) for an overview of informal 
institutions in political science. 
26 For examples of some of the institutions for which history has been shown to impact modern output, 
see Bates et al (1998). For examples in political economy, see the Varieties of Capitalism literature that 
grew out of Hall and Soskice (2001). 
27 Van Dijk defines “power” as: “Thus, social power here will be summarily defined as a social relation 
between groups or institutions, involving the control by a (more) powerful group or institution (and its 
0members) of the actions and the minds of (the members) a less powerful group. Such power generally 
presupposes privileged access to socially valued resources, such as force, wealth, income, knowledge, or 
status” (1995, 10). Van Dijk (1989) separately notes though that there are many disagreements about the 
definition of power in various literatures. 
28 “For an analysis of the power of the media … in relation to other elite institutions, see Altheide (1985), 
Altschull (1984), Bagdikian (1983), Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter (1990), Paletz and Entman (1981), 
among many other studies” (van Dijk 1995, 30).  
29 To give another example, a recent political science textbook referred to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
fireside chats as an example of an “informal institution” in American politics (Kernell, Jacobson, Kousser 
& Vavreck 2016). 
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nickname given to the media across many countries – as the fourth estate30 or fourth 
branch of government – provides further anecdotal evidence for media’s being 
considered as an institution. Variation in the role news plays an institution may, 
therefore, be manifested in citizen behavior in a comparative context. Any such 
variation would depend on institutional development, addressed in the next section.  
 
Institutions & reputation 
Because contention is ultimately about challenges to the status quo, it is 
important to consider how the status quo came to be. Some scholars in political 
communication have already done this (Cook 1998, Schudson 1998, Sparrow 1999), 
though only for the United States and focusing on contemporary media. But, given the 
aforementioned definitions, since institutions condition or constrain the lives of the 
citizens living under them, different media configurations could beget markedly 
different patterns in behavior over long periods of time.  
For this reason, comparative political science takes a much longer view of 
institutions, having come to the consensus in the literature that the current shape of any 
institution is the result of its development over time. Put another way, outcomes in the 
present are conditioned by previous decisions made, that is, the path that an institution 
                                                          
30 “The term ‘fourth estate’ has been used to refer to the press since at least the early 1800s. The idea of 
the fourth estate has a long history, parallel with that of the democratization of political processes, with 
its origins in the European Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The origin of the term is 
attributed to the eighteenth-century English political philosopher and commentator on the Revolution, 
Edmund Burke, referring to the three sections of the French Estates-General, an assembly consisting of 
representatives from the clergy, the nobility, and the commoners (in practice, the bourgeoisie), whose 
gathering in 1789 is said to have paved the way for the French Revolution. [The term] has become 
shorthand to denote the role of the public media as a pillar on which the smooth functioning of a 
democratic society rests, together with the other three estates – legislative, executive, and judiciary. A 
free press is also a counterbalance to these powers, a watchdog guarding the public interest, and 
providing a forum for public debate – a public sphere – that underpins the processes of democracy” 
(Thussu 2008). 
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took to result in its current form (Levi 1997, Pierson 2000, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
An institutionalist approach acknowledges that local adaptation is almost inevitable, 
thus potentially leading seemingly initially similar institutions on divergent paths 
(March and Olson 2011).31  
For news, this means that we cannot only look at the modern news as it is but 
must consider its evolution within any place and relative to other institutions. With 
regard to media, “an institutional approach suggests that the news media’s political role 
may differ across media systems” (Allern and Blach-Ørsten 2011, 92). 
In economics, reputation is the summation of any firm’s past actions (Kreps and 
Wilson 1980, Rosenthal and Landau 1979, Fombrun 2012). The economic definition of 
the term comes quite close to the common usage (Noe 2012, 130).32 To employ the most 
widely used definition, a reputation is an estimation of a thing (Mahon 2002) or 
signaling device imperfectly informed by the past used to estimate likely future behavior 
(Foreman, Whetten and Mackey 2012; Noe 2012).33  
The formation of reputation plays out much like a repeated game in which an 
agent with limited information comes to understand another entity to be something 
(Cabral 2005, 3 emphasis in original). Whereas trust or legitimacy are reciprocal and 
                                                          
31 “Once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will be 
other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal 
of the initial choice. Perhaps the better metaphor is a tree, rather than a path. From the same trunk, there 
are many different branches and smaller branches. Although it is possible to turn around or to clamber 
from one to the other – and essential if the chosen branch dies – the branch on which a climber begins is 
the one she tends to follow” (Levi 1997, 28). 
32 Focusing on institutions, reputation is the “public’s cumulative judgements of firms over time” 
(Rindova et al 2005, 1036) or “a global impression which represents how a collective … perceive a firm” 
(Rindova et al 2005, 1033). Reputation is a screening strategy audiences employ (Weiglet and Camerer 
1988) informed by an organization’s “performance, actions, demographics, affiliations, and industry” 
(Lange, Lee and Dai 2011, 177).  
33 See Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty (2006) for overview of the definitions of “reputation” in economic 
literature.  
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better informed (because the parties in any transaction have access to information about 
said transaction), reputation is observed from afar and Bayesian (Cabral 2005).34 
Central banks, parliaments, tribal councils or any other institutions35 develop a 
reputation from past behavior that observers use as an indication of likely future 
behavior and as a screen or signal about trustworthiness or other traits.  
Lange, Lee and Dai write that a positive reputation allows firms to charge higher 
prices, to get better applicants or workers, and even to improve their return on 
investment (ROI) (2011, 169). They further contend that “a good reputation may also 
lead perceivers to give organizations the benefit of the doubt when new negative 
information comes to light” (2011, 169). A positive reputation, therefore, has intrinsic 
value to a firm and, once earned, is resistant to change. Put in terms often used for 
institutions, reputation is sticky. Critical to reputation is this distinction: participants in 
any transaction work on building trust or legitimacy with each other; but observers, who 
do not observe the details of the transaction, must rely on reputation. 
 
Media, government and the status quo 
 One critical factor in any media entity’s reputation is its relationship with 
government. Two factors have been shown by scholars of political communication as 
generating a status quo bias among mainstream media: 
                                                          
34 Cabral notes the distinction this way:  
“• Trust. This is the situation ‘when agents expect a particular agent to do something.’ Typical models 
feature moral hazard. The essence of the mechanism is repetition and the possibility of ‘punishing’ off-the 
equilibrium actions.  
“• Reputation: This is the situation ‘when agents believe a particular agent to be something.’ Typical 
models feature adverse selection. The essence of the mechanism is Bayesian updating and possibly 
signaling as well” (2005, 3, emphasis in original) 
35 International relations scholars have debated the utility of reputation in geopolitics, but many 
definitions are similar in focusing on a country’s past diplomatic actions (Guisinger and Smith 2002). 
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1. Proximity to power means that elite stances are most likely to make news 
(Bennett); and 
2. Objectivity is a defensive mechanism employed by journalists for self-
protection (Tuchman 1972, 1978), but “effectively functioned as a subterfuge 
for advocacy for status quo policies and ideologies” (Waisbord 2009, 373) 
 
To unpack these ideas, first, in general, journalists follow events (Sigal 1973). Put 
another way, elite ideas flow through the media to the people (Zaller 1992). The theories 
of indexing36 (Bennett 1990), cascading activation37 (Entman 2004) and the Politics-
Media-Politics38 model (Wolfsfeld 2004) all state that journalists’ presentation of events 
grows out of official positions. In other words, “the news media mostly focus on what 
elites are saying and doing and they record it. If neither the government nor the 
opposition is talking about an issue, even an important issue, the news media will 
likewise, simply ignore it” (Wolfsfeld 2011, 10). Simply put, for much general news 
media, a head of state has a good chance of making news if she wants, but a person on 
the street clamoring for attention, even about an important topic39, has much less 
chance.  
                                                          
36 “Mass media news professionals, from the boardroom to the beat, tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and 
viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in mainstream 
government debate about a given topic … ‘other’ (i.e., non-official) voices filling out the potential universe 
of news sources are included in news stories and editorials when those voices express opinions already 
emerging in official circles” (Bennett 1990, 106). 
37 Cascading activation holds that, while elites will dominate how news starts, media interpretations 
(frames) may impact how elites at different levels address a story as it evolves.  
38 The PMP model gives journalists a more active role in the evolution of the political process: “The role of 
the media in political processes can best be understood as a cycle in which variations in the political 
environment lead to variations in media conduct that, in turn, lead to further variations in the political 
environment” (Wolfsfeld 2013, 1)  
39 To employ two recent examples, Syria’s civil war started in March 2011 (“Syrian civil war timeline” 
2016), but the war has been largely out of the news except in cases of photos sparking human interest 
stories, specifically of one boy drowned on a beach (Bloch 2015) and another boy covered in dust 
following a bombing (Narayan 2016). The emotional impact of these images, the rarity of conversations 
about children in war, and the audiences’ ability to relate as parents to children in danger combined 
rendered the stories newsworthy. But the issue then disappeared from news coverage in the United States 
and other places where the topic was not on the elite or public agenda. 
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This unintentional favoritism of elites becomes especially true in cases in which 
markets are deregulated or in which oligopolies control media. “The higher the degree of 
concentration the more the power in the market is shifted from the consumer to the 
producer” (McChesney 2003, 131). The positive externalities of mass media (Baker 
2002) are one reason why ownership patterns have been of such concern to social 
scientists (e.g., Gilens and Hertzman 2000) – if elite voices are privileged, then elites in 
power have incentive to squash stories about themselves or which they deem negative to 
them or their interests.40 And competition tends to foster better journalism (Coulson 
and Lacy 1996). But news organizations close to or dependent on government may 
downplay evidence that contradicts a government’s narrative (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence 
and Livingston 2006). The combination of privileging elite narratives and potentially 
downplaying discordant information about the government leads to a dominant or 
mainstream narrative that privileges the status quo (Waisbord 2000, Nichols and 
McChesney 2013). 
Journalists may also unwittingly promote status quo values over change for other 
reasons. Journalists may support the status quo to promote stability in less consolidated 
democracies (El-Issawi 2016, 23). Everywhere, journalists are in the business of 
information and therefore rely on sources. Giving up a source – aka burning a source in 
the case of confidential sources – is costly (Rosen 2005). It affects a reporter’s 
reputation and her ability to do her job in the future.41 Since reporters cannot do their 
                                                          
40 See Schwartz (2017) for a recent example of Murdoch-owned entities allegedly engaging in such 
framing manipulation. 
41 Contrary to popular belief, in many places, there is no legal protection for sources. In the United States, 
this has been the case since Branzburg v. Hayes was heard by the Supreme Courtin 1972. Journalists can 
be compelled to reveal sources if the government can “‘convincingly show a substantial relation between 
the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.’ In other words, it’s a 
balance, and the government needs to have a good reason to force journalists to cough up their notes or 
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jobs without information, which comes from sources, reporters necessarily must protect 
those relationships, which means not publishing anything that might endanger sources 
or their willingness to keep talking with reporters. 
This reality that journalists are human beings in need of a paycheck buttresses 
elite bias to induce mainstream media to favor the status quo. Tuchman (1972) referred 
to the idea of news objectivity as a “strategic ritual.” Reporters working and advancing 
as journalists come to know what their editors and colleagues will consider 
“newsworthy.” They also know they can get sued. So, reporters employ quotation marks 
as protections of their own objectivity and generally present at least two sides to an 
issue. This is not objectivity42 though, as Tuchman details. Rather, it is self-protection43 
that keeps out many voices on the extreme.44 It may even, as in the case of climate 
                                                          
sources. Because case law has not been particularly strong, many states have passed shield laws to provide 
further protections for journalists” (“Shield Law 101: Frequently Asked Questions”). A famous relatively 
recent case involved New York Times reporter Judith Miller, who was jailed for contempt of court for 
almost three months for refusing to release her source (Liptak 2005, Schmidt and VandeHei 2005). See 
Peters (2016) for more detail on the US situation. See Ponsford and Turvill (2015) and Ling (2015) for 
information about the United Kingdom and Canada, respectively, neither of which protects journalists’ 
privilege. 
42 Tuchman does not condemn objectivity, per se, but rather points out that journalistic professionalism 
and industry norms are not the same as objectivity in the way the mass public might understand it. 
“Communications research has… thoroughly demolished the idea that news is or can be ‘value free.’ The 
canons of bland, ‘objective’ reporting are perfectly consistent with the selection of quotes and facts, the 
framing of interpretations, and the attribution of importance (through repeated front page headlines, for 
example), all so as to support or oppose a particular policy position … Curiously, however, many 
communications researchers tend to resist the possibility that the values conveyed in news stories might 
tend systematically to reflect the policy preferences of media organizations themselves. Scholars seem 
particularly skeptical of the idea that multiple news stories, written at different times by different 
(presumably independent) reporters, and based on different sources, could share a common political 
thrust, or that the ‘wall of separation’ between news and editorial departments could somehow be 
breached so that news stories would tend to mirror editorial views” (Page 1996, 21). 
43 There are also physical security issues that endanger many journalists. In the Americas, for example, 
“Corruption, impunity, cyber-surveillance and government violence – violations of freedom of 
information take many different forms in this vast region. Mexican, Honduran, Colomb-ian and Brazilian 
journalists sometimes pay with their lives for investigating drug trafficking or corruption. Cuban and 
Venezuelan journalists are under constant pressure from governments that use all possible means to 
censor independent media outlets. Journalists in the United States cannot freely cover stories linked to 
surveillance or espionage” (Reporters Without Borders 2017). 
44 Reliance on advertising-based business models led newspapers and network television to cater to 
mainstream or media consumers, under the guise of objectivity (Schudson and Tifft 2005).  
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change, a topic on which 97% of scientists agree exists, create a false dichotomy that 
distorts public discussion (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). 
Geography and deadlines also play roles in making a status quo narrative 
dominant. Reporters have to go where the news is; so many tend to cluster around 
police stations, campaigns, government offices, and other locales where they are likely 
to hear about news, known as beats (Tuchman 1978). Issue specialization – like a 
science “beat” – happens, but it does not generate the bulk of news reporting. This 
means that journalists’ routines create an implicit bias against topics that are off of their 
normal radars (Cook 1998, 89). 
In short, there is political, economic and sociological research that supports the 
idea that mass media will tend to support status quo ideas, albeit sometimes 
unintentionally. This is commonly referred to in the literature as status quo bias 
(Altheide 1984, Breed 1955, Reese and Ballinger 2001). A common example of status 
quo bias is whether news organizations frame protests as free speech or as disruptive. 
Similarly, framing hate speech as dangerous is quite different than framing it as a free 
speech. The tendency to treat protests as rare and/or disruptive and hate speech as 
dangerous is one manifestation of status quo bias in media.  
It is important to point out that status quo bias does not equate to alignment with 
any particular administration, but rather with life continuing to function normally 
without disruption. As shown by the figures in the previous chapter and as will be 
detailed in the next chapter and in Appendix A, administrations on the left and right 
often employ the same types of pressures – carrots and sticks – with the media. Such 
economic pressures and the professionalization of journalism (Tuchman 1972, 1978), as 
well as long-established journalistic norms (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007) that would 
27 
seemingly be the product of path dependence, work together to limit the space within 
which most media operate. I use status quo bias in that sense in this dissertation. 
The aforementioned research is based overwhelmingly on newspapers and 
television, two industries (in Western industrialized democracies) subject to 
government regulation, with high visibility, and with higher barriers to entry and 
overhead costs. News media entities experiencing different realities, such as being less 
reliant on elite sources or less subject to elite critiques, should have different 
relationships with government and, therefore, different reputations for their willingness 
to criticize the status quo.45 Put another way, news media that did not co-evolve with 
government under similar circumstances might have earned very different reputations 
over time.  
 
The links between media consumption and behavior 
Existing scholarly literature is mixed about which media impact behavior, as well 
as why and how they do: Early political communication found no effects from media 
consumption, the “minimal effects” model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; 
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954); but scholarship in the 1980 and 1990s found 
important, though, indirect effects. Namely, media tell people what to think about and 
shape how people think about politics (Erbring, Goldenberg Miller 1980; McLeod and 
McDonald 1985; Iyengar 1994; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 
1982).  
                                                          
45 The journal Media History dedicated a special issue (2001, volume 7:2) to case studies of alternative 
media, including the Black Panther newsletter and photojournalism that pushed boundaries.  
28 
 Bakker and de Vreese (2011) find that Internet news consumption stimulates 
political engagement more than traditional media consumption (newspapers and 
television), but that all have some positive association with active or passive online or 
offline engagement. Other scholars find that Internet news consumption spurs 
discussion (Shah et al 2005)46 or increases the likelihood of caring about the news 
(Salzman 201147), which only then spurs engagement. In the past decade, the consensus 
in political communication literature is that news consumption via Internet stimulates 
political engagement48, but the “why” and “how” remain much less clear. (See Gibson 
and Cantijoch 2013 for review.) 
Norris & Inglehart (2009) provide the most detailed analysis of the relationship 
between mass media consumption and political participation – finding support for a 
positive atomized association between the two (meaning that overall, worldwide, at the 
individual level, there is a generally positive relationship between increased news 
consumption and increased participation – but point out that large-n analyses generally 
fail to account sufficiently for institutional variation when considering the correlations 
between freedom of the press and economic growth and freedom of the press and 
democratic attitudes (2009, 240). They also note the importance of testing whether or 
not there is a positive association between media consumption and various types of 
political and civic engagement in countries that are not industrialized democracies 
(2009, 243).49  
                                                          
46 They employ an auto-regressive model allowing for greater inference about causality.  
47 Salzman (2011) uses political knowledge and news consumption to predict political interest, contrary to 
the abundance of literature that considers political interest to be a prerequisite for news consumption 
(Prior 2005, Strömbäck and Shehata 2010, Van Deth and Elff 2004). 
48 See Boulianne (2009) for meta-analysis showing this 
49 Norris and Inglehart call for expanding the territory over which media effects are tested, in part, 
because they find a greater association between news consumption and various types of engagement in 
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Increased news consumption across different media platforms, with the 
exception of consuming television news, is generally expected to increase civic and 
political participation, at least in industrialized democracies. Exposure both to more 
news and to more clearly political news content increases knowledge and propensity to 
participate, but especially among those already likely to vote (de Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2006, Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster 2010). Some social scientists have 
also observed differences in participation by media platform but suggest such 
differences might be the result of an unobserved variable, such as content (Newton 
1999, Molyneux 2017). 
From an institutional perspective, these findings all assume the presence of a 
generally free press50 and comparability of content or presentation across platforms. But 
there is no guarantee that the same media platforms in different countries are 
functionally equivalent. Distinguishing merely between the majoritarian and consensus 
models of democracy (Lipjhart 1999) would likely mask heterogeneity, as would 
distinguishing democracies from non-democracies (Przeworski et al 2000), as they are 
blunt, black-and-white distinctions. In just the examples in the articles cited so far in 
this chapter, there is a mix of presidential republics, parliamentary republics, 
constitutional monarchies, and a military junta. The countries also show variation in 
human development, from medium to very high (UNDP), and in the amount of 
freedoms enjoyed (Freedom House)51. In all the countries, there is at least some private 
                                                          
cosmopolitan (developed) countries than they do in parochial (traditional or still developing) countries 
(2009, 252); but their analyses do not account for government-level variation beyond dichotomous 
cosmopolitan/parochial coding (2009, 158). 
50 According to Freedom House, the US, Canada, and most of Western industrialized Europe qualify as 
“free” press, with only Italy scoring as “partly free” (Freedom House 2017). 
51 Denmark scores 98 out of a possible 100 on aggregate freedoms, whilst Vietnam scores 20.  
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media, but the countries range in ease of doing business from 3 to 187 out of 190 (World 
Bank).52 A theory not reliant on freedom of the press or a modal institutional 
arrangement should be more applicable widely. A theory that could be used to 
interrogate the relationship between media and behavior at different levels of analysis –
platforms, outlets, groupings – would be more useful. 
 
How to disaggregate media 
As stated previously, the news media is not a monolith. Scholars have noted a 
variety of differences: Publicly-funded news vs free-market businesses; so-called hard 
news vs soft news53; broadcasting vs narrowcasting54 or niche marketing; and recently 
one-way news vs personalized or algorithmic ordering of headlines.55 Different media 
also specialize in different types of news, with magazines, for example, forgoing 
breaking stories in favor of longer-form analysis. In multilingual, rural or tribal areas, 
radio stations broadcast translations of urban newspapers into indigenous or otherwise 
lesser-used languages, thereby expanding the reach of information to populations not 
initially served by that newspaper. Though the “elite press” that focuses on politics has 
been of most interest to scholars of political communication (Pool, Laswell & Lerner 
                                                          
52 Venezuela is near the bottom of the ease of doing business list at 187 out of 189 (World Bank). 
53 Baum defines soft news as “as a set of story characteristics, including the absence of a public policy 
component, sensationalized presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject 
matter, such as crime and disaster” (2002, 92). 
54 Broadcasting is directed toward the masses, exemplified by 1960s network news; but narrowcasting 
involves targeting communiques to specific groups, for example talk radio or cable news in the United 
States (Lilleker 2006, 46-48). 
55 Google News Help section, for example, states the distinction between its “Editors’ Picks” section, which 
has one order to it, and its “Suggested for you” section, based all past web activity, including that not 
related to news. https://support.google.com/news/answer/40213?hl=en (August 24, 2017). Forty-four 
percent of Americans used Facebook for some kind of news in 2015 (Matsa and Lu 2016). Facebook 
orders items based on a proprietary and regularly-altered algorithm that it does not share with the public, 
only noting that it prioritizes based on what the user should find most interesting (Oremus 2016). 
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1955), evidence suggests that the means of reporting and expectations between media 
platforms continue to differ widely (Reich 2016).  
From a comparative institutional perspective though, those differences may not 
be the items of interest. What would matter more is whether the role that mass media 
regularly plays is comparable across borders, a concept known as functional 
equivalence. “Functional equivalence stresses the relevance of relationships instead of 
intrinsic properties of concepts … Functional equivalence refers to the requirement that 
concepts should be related to other concepts in other settings in more or less the same 
way. It is based on the notion that comparability … is an attribute of elements’ 
relationships” (van Deth 2009, 91-91). In other words, what is the relationship of a 
medium with the political class and polity? 
The classic example used to explain functional equivalence56 is the Ministry of 
the Interior, often charged with policing, national security, elections, immigration, and 
relations with states. The US Department of the Interior has a similar name but very 
different role (land management) and is not comparable to other Interior ministries. 
Similarly, the Home Ministry in one country may fulfill the traditional roles of the 
Interior Ministry, despite a different name or appearance. Depending on the size of the 
country, the roles may be broken into different ministries that cumulatively would be 
compared with the singular Interior Ministry in another country. 
                                                          
56 Political communication has employed the same term – functional equivalence – extensively in looking 
at media substitution. By that definition, “functional equivalence predicts, ‘as new media come along that 
better serve a particular function, the use of the previously dominant medium that served that function 
declines’ (Neuman, 2010, p. 12). Adding to that description, ‘functional equivalence of news media is 
defined as providing the same gratifications and gratification opportunities and as providing the same 
types of content’ (van der Wurff, 2010, p. 140). Taken together, this theory means that a new technology 
that serves the same functions as an older technology, only better, will dominate” (McIntyre 2014, 9). I 
use the term in the comparative institutional way. 
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In a review article, Wirth and Kolb summarized the importance and difficulty 
related to functional equivalence well when they said that “neither equivalence nor its 
absence can ever be presumed” when comparing communications institutions (2004, 
88). I opt not to necessarily compare television in one country versus television in 
another, but rather to trace the histories of different media entities and classify them as 
aligned with or more distanced from government, thereby allowing for greater 
heterogeneity than merely comparing platforms would do. For example, scholars have 
argued that broadsheet newspapers in the United States serve much the same function 
as public television news in Scandinavia, with which public television news in the United 
States is not comparable (e.g., Curran et al 2007). 
 
Status quo = pro-government 
Functional equivalence is how status quo bias enters into the discussion of media 
and its role in society. If reputation is a signal to consumers, harkening back to 
consumer goods, then reputation interacts with the product being offered to determine 
purchase intention (Yoon, Guffey and Kijewski 1993). But consumers are only one 
market. Any organization also has a reputation with its investors or other stakeholders 
as well. And “the firm’s reputation in one market is linked to its reputation in the other” 
(Noe 2012, 131).57 To draw the analogy to news, if media are repute for being close to 
politicians (one of their markets), that could affect the media’s reputation with its 
consumers (another market).58  
                                                          
57 To give one example, until the mid-1970s, French radio and television “were controlled by the state and 
thus both in fact and in the eyes of the public and other journalists were more a part of the political field 
than of the journalistic field” (Benson 1999, 470). 
58 Or vice versa. Media repute as celebrity or gossip news – for example TMZ – are less likely to be taken 
seriously outside of those circles and therefore, in the case of politics, less likely be granted press 
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 If proximity to power leads to lower likelihood to criticize the status quo, then 
less proximity to power could correlate with greater likelihood of criticizing the status 
quo. Thinking of the relative audience for news media, there may be a segment of the 
public interested in information outside the status quo. In terms of reputation, 
consumers interested in narratives (or “frames”)59 that challenge mainstream 
interpretation of events60 would then gravitate toward media reputed that is less close to 
or more likely to criticize government or its versions of events.61  
To summarize, people engage politically for many reasons, one of which is 
news consumption. But news is not monolithic. There is no guarantee that media 
that look alike – aka newspapers – fulfill the same role across borders. Media 
outlets’ willingness to criticize government – its level of status quo bias – is one 
indication of its closeness to government and is observed by consumers, 
regardless of locale. Citizens use reputation as one signal of news content. If they 
are displeased with the status quo, they are more likely to consume news critical 
of the status quo. A measure utilizing reputation as a criterion may allow for 
better cross-national analysis. 
Merely hearing news outside the status quo is not itself of political interest. This 
topic should be of interest to comparative political science because that news 
                                                          
credentials for political event, even though such outlets, like TMZ, may operate bureaus focusing on the 
political class (Newton-Small 2009).  
59 Framing is how news is contextualized (Entman 1991). “The way in which events are covered and 
presented to each audience can lead to a dominant perception emerging” (Lilleker 2006, 82). 
60 Gainous, Wagner and Abbott (2015) suggest that it is the greater availability of dissonant information 
on the Internet that begets the association they find between more frequent use of the Internet and 
negative attitudes, civil disobedience, and unconventional participation in East Asia. Gainous, Wagner 
and Gray (2016) found that social media use had a negative influence on citizen attitudes because ICT 
increases exposure to dissonant information.  
61 After all, few news consumers are aware of the actual ownership of various news outlets. But consumers 
are aware of the reputations those media entities earn. For an example of an analyst trying to connect 
media ownership to content output for a mass audience, see “Sinclair Broadcast Group.” 
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consumption then impacts their propensity to participate politically. Citizens, 
understanding that a given media entity is reputed to produce content critical of the 
government or status quo, select platforms that conform to their own beliefs about 
changes necessary to the economic and political status quo. Individuals who prefer 
dominant media should be less likely to engage in anti-governmental activity of any 
kind, as their preferred content will reinforce the status quo (Herman and Chomsky 
2002) or focus on less political news (Prior 2003). In hearing news outside of the status 
quo or mainstream, news consumers are relatively more likely to engage in change-
oriented political behavior than consumers of news that reinforces the status quo. 
Two hypotheses about the behavior of news consumers then emerge: 
H1:  People consuming media less aligned with the status quo will be more 
likely to engage in behaviors challenging the status quo 
H2:  People consuming media aligned with the status quo will be less likely to 
engage in behaviors challenging the status quo 
 
Methodological notes 
Bridging the existing divide between comparative politics and political 
communication requires looking outside the subset of countries largely addressed by 
comparative media scholarship. Political behavior scholars conducting research on post-
Communist, Latin American and Pan-Asian areas have shown that assumptions and/or 
findings from industrialized democracies do not nearly overlay in other places.62 
Scholars have also found that issues highly salient in one locale may not be at all in a 
culturally-similar but nonetheless distinct area (e.g., Posner 2004). The greater the 
                                                          
62 To give two examples: Compulsory voting, as is mandated in Australia and most of Latin America 
immediately changes the standard calculus of voting (Power and Roberts 2007); and where communal 
values override individual values, commonly used phrases such as “public opinion” take on different 
meaning (Cho 2000).   
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breadth of political engagement studied, the richer the picture becomes, but the more 
care that is needed at the outset to avoid problems of over-reaching (Mahoney 2000). 
Western, educated, industrialized, rich democracies (WEIRD) are not representative of 
most of the world’s population, after all; and expectations about human behavior drawn 
from WEIRD countries do not hold when tested elsewhere (Henrich, Heine and 
Norenzayan 2010).  
Most of the aforementioned research depends on content analysis or 
experiments. As political communication moves into areas in which content analysis is 
more difficult or, in some places, not feasible, political communication needs a way to 
theoretically explain the relationships between consumption and behavior that scholars 
might observe. After all, a void of high-quality data like surveys offered in advanced 
industrialized democracies does not mean there are not questions of scholarly interest 
that need asking.   
This dissertation focuses on one reason for media consumption that might be 
particularly important in some areas of the world and offers a methodological work-
around for content analysis. I offer a rigorous alternative utilizing available data that can 
engage with the question of how media consumption has an impact on behavior now 
while scholars wait for better quantitative data to catch up.  
The next chapter of the dissertation engages with the question empirically. I 
detail the operationalization of the classification scheme that I employ to translate 
media history and journalism studies into codable characteristics that can be included in 
statistical analyses of behavior.  
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Chapter 3: FIRST QUANTITATIVE TEST 
As discussed in the previous chapter, existing literature about the sociology of 
news suggests that news production gives greater weight to sources and perspectives 
from the economically or politically powerful. Because these sources have benefited 
from the status quo, they are also unlikely to signal to the public about problems within 
the status quo.  
Some outlets do challenge the status quo.63 However, these diverse voices do not 
exist equally across all media platforms.64 The historical and institutional development 
of the platforms create space for, or inhibit, the ability to challenge the status quo. 
Media platforms develop reputations about their willingness to counter government or 
economic interests. These reputations provide one means by which consumers select 
from the available media diet in any locale.  
I posited in the previous chapter that civic engagement increases among those 
who consume news from outlets reputed to be more likely to carry content challenging 
the existing order. The crux of that argument lies in connecting media reputation for 
non-mainstream views to the behavioral outcomes of each media platform’s consumers. 
In this chapter, I employ a mix of data to link reputation to behavioral outcomes via a 
two-step process: 
                                                          
63 One common example of this is news framing of a protest as a free speech issue or a public safety issue 
(Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson, Clawson and Oxley 1997). For both the 2009 European elections 
and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street protests, framing was significantly different, depending on the media 
platform (Schuck et al 2013; DeLuca, Lawson and Sun 2012). Even within the same platform, in large 
enough countries, there may be variations in framing; Fox News and MSNBC in the United States are a 
common example of this (e.g., Feldman et al 2012). 
64 Depending on the media system, there may either be internal or external diversity of voice. Media 
sometimes cater to a smaller segment of the audience, resulting in greater external diversity of voice but 
relatively less internal diversity of voice on any one channel (Bae 2000). 
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First, I associate the individual media platforms in each country with a specific 
reputation. Because there currently exists no classification system for reputation that 
looks directly at the historical interplay between media and government, I construct a 
categorization scheme to quantify reputation, an abstract concept. To accomplish this, I 
borrow from the study of other institutions65, to classify the institutions of news media 
based on their historical interactions with government. This process ultimately results 
in a three-category classification scheme: news platforms in each country are 
categorized as either close to government (status quo-enforcing), far from government 
influence (status quo-disrupting), or there was insufficient information to have an 
expectation in either direction.   
Second, I evaluate whether consumption of news via different media platforms is 
differently associated with different forms of political participation, as theorized in the 
previous chapter. I conduct data analysis on cross-country data available from the fifth 
and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. Specifically, I investigate the association 
between media consumption and signing petitions, boycotting, peacefully 
demonstrating and protesting.  
 
Reputation as Proxy 
Bromley defines reputation “as the way key external stakeholder groups or other 
interested parties actually conceptualize the organization” (2000, 241). With respect to 
media organizations, reputation is the general impression that the public has of the 
                                                          
65 See Bernhard (1998) for an example of categorization and characterization of central banks. See 
Przeworski et al (2000) and Elkins (2000) for differing perspectives on how to categorize democracies -
and non-democracies.  
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interaction between the government and any medium.66 Whether a medium seems 
subservient to the government is one indication of the probability that the medium may 
provide non-state views in its news coverage. Observers with incomplete information 
about how news is made and want to choose news that conforms to their expectations 
may use this impression as one shortcut when making decisions about which media to 
consume.67  
The classification scheme separates media platforms into three orientations 
based on their historic interactions with government. Media can have a close (status 
quo-enforcing) or distant (potentially status quo-disrupting) relationship with 
government. A third category with a null coding was assigned to platforms for which 
insufficient or contradictory information was available from secondary sources. This is 
ultimately a conservative test, but therein a reasonable first step in an endeavor to 
bridge quantitative political communication with comparative politics without the 
resource and language requirements inherent in content analysis. 
 
                                                          
66 Comparing outlets within any medium is common in high-choice media markets, including many 
industrialized democracies. But, as Prior (2007) showed, differences between outlets (TV channels) on 
one platform (broadcast television) pale in comparison to differences between the platforms of broadcast 
TV and cable news. Similar differences in content have been shown between newspapers and television 
news (e.g., Curran et al 2007). As such, especially in the United States, though differences between media 
outlets may be visible and salient to contemporary political conversation and a common focus for 
scholarly comparison, from a more global perspective, a higher level of analysis allows for macro-level 
cross-national comparison.  
67 This is not to discount the possibility of different outlets within the same platform having different 
reputations in some situations, especially in larger countries. Media specialists especially know, for 
example, that, in the US, CBS broadcast news carries more hard news than ABC; and both carry more 
centrist news than cable television news (See Stelter 2012 or Jurkkowitz et al 2013 for examples). There is 
little to suggest that, overall, the population in general makes such fine-grained distinctions. Since most of 
the world’s population is not as fragmented as the audience in industrialized democracies – Burundi, for 
example, has four broadcast television stations – the media market segmentation that results from the 
availability of hundreds of channels and consistently reliable and relatively cheap access to news via the 
Internet is not the modal reality internationally.  
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Quantifying Abstract Concepts in the Literature 
Political scientists have been systematically classifying political systems, regimes 
and entities cross-culturally since at least Almond (1956). Different organizations and 
projects employ different means to quantify abstract notions. There are over 180 
different institutions that produce classification schemes regularly employed by 
journalists and scholars (Bush 201768).69 No system is ideal. All systems for coding 
abstract ideas or latent information are subject to some human error or interpretation 
and, therefore, criticism, particularly when a country’s ranking is lowered.70 Even 
content analysis, used widely in the study of media, is limited by language and 
                                                          
68 For a summary of the article, see the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog: http://wapo.st/2izypFb 
(November 20, 2017) 
69 To give a few examples of how scholars working comparatively define and categorize abstract concepts: 
• In media, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans Frontières 2016) ranks the danger to 
journalists worldwide. Their data derives from an online questionnaire that is distributed to 
journalists, lawyers and sociologists in 20 languages. The organization combines their answers with 
event counts of violence against journalists amassed via open source media and sources in different 
countries to produce a rating of the safety of engaging in journalism in a country. Violence against 
journalists is also coded by staff for its severity, such that physical violence against a reporter is 
weighted more than destruction of property. Any country can be scored low, even without violent acts, 
if personal freedoms are themselves scored low. 
• In the realm of politics, the World Governance Indicators ranks the reliability of institutions and 
respect for law. On their website, the World Bank defines governance as “the traditions and 
institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.  This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions among them.”  The idea of “governance” is 
disaggregated into six component parts (Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence; Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption), 
with scores assigned to each component. Their data is derived from a mixture of mass survey results 
and expert opinions in an unobserved components methodology (Kaufmann, Krayy and Mastruzzi 
2010, 15).  
In contrast, Transparency International (TI), with its focus solely on corruption, averages scores from 
reputable institutions (including the Economist Intelligence Unit and World Economic Forum). TI 
contends that its method is more transparent and replicable than methods that rely on data only 
available to the institution preparing the report (Transparency International 2017).  
• Most well known in political science, arguably, is Freedom House (FH), which advocates for the 
expansion of human rights and promotes the importance of functioning democratic institutions that 
protect the rights of all. They currently categorize “freedom” through a two-step process69: analysts 
first score countries based on publicly available information; and draft scores are then reviewed by 
FH management and regional experts, yielding a consensus score the institution presents are broadly 
reliable (Freedom House 2017b). FH separates its ranking on press freedom from its report on overall 
freedom. 
70 See Doubek (2017) or Gerstenfeld (2016) for examples. 
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resources, especially as collecting the full content of even text sources is a resource-
intensive endeavor (Monroe and Schrodt 2008). 
With regard to reputation, though much has been done on government 
reputation in economics (e.g., Brewster 2009, Cole and Kohoe 1997), I have not located 
any general classification scheme for institutional reputation. Though publicly available 
options such as Freedom House, Polity, and Reporters without Borders touch on media, 
none of these classification systems look directly at the historical interplay between 
media and government, instead focusing exclusively on their contemporary interactions.  
While that perspective makes the classifications dynamic and able to adapt to 
events, it also detaches them from history, rendering them unhelpful to gauge the 
relationships between media and government over longer periods. The detachment from 
history effectively amounts to treating different news media platforms as if they had 
developed along the same path, but that assumption is not valid.  
Existing measures also looked at state-media relations holistically, not 
disaggregating consistently between different media that might reinforce or challenge 
the status quo. Such groupings effectively hide existing differences between platforms 
before any analysis could be conducted. Additionally, existing measures largely ignore 
radio news,71 the most reliable media platform even today in some areas and under 
                                                          
71 Both Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders include attacks on radio journalists and pressure 
on radio stations and owners in their reports on security and openness, but more attention is paid to 
television and newspapers. In scholarship, studies involving radio in political science are rare. Pasel et al 
noted: “Radio news has been at most a side note in many studies of political participation, possibly 
because television has usurped the better part of the informative role of talk and news radio (Chaffee & 
Frank, 1996)” (2006, 119). Green-Pedersen and Stubager (2010) were able to exploit a unique reality in 
Denmark that radio news is a better predictor of television news coverage than newspaper content is for 
their study of legislative responsiveness to issues, as was Thesen (2012), but that was anomalous for the 
state of radio research in the field.  
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some conditions.72 For both of these reasons, existing analyses seemed too general to get 
at the research question here.  
Additionally, existing measures showed little variation within the region. Only 
Venezuela is listed as “not free” among Latin American countries for which survey data 
about both behavior and media options exists, with most of the hemisphere is listed as 
“free” by Freedom House (2017a). Polity IV scores the entire Western hemisphere as 
democratic, except for Cuba (autocracy), Ecuador (open anoncracy), Haiti (failed state), 
Suriname (open anocracy), and Venezuela (open anocracy).73 This may be an artifact of 
the construction of the measures, which largely focus on differences between 
functioning democracies, fragile states and autocracies. After all, in Freedom House 
rankings, only Africa and Asia show notable within-continent variation, with most 
variation being between industrialized democracies and the rest of the world.74 It was, 
therefore, necessary to devise a new means to categorize the closeness of press to 
government that would show variation not merely akin to level of development or 
violence. 
 
Conceptualizing reputation  
My categorization scheme uses Hallin and Mancini’s idea of political 
parallelism75 as a jumping off point to evaluate media as disaggregated into its 
                                                          
72 See Adhikary (2015) for an example of the importance of radio following the 2015 earthquake in Nepal. 
73 Belize and French Guinea not rated 
74 Visual illustration of this at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2018 
(February 5, 2018) 
75 There is no one definition of political parallelism, as its use in political communication has changed 
somewhat in recent years. Mancini (2008) described it this way:  
“Seymour‐Ure (1974) was the first scholar to speak of a ‘parallelism’ between parties and newspapers. 
In his view this refers to three main features: the ownership of the mass media by political parties, the 
editorial choices of the news organizations, and the party affiliation of the readers. Jay Blumler and 
Michael Gurevitch (1995) further developed this concept, slightly changing it… [to] include any 
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component platforms. I do this because political parallelism is the most common means 
of gauging state-media closeness in existing political communication literature. It 
functions as a good entrée, then, to looking at status quo-reinforcing or status quo-
disrupting media without deviating fully from existing scholarship. 
I specifically focus on how recurrent patterns of political parallelism might be 
observed because institutions and industries tend to develop habitual working patterns, 
including in journalism (Tuchman 1972, 1978; Schudson 2000). The pattern of 
interactions between the state and journalists is, therefore, a reflection of the 
internalization of past actions. That which is normalized becomes that which is 
expected. So, reputation derived from the past would be the public’s expectation of 
media-state relations for the future. 
Drawing from existing literature, especially Waisbord (2000, 2003, 2015), there 
are both political and economic factors that foster status quo bias. I, therefore, deemed 
the following factors to be theoretically important to document the relationship between 
government and media entities within countries76:  
1. Revolving door between media executives and government;  
2. Oligarchic control of the media industry;  
                                                          
organizational connections to political parties, the stability and intensity of editorial commitments 
and presence or absence of legal restraints on the rights of the media to back individual parties’ (65). 
Even in the absence of organizational links, party parallelism in Blumler and Gurevitch's view may 
include also all those situations in which a news organization backs in a more or less stable condition 
a political party, either because of a historical tradition or because of contingent decisions.” 
In 2016, Mancini further clarified: 
“There are differences between party press parallelism and political parallelism. Political parallelism 
indicates the degree to which media outlets tend to support and/or are linked to different cultures, 
ideas, and organizations that play some role within the political arena. Party press parallelism 
indicates some sort of organizational links, providing a tool for the party to organize its activity and to 
mobilize members. As numbers of party members have declined, readerships for party newspapers 
have also declined, and many parties have sold their newspapers to private entrepreneurs…. Party 
press parallelism has shifted toward what we define today as political parallelism. This is reflected by 
the alignment of newspapers along the lines of different ideological, political, and cultural views.” 
76 More details about the manifestation of these characteristics are discussed in “Coding Criteria” below. 
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3. Government control over those running specific media entities (not 
necessarily journalists);  
4. Clientelism;  
5. Restricting the provision of materials essential to the production process, 
such as newsprint for newspapers;  
6. Governments’ revoking licensing or enacting legislation to censor, beyond 
merely technically having the right to do so;  
7. Media established or founded in direct opposition to existing political 
leadership or state media; and 
8. An environment that encourages self-censorship. 
These criteria are more nuanced than a general press freedom score from Freedom 
House or Reporters Without Borders or similar rating organization would yield. 
The decision to code at the level of the media platform allowed for better cross-
national comparisons than country-level measures, but did not get into the weeds of 
market battles or press competition within any country. In other words, coding at the 
level of platform kept countries comparable, given differences in population, geographic 
expanse and market power. Size, expanse and human development are all frequently 
employed in comparative politics to account for variation that might be masked cross-
nationally (omitted variable bias). As an illustration, Brazil has 68 times the population 
of neighboring Uruguay and 47 times more land area; however, literacy and per capita 
income are higher in Uruguay.  Given these notable differences, comparing within 
platforms — such as newspaper circulation numbers or television market penetration — 
would not necessarily illuminate patterns in political behavior, as they would not be 
size- or development-appropriate comparisons.  
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Coding at the level of media platform also kept the coding focused on the 
proximity to government rather than drawing the discussion away toward other factors 
that might have a temporary impact on news media.77 Additionally, coding at the level of 
media platform allowed for more disaggregation than publicly available systems that 
code at the level of media system or country, like Hallin and Mancini (2004, 2012) or 
Freedom House, which both discuss the general media situation in any country.  
 
Collecting and Coding Data 
The research process to derive a feasible, replicable classification scheme 
involved two parts: first identifying possible sources of information about the historical 
relationship between governments and media platforms, and then looking for patterns 
within their contents. The sample is therefore a relevance sample,78 albeit an extensive 
one.  
It is not possible to know the full population of all relevant secondary sources for 
any country or for the region overall. Over the course of two years, I collected over 100 
secondary sources about media history and media relations for the region as well as for 
individual countries. Many of the books and articles were scholarly publications from a 
variety of disciplines outside of political science, including history, communication, 
                                                          
77 For example, the widely-known disdain for media conglomerate Clarin held by spouses and successive 
Presidents Kirchner and Fernandez during their 2003-2015 terms in Argentina does not itself undo 
decades of mutually beneficial relations between multiple administrations and newspapers and television 
news more generally. Coding at the outlet level, though appropriate for an analysis of modern Argentine 
media only, would not be an accurate characterization overall of the state-media relationship in country, 
relative to any other. (See Laborda 2010 for details on the dispute between the Kirchner-Fernandez 
administrations and Clarín.) 
78 A relevance sample is a sample returned based on directed search results (Krippendorff 2004). A 
common example would be a Boolean search based on a word stem or a search on Twitter using a 
hashtag. What is returned should be relevant, but it might miss items, for example on Twitter misspelled 
or similar-but-different hashtags. 
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journalism studies and even economics. Journalists or subject matter experts also 
authored some of the pieces, for example on ownership patterns. Many sources about 
the region as a whole were books with chapters, some peer-reviewed and others invited, 
on individual countries. The biggest impediment to obtaining information was that 
books were out of print or otherwise unavailable in both the United States and Mexico. 
Nonetheless, I feel confident in the validity of the sample, given its multilingual 
character, the nearly two years invested in data collection, and the extent of the searches 
I conducted. 
News sources were essential to finding out about state interventions in media. 
Therefore, I also searched many non-academic sources, such as The Economist or 
Columbia Journalism Review, for information about media-state relations. I relied on 
professional organizations, such as Reporters without Borders, to provide context for 
how consistent the current representation of journalism was with the history of 
journalism in the country. 
I drew from sources in multiple languages. Whenever possible, I used original 
language sources, preferring not to rely on translations, given the risk of inaccuracies 
(Temple and Young 2004, van Deth 1998, Jowell et al 2007). Further, local sources 
offered more details in many cases and, as On The Media has noted, are geographically 
closest and most likely to understand the nuances of a situation.79 I rejected some 
sources that, though more detailed about media in any given country, did not seem 
sufficiently unbiased to have confidence in the analysis.  
                                                          
79 On the Media is the journalism blog for WNYC public radio. Staff there have produced a number of 
consumer guides for how to read news, especially in difficult situations. For their breaking news guide, 
which is updated often, see https://www.wnyc.org/story/breaking-news-consumers-handbook-pdf/ 
(June 5, 2018). 
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I coded the four media platforms – newspaper, television, radio and Internet 
news – based on multiple accounts (whenever possible) of the longitudinal relationship 
between media platforms and government. I focused on specific references to each 
individual platform to get at the research question of interest. Specifically, as detailed in 
Appendix A, I annotated every instance of any author’s account of a state pressure, 
incentive or restriction on news media activities. The variety of authors, sources and 
languages employed meant that there was not a codebook looking for specific events or 
words, but rather I searched for accounts of state-media relations generally.  
 
Coding Criteria 
The literature about political communication in industrialized democracies 
provides a starting point for categorizing state-media relationships. The first three 
criteria — the revolving door between business and government; oligarchic control of an 
industry; and government control over those running specific entities — are well-
documented concerns of scholars of political science overall, not just political 
communication, for normative reasons (Baker 2007, Doyle 2002, Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos 2002). Relative to the press, these three criteria represent different 
means by which elite voices might be prioritized over other ideas, a critical component 
of the theory outlined in the previous chapter. After all, a politician becoming a 
television commentator is not itself dangerous to democracy; but a journalist working in 
politics and then going back to journalism could be. Even in arenas in which political 
alliances are assumed within the press (a tenet of Hallin and Mancini’s original 
conception of political parallelism), the harder it is to tell where the press ends and the 
party begins, the more severe or extreme that parallelism would be. 
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Oligarchic control of media and government control of positions of power within 
media both potentially impact media output. Historians have catalogued countless 
instances of monopolies or oligarchies producing sub-par deliverables. Concentration of 
ownership is also an important concern of scholars of political communication (Baker 
2002, 2007; Meier and Trappel 1998; Winseck 2008), with competition thought to 
make coverage more honest. And a government’s having control of editorial decisions is 
a classic means of identifying media loyal to the state, even if supposedly independent.80 
The next two criteria — concerns about clientelism and restricting items 
necessary to production — go to economics. One is a carrot, the other a stick, to use 
Waisbord’s terminology (2001). Clientelism generally occurs when personal 
relationships are more important for functioning government than official channels. 
Clientelism was first introduced to the study of media systems by Hallin and 
Papathanassopoulos (2002). They argued the idea was relevant to the study of media in 
because it is pervasive, existing in some form in each country. Clientelism would be 
manifested in the state’s giving extra incentives to preferred media potentially could be. 
This is not a measure of giving a favored entity a scoop but rather of economically 
propping up favored entities, for example with advertising dollars. 
Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) thought clientelism especially important 
to consider in later- or lesser-consolidated democracies, such as in Eastern Europe or 
Latin America, where government channels may not be as clear, fixed or functional. 
Since most political communication research has occurred in and about industrialized 
democracies, their argument seems important to any geographic expansion of political 
                                                          
80 See Mueni (2018) for an example from this year of such control in Kenya. 
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communication. It also provides a means of comparison well understood within 
comparative politics and contributes to that (separate) literature.81 
Restricting items necessary to production is the other side of that equation. 
Effectively, this criterion is about a state’s cutting off the economic lifeline of media as a 
means to induce subservience. This may involve tariffs or imports, for example on 
newsprint, but it could also be about restricting advertising or slowing bandwidth or any 
other economic measure that, while not legally censorship, is employed to keep media 
entities in line.   
The sixth criterion — revoking licensing or enacting legislation to censor — is the 
classic approach to measuring censorship. Many countries regulate media, but they do 
so to different extents. Some have the ability to restrict media but opt not to, whilst 
other countries heavily regulate different media. Punishing individual journalists would 
also fall under this criterion. 
The seventh coding item — media established or founded in direct opposition to 
existing political leadership or state media — was employed to account for the role of 
state media. The reality is that, in many places, the government was essential in 
establishing the infrastructure for different media. So, a private entity going around 
government to act as a counterweight to it is a strong historical signal of the proximity of 
government to media. 
The final criterion — an environment that encourages self-censorship — is a 
reflection of the reality that, in many places, across the world, freedom of the press 
                                                          
81Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) position seven countries on a spectrum of clientelism in their 
article, for example, allowing for more nuanced cross-national comparison. Relative to clientelism within 
any country, Magaloni (2006) has written extensively about clientelism in Mexico, but about the 
dominant political party, not the media. Looking at relationships between the state and different media 
would add nuance to a discussion that treats the media as more monolithic than it in actuality is. 
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exists only in theory, despite laws on the books. This criterion also captures instances in 
which reporting may be unsafe and therefore inadvertently only promote status quo 
ideas, for example historically with various mafia and their contemporary counterparts, 
cartels or warlords.  
I did not expect all factors to be present in all countries, quite the contrary. But 
the aforementioned criteria draw from both political communication and comparative 
politics, as well as economics, to consider holistically different incentives and pressures 
that might be present in a variety of different contexts. They are a reflection of different 
strands of research. 
 
Coding Procedure 
My classification system has three possible classifications: close to government 
(status quo), far from government (potentially disruptive) or a centered null category 
reflecting insufficient data to yield a directional expectation.82 Absent clear exceptions, 
as discussed below, in general, each notation about a county was equally weighted. That 
is to say, each instance of any of the above criteria held equal weight, be it status quo-
enforcing or disruptive, even though all items might not be documented in all countries. 
The coding is cumulative. 
Generally, having catalogued all instances of the aforementioned criteria, I 
looked for a pattern over time with each of the four platforms in each country.83 A single 
                                                          
82 Were more sources available across the region or were I able, over time, to find enough sources about 
all countries to expand the coding to a five-point Likert scale (very close, leaning close, insufficient 
data/neutral, leaning far, very far), that would be preferable. 
83 Though Spanish-language newspapers have been published in the region since the late 18th-century, 
the timeline for broadcast news media goes back approximately a century. Extrapolating about history’s 
impact on current institutional form does not, therefore, go so far back as to raise validity concerns. Most 
criticized for doing this in comparative politics in recent years was Putnam (1993) for his book on Italian 
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instance of government censorship is not, after all, indicative of a relationship that the 
public might observe as oppositional. Platforms were rarely coded as close to or distinct 
from government based on a single account, though there were cases for which that was 
justified. Specifically, I took scholars’ having pointed out a distinct relational bifurcation 
as strong evidence of distance from any regime.  
In none of those cases was there any lack of clarity. In cases where historians 
disagreed, I would not have used any single item as evidence of crossing a cutpoint and 
definitely being close to or distant from government. In the rare instances that my notes 
from sources contradicted each other – as happened in the case of how to code 
newspapers in Chile84 – then I revisited the original sources, comparing details of the 
scholarship. If a source was clearly better sourced, the coding from that source was 
used. If they were approximately equivalent or drawing from different literatures, I 
coded the case as insufficient data.85  
I opted to be conservative with coding. Unless I had sufficient documentation 
from secondary sources of an over-time relationship between government and the press, 
I defaulted to coding as “insufficient data.” Any replication with additional information 
should therefore intensify, not dilute or weaken, categorizations.  Full details for 
replication – including each source employed in the categorization of each country – can 
                                                          
social capital. (See O’Neill 1996 for review of the research and Putnam’s critics.) This analysis goes back 
about a century and is largely focused on the post-WWII time period. As such, though historical and 
combining qualitative and quantitative measures, I hope to avoid the pitfalls of reducing multi-century 
evolution into a simple classification. 
84 Benavides et al (2009) presented newspapers as apolitical for not taking on the dictatorships, which is 
insufficient to code newspapers as aligned. Tironi and Sunkel (2000) noted the history of party ownership 
or affiliation with newspapers, even preceding the dictatorships, which suggested an oligarchic 
association, as had also been presented elsewhere (Montoya-Londaño 2014, 67). The documentation of 
oligarchy was used to justify the coding of newspapers as close to government, despite one source’s 
claiming newspapers faced largely market pressures.  
85 I had decided early that countries for which there were no available reliable materials in the relevance 
sample would be dropped; but I was able to find at least one source for every former Iberian colony. 
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be found in Appendix A and is summarized in Table 3.1 of this chapter. The appendix 
also contains the complete list of sources used for each country. 
 
Internet news reputation 
Internet news developed and spread on a much faster timeline than the other 
platforms. The later development and decentralized organization of the early Internet 
produced fundamentally different news production norms than traditional news outlets. 
Instead of relying on beat reporting or connections, so-called citizen journalists86 under 
democratic regimes could report what they chose. There was no indexing or reliance on 
elites, as happened historically with larger media, and no barriers on the amount of 
space any topic can occupy.87 This lower barrier to entry for content production that 
results in potentially unlimited content.  
Further, after initial defense funding from the United States88, the World Wide 
Web and following iterations of the Internet developed in largely private hands, in many 
places absent clear regulation. OpenNet Initiative data from 2013 indicated that less 
than half of all countries engage in any kind of political filtering, with only 20 percent 
engaging in severe censorship.89 Cuba is the only country in the Western Hemisphere 
                                                          
86 Bulkley (2012) gives examples of how the raw materials from regular people’s filming political events 
has changed journalism and documentary filmmaking. 
87 The size of the “news hole,” be it in column inches for newspapers or minutes for segments for 
television news has traditionally been a limiting factor. Oxford dictionaries defines “news hole” as: “The 
area of a newspaper or magazine that is available for news stories, after deduction of the area taken by 
adverts, pictures, etc.; (hence) the amount of airtime available in a news programme, channel, etc., for 
news broadcasting.” 
88 For a comprehensive explanation of the development of ARPANET into the modern Internet, see Flichy 
(2007). 
89 There is little information on much of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly at lower 
levels of development, with coverage instead concentrated in Asia, Europe, North America and the Middle 
East. For Latin America, the report includes information from Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela. 
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that systematically filters Internet content (Kim et al ND). This suggests that, though 
Internet news might in some locales be censored like television was/is, in more places 
than not Internet has evolved with little oversight.  
The Internet and social media also facilitate narrowcasting, not targeting any 
conservative median reader or viewer, which represents a fundamentally different 
business model than traditional media.90 Internet news is fundamentally diffuse 
(Tewksbury 2005, Tewksbury and Rittenburg 2009) and, therefore, on balance, less 
likely to be aligned with or dependent on government or particularly promoting of any 
status quo, given its catering to niche audiences. There is also an increasing body of 
scholarly literature that suggests that there is something importantly different for 
participation about consuming news on the Internet, relative to more traditional, one-
way news platforms.91 For that reason, on this subset of countries, Internet news is 
always categorized in my coding scheme as not aligned with the status quo.92  
 
Example 
I demonstrate my classification scheme at work by discussing how the Mexican 
media were coded. I first summarize the history of press-government relations in 
modern Mexico and then translate that history into classifications:  
                                                          
90 Merriam-Webster explains the difference between broadcasting and narrowcasting as follows: 
Broadcasting: “the act of making widely known: the act of spreading abroad” 
Narrowcasting: “message delivered to a small group, rather than large” 
The latter came into use, unsurprisingly, as a response to the former. https://www.merriam-
webster.com/words-at-play/broadcasting-and-narrowcasting (June 5, 2018) 
91 Kenski and Stroud (2006) and Bakker and de Vreese (2011) independently found that Internet use 
positively predicted political engagement, whilst traditional media did not, even when accounting for 
relative entertainment preference (Prior 2007). Online information does not differ from print content in 
many cases (Ghersetti 2014) but includes slightly (but not significantly) more mobilizing content 
(Hoffman 2006). 
92 In some places, for example China, where sites require licensing and/or face censorship, the 
preponderance of the evidence may come out differently.  
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Nearing the end of the last dictatorship in the first decade of the 20th century, the 
Mexican press called for political liberalization (Orme 1997). But from the 1930s until 
almost the end of the 20th century, Mexico’s “perfect dictatorship”93 of one-party rule 
limited the ability of any press to confront the government. Support for the post-
revolutionary state, clientelism and intimidation limited both the ability and willingness 
of media (or any opposition force) taking on the ruling party (Orme 1997, Magaloni 
2006). Pressure put on privately-owned news media is thought to elicit pro-government 
bias in news coverage, thereby impeding the development of democracy in authoritarian 
regimes and the consolidation of democracy in young democracies (Abbott 2011), as was 
Mexico in the middle 20th century.  
The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or 
PRI) that ruled Mexico for seven decades was a “gigantic, pork-barreling political 
machine” (Lawson 2002, 17). The party limited broadcasting concessions, for example, 
to political allies as rewards, but also as a means to guarantee favorable coverage 
(Lawson 2002, 25). Through both official and unofficial means, from 1929 through the 
1990s, the PRI garnered effective control of the public agenda, self-censorship from the 
press on issues the government did not want covered and preferential election coverage 
(Lawson 2002, 48). “The culture of collusion was so great that the standard media 
business model depended not on circulation, but on government largesse,” with the 
head of the Televisa network often only somewhat jokingly referred to as the Minister of 
Culture (O’Neil 2013, 80).  
                                                          
93 Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa coined the term in 1990. At a conference on Latin democracies, 
Vargas Llosa was quoted as saying, “The perfect dictatorship is not communism. It is not the Soviet 
Union. It is not Fidel Castro. The perfect dictatorship is Mexico… It has all the characteristics of a 
dictatorship: permanence, not of one man, but of one party. A party that is untouchable” (translated from 
“Vargas Llosa: ‘México es la dictadura perfecta’”). 
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One experienced journalist put it this way:  
 
“The Mexican press censors itself. Outside observers who look for 
examples of direct government censorship, monopolization of the 
distribution of newsprint and limitless government power to suppress or 
publicize news and commentary fail to grasp the nature of the relationship 
between the government and media – a complex network of mutual 
benefits, commitments and favors, difficult to penetrate and even more 
difficult to reform” (Riva Palacio 1997, 22). 
 
This system lasted through the 1980s, when mass media gradually gained more 
independence (Lawson 2002, 61). Print media was the first to gain some measure of 
distance or insulation from government, with the establishment of new magazines in the 
late 1970s. For radio this process occurred largely between 1985 and 1996, particularly 
after the devastating Mexico City earthquake when radio was necessarily the primary 
means of communication (Lawson 2002, 94). Television was the slowest to signal any 
independence from the PRI, receiving wide condemnation for its preferential PRI 
coverage in the 1988 election, especially relative to more balanced or critical radio 
coverage (Lawson 2002, 101).   
And even after television news had begun to distance itself from the PRI, 
pressures remained. The Mexico City bureau chief for Miami-based Univisión, Bruno 
López, detailed his experiences working in Mexico in a 1997 book. López was in the 
unique position of working for an American press entity with the expectation that he 
would act as a watchdog; but Univisión’s business relationship with Mexico’s Televisa 
meant that his stories could also be aired in Mexico. He detailed multiple instances in 
which Televisa, still affiliated in many ways with the PRI oligarchy, cut or re-edited his 
pieces to reframe them in a pro-government way (López 1997, 91-95). López’s unique 
circumstances – which allowed for a direct comparison of content aired within Mexico 
versus content aired outside of Mexico – allow social scientists a rare vantage point to 
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observe the unwritten but very much in-force pressures governments can exert on mass 
media. 
The evolution of radio in Mexico was less clearly aligned with government. The 
introduction of radio technology played a critical role in the dictatorship and then 
revolution that preceded the PRI (Castro 2016). Analogized to the penny press that 
preceded the US and French revolutions, radio was the preferred means of 
communication for rebels in the 1920s and 1930s (Castro 2016, 8). For that reason, once 
the revolution ended and the PRI took power, the state had a strong interest in the 
communications medium. 
As was the case with many geographically dispersed countries, radio was at first a 
means of national unification (Karush 2012, Hayes 2000). The reach of radio into more 
rural areas allowed for greater penetration of news about the country; and the first 
national radio station was founded within the Ministry of Education (Hayes 2000, 42). 
Then the exponential growth of radio in the second half of the twentieth century led to it 
being a largely local enterprise in Mexico — effectively narrowcasting (Hayes and 
McSherry 1997). That resulted in the regulations for radio laying the groundwork for 
television regulation but in the evolving medium itself slowly falling away from a nation-
building endeavor to an apolitical commercial venture (Hayes 2000).  
In other words, the similarity of radio regulations to those that would come to 
exist for television does not equate to the platforms’ being treated similarly once 
regulations were in place. Rather, the more local nature of radio (pre-satellite era) 
means it would come to garner, almost definitionally, far less attention than television 
would. Nor does Mexico does have a strong history of community radio like some other 
countries in the region. The more commercial nature of radio ventures and the PRI’s 
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paying less attention to it after initial regulations were put in place suggests less 
affiliation with the government than exhibited by television. 
In the 21st century, there remain obstacles to Mexican press independence: price 
controls on staple goods, justified by social need, constrains the advertising budgets of 
the firms producing those items; electoral losses by the PRI have not reduced the party’s 
dominance in the business world, which is still characterized as an oligarchy; and the 
executive retains control of broadcast rights, despite the establishment of a supposedly 
politically neutral broadcast authority (Lawson 2002, 175-176). All of these factors 
combine to render large, traditional mass media in Mexico (especially television) to be 
seen as supporting the government (or business status quo-preferring) forces – what 
Orme (1997) calls a “culture of collusion.”94  
Further, even years after the dedazo95 process of selecting a president had ended 
and multi-party elections fed by primaries were held, the Mexican press – especially 
television – was still associated with the PRI regime (Lawson 2002, 7). A recent survey 
found that 93% of journalists surveyed96 said that reporters knew what topics to avoid 
and 70% said that owners interfered with editorial decisions and content, specifically 
noting that “news organizations prefer to avoid subjects that affect government 
institutions or the political class” (Reyna 2017).97 Widespread self-censorship is also a 
security matter in Mexico, as journalists face threats from both drug cartels and corrupt 
                                                          
94 Mexicans in 2017 do nonetheless believe that the media has a positive influence on the country (Vice 
and Chwe 2017).  
95 “For decades, Mexican presidents were selected not according to rules in the Constitution, the electoral 
law, or party statutes, but rather via the dedazo (‘big finger’)—an unwritten code that gave the sitting 
president the right to choose his successor, specified the candidate pool, and prohibited potential 
candidates from openly seeking the job” (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 725). The dedazo was one of the 
reasons that political scientists did not consider Mexico a true democracy for much of the 20th century.  
96 Relevance sample, mixed methods (focus groups, in-depth interviews and Internet-based surveys) 
(Reyna 2017) 
97 Translated from Spanish 
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politicians if they report on certain topics. The summary of the latest Reporters Without 
Borders report states: 
Constant violence and fear 
Land of the drug cartels, Mexico continues to be the Western 
Hemisphere’s deadliest country for the media. When journalists cover 
subjects linked to organized crime or political corruption (especially at the 
local level), they immediately become targets and are often executed in 
cold blood. Most of these crimes go unpunished, with Mexico’s pervasive 
corruption accounting for the impunity. Some elected officials are directly 
linked to organized crime. Ownership of the broadcast media is extremely 
concentrated, with two media groups owning almost all the TV channels 
(Reporters Without Borders 2017b). 
 
These anecdotes lend credence to the idea that reputation is sticky and declaring 
journalistic independence from government influence may not change public perception 
of any entity.98  
In summary, Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America in which to 
be a journalist,99 not just in modern times but also historically (Hughes 2008, 147). 
Television especially is aligned with government, both during decades of one-party rule 
and in the recent years with two main parties (Gutierrez Rentaria 2009; Fox 1997, 37). 
Radio has no such history of government involvement (Fox 1997, 38). Newspapers are 
less obviously partisan than television but remain dependent on government 
advertising, rendering them subservient (Hughes 2008, 132). The word most often used 
to describe the relationship between the Mexican government and press is collusion, in 
                                                          
98 Survey evidence confirming this would be optimal, but no such surveys exist. Fielding such a survey 
cross-nationally would likely require limiting questions to citizens’ opinions about the biggest or most 
influential press in the country – the New York Times traditionally in the United States or BBC in the 
United Kingdome – thereby potentially skewing survey results toward the public’s perceiving media as 
colluding with government. Further, in WVS 6, for example, there is only a 0.1052 correlation between 
media trust and total media consumption. (Correlations for trust in media and consumption of individual 
media platforms maxes out at 0.0840 for radio. Correlation for trust in media and total media 
consumption in Mexico was 0.0975.)  
99 Ranked 147 of out 180 by Reporters Without Borders in 2017, the lowest ranking for any Latin 
American country. (In the Western hemisphere, only Cuba ranked lower, at 173.) 
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large part because much political advertising in the press is presented as if it were news 
(Keenan 1997; Orme 1997), akin to native advertising or content marketing100 in the 
United States.101  
Having compiled the information about Mexico, preponderance of the evidence 
led me to code television and newspapers as aligned with the status quo. There was 
insufficient data to position radio either way, resulting in a null coding. Put another way, 
there were sufficient sources that clearly identified an ongoing symbiotic relationship 
between the Mexican government and television and newspapers, but no such 
accumulation of qualitative data that would lead to confidence classifying radio as either 
close or distant from government. Specifically, for Mexico, I had over 15 sources that 
contributed to the categorizations for the three traditional forms of media.102  
 
Final Classification Scheme 
There are 18 countries in Iberian Latin America for which I was able to find at 
least one source about the history of newspapers, radio and television for each country. 
For many of the smaller countries, there was insufficient directional data to derive 
classifications for media-government closeness, even when employing sources in 
multiple languages. For many medium-sized and larger countries, though, I was able to 
classify all four media platforms (newspaper, radio, television and Internet).  
                                                          
100 Dictionary.com defines native advertising as: “advertising content on a website that conforms to the 
design and format of the site and is integrated into the site’s usual content” (October 11, 2017). It is 
generally designed to be all-but-indistinguishable from news content. 
101 Orme notes that many press outlets could not survive economically without government ad buys. So 
“the government and many politicians buy space in the form of news bulletins promoting their activities 
or simply reprinting speeches. Of course, the newspapers never inform their readers that they are reading 
paid advertising rather than hard news” (1997, 22). 
102 This number discounts multiple sources from two scholars who focus on media in Mexico and Latin 
America: Chappell Lawson and Silvio Waisbord, respectively. Those two political scientists accounted for 
over 10 sources for the dissertation. 
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As was expected based on existing literature about industrialized democracies, 
television news was the most likely to show status quo bias : That industry, after all, has 
high barriers to entry, is highly regulated and largely caters to the median citizen. The 
most information was available about newspaper-government relations, presumably 
because that medium has the longest history of any in news. In many countries, it 
seemed that laws were written based on newspaper and television relationships with 
government. 
Radio was the most likely traditional medium to have a history of showcasing a 
diversity of voices (aka non-status quo positions), presumably because of its relatively 
low barrier to entry and, thanks to geographic dispersion, lesser chance of monitoring or 
regulation. To reiterate, at least among this subset of democracies with adjectives, 
Internet was classified as always far from government.  
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Table 3.1: Reputation Coding in Latin America 
Country Newspaper Television Radio 
Argentina 0 - 0 
Bolivia - - + 
Brazil 0 - 0 
Chile - 0 0 
Colombia - - + 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 
Dominican Rep. - - - 
Ecuador - - - 
El Salvador - - + 
Guatemala - - 0 
Honduras - 0 0 
Mexico - - 0 
Nicaragua 0 - + 
Panama - - + 
Paraguay 0 0 + 
Peru - - + 
Uruguay - - + 
Venezuela - - - 
- =  4th Branch or status quo reinforcing (meaning no expected relative association with 
behavior) 
0 =  No expectation can be extrapolated from sources (as of Spring 2017) 
+ = 4th Estate distinct from government or government watchdog (translating to an 
expected relative positive association with behavior)  
 
Why Latin America? 
This and the empirical chapters that follow test the theory outlined in Chapter 
Two in Latin America. Latin America is uniquely suited to research bringing together 
different subfields. Unlike other regions grouped together by Western scholars or 
artificially created or cherry-picked (e.g., Friedmann 2014, Waisbord 2015), the 
countries of Latin America share a common cultural and linguistic history. They gained 
independence largely around the same time, experienced dictatorships in similar waves, 
and have many of the same political institutions. All are presidential democracies 
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(Mainwaring and Hagopian 2005)103 that share largely natural boundaries.104 
Institutionally, then, there is variation in current politics (such as the strength of 
democracy or political leaning of the administrations), but not so much in political 
norms or institutions, allowing for examination of the media as the “different” 
institution within a most similar design (Mill [1843] 2012; Przeworski and Teune 
1970).105  
Limiting to Latin America to the past few years also addresses both the Woods-
Jordan106 and Bonds-Ruth107 problems (Elkins and Sides 2010), aka non-comparability 
across space or time. The concept of political participation is not stretched too far, nor is 
                                                          
103 Venezuela scores lowest on Freedom House’s aggregate scale at 35 as “partly free,” and Bolivia’s Evo 
Morales is threatening to ignore the constitution and remain in power when his current term is up 
(Oppenheimer 2017), but no Latin countries have yet been classified as not free or completely 
malfunctioning democracies. 
104 Unnatural boundaries, especially in Africa, have been shown to “magnif[y] the likelihood of civil wars, 
political instability, and secession attempts” (Englebert, Tarango and Carter 2002, 1093). Natural 
boundaries are thought to correlate more with natural grouping and divisions of ethnic groups, clans, 
tribes, etc. 
105 Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñan argue that Latin America is an especially fertile ground for testing theory 
because of its “important regional and temporal specificities” (2005, 57). It is both large enough to be 
allow for theory generation, but also potentially exceptional enough, relative to the industrialized or as yet 
undeveloped world, to test true theoretical generalizability. And, drawing from sociology, Latin America is 
ideal for looking at possible regional or contamination effects (Booth 1979, 50; Mainwaring and Pérez-
Liñan 2005, 23) which one-country studies could not possibly consider. 
106 “The Woods-Jordan Problem: Non-equivalence across Space – Who is the better athlete: Tiger Woods 
or Michael Jordan? The New York Times (2008) ran a widely circulated online debate on the topic not 
long ago. The question has no straightforward answer because Woods and Jordan played different sports, 
and the talents needed to excel in one sport are less relevant in the other. Woods does not need a jump 
shot. Jordan does not need a flop shot. Some measures have this same problem: they do not travel well 
from one location to another. These dislocating effects arise from differences across contexts in language, 
custom, and culture—that is, shared meanings, norms, and values. Non-equivalence can emerge across 
countries, other jurisdictional units, ethnic groups, social classes, or any set of entities defined by cultural, 
political, or economic markers” (Elkins and Sides 2010, 1).  
107 “The Bonds-Ruth Problem: Non-equivalence across Time – Is Barry Bonds the best home run hitter in 
the history of Major League Baseball? Measured by the raw number of home runs, he is. But is it 
appropriate to compare Bonds’ performance with that of players whose careers occurred years or even 
decades ago? Many things have changed in baseball since the era of Babe Ruth or even Hank Aaron: the 
size of ballparks, the quality of pitching, the composition of baseballs and bats, and the apparent 
prevalence of steroid use. In short, times have changed, and the question is whether they have changed so 
much as to render “number of career home runs” a misleading measure for comparing the prowess of 
hitters over the history of baseball … as data collection persists in the social science, the passage of time 
can change the meaning of constructs and the items used to measure them… As time passes, researchers 
may need to re-conceptualize the construct — e.g., ‘What does it now mean to be X?’ — and reconsider 
whether particular items tap that construct” (Elkins and Sides 2010, 3). 
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that of what constitutes mass media (Sartori 1971), and comparison is possible because 
of the limit of space and time. Therefore, Latin America is a reasonable first step in the 
testing of the theory without encountering other problems of measurement or 
implementation.  
 
Research Design and Data 
This chapter analyzes available data to determine whether platforms exhibit 
uniform associations with political participation activities or not. Having established 
directional expectations for the impact of historic relations with government on modern 
media content output, the next step in the analysis is to link that historically-influenced 
content to observable behavioral outcomes. I first examine available news sources and 
then examine differences in behavior. This next section details available data. 
 
Data Sources  
Cross-national analysis relies on comparability to achieve consistency across time 
and space. For the maximum time and space coverage, comparativists rely on the World 
Values Surveys (WVS) and the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS), both of which are 
compilations of national surveys with representative samples. The former will be 
described in detail and employed in this chapter, the latter in the next chapter.108 
 The World Values Survey (WVS) began as the European Values Survey in 1981. 
The survey is designed to measure cultural change. There have been six waves of surveys 
thus far, with the largest expansion in country coverage between 1995 and 2000: Wave 1 
                                                          
108 I attempted to supplement WVS with privately available data, but there was little on Latin America. 
Media Tenor, for example, only had one report (from 2007 about Hugo Chavez) even somewhat related to 
media in the region. 
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(1981-1984), Wave 2 (1990-1994), Wave 3 (1995-1998), Wave 4 (1999-2004), Wave 5 
(2005-2009), and Wave 6 (2010-2014). Data collection for wave 7 began in January 
2017, with results expected to be made public in 2019 and subsequent waves every 5 
years, according to the WVS website.  
WVS is a random probability survey whenever possible and employs a quota or 
cluster system where random probability is problematic (Kittilson 2007). Teams in 
almost 100 countries each fund their own survey administration, with a common core 
questionnaire administered to almost 90 percent of the world population. Teams in each 
country retain the right to add or subtract questions. Organizers have administered the 
surveys to approximately 400,000 respondents so far. The other commonly known 
cross-national survey are the world Barometers, which will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter.  
Both WVS and the Barometers groupings exhibit positives and negatives for 
cross-national research: WVS focuses on values over engagement and has been designed 
to test and promote a specific idea, the human development sequence (following 
Inglehart and Welzel 2005). The barometers speak much more to political activities but 
the common questions are few worldwide, meaning they tend to promote analysis at the 
regional level (Bratton 2009, 1).109  The questions about news consumption in WVS 
allow for better matching between news consumption and political endeavors than 
                                                          
109 The surveys also differ greatly in coverage, with the AmericasBarometer covering the entire 
hemisphere only since 2010. Though WVS organizers claim to have a good balance of countries, they do 
not. In Wave 6, only five countries (out of 42) listed in 2014 as having low human development 
(Zimbabwe, Yemen, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Pakistan) by UNDP were included in the survey. The sample 
skews heavily toward those 49 countries listed that year as having very high human development.  That 
said, not all GBS cover as wide a geography as the AmericasBarometer. South Asia, for example, is not 
covered at all, meaning this research question could not be asked in the world’s largest democracy – India 
– without access to national surveys that presumably do not have similar root questionnaires. 
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would be available using the GBS for the region (the AmericasBarometer), which does 
not disaggregate its question about media consumption, asking instead only about 
general news usage.   
 WVS coverage of Latin America has expanded since its inception. Wave 1 
included Argentina and Mexico. Brazil and Chile were added in Wave 2, while Wave 3 
saw the most significant expansion of countries with the addition of Argentina, 
Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela (but not Brazil). Wave 4 shrank back down to five countries with Argentina, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela but expanded again in Wave 5 with Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Wave 6 duplicates the Wave 5 
country list with two exceptions: the addition of Ecuador and removal of Guatemala.  
Though Latin American data has been available for a limited subset of countries 
the survey’s inception, Waves 5 and 6 are the only ones to include questions about 
media consumption. Most importantly, these surveys collect information on media 
consumption disaggregated by platform. Important for research in developing 
countries, survey questions asked about access to or use of the Internet for news, not 
technology ownership, as libraries or cyber cafés are still common features in many 
places where computer ownership and/or broadband connections are expensive 
(Economist 2008a, Gillwald 2017, C Williams 2016).  
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The question in both iterations of the survey was worded similarly, but the 
answer selection differed. In Wave 5, the answer choice was either yes (have used) or no 
(have not used): 
WVS 5: People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and 
the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used it 
last week or did not use it last week to obtain information: 
V223. Daily newspaper 
V224. News broadcasts on radio or TV 
V228. Internet, Email  
 
By contrast, Wave 6 provided choices on the frequency of consumption (from never to 
daily):  
WVS 6: People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various 
sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to 
obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never:  
V217. Daily newspaper  
V219. TV news  
V220. Radio news  
V222. Email  
V223. Internet  
 
Non-response rates on questions in surveys in Latin American can be very high 
(Córdova 2009, Seligson 2005). For example, a question about protest in the 2008 
AmericasBarometer had an 11.17% non-response rate across the countries surveyed 
(Moseley and Moreno 2010). Some surveys report overall non-response rates as low as 
3% (Seligson 2004), but high question non-response rates are not surprising. The more 
international the survey – i.e., the more one attempts to include developing countries – 
the greater the risk of non-response, for both cultural and logistical reasons (Seligson 
2005); and question non-response becomes a more concerning factor when tackling 
multi-variate analysis (Seligson 2005).  
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Dependent variables  
The main outcome of interest for my dissertation is political engagement. 
Following Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995), I define participation as “activity that is 
intended to or has the consequences of affecting, either directly or indirectly, 
government action” (1995, 7). Verba and Nie (1972) first explicated that participation is 
more than voting, by including membership in seemingly non-political organizations as 
measure of participation. However, they limited their definition to active forms of 
participation (1972, 3), not including passive or generalized support for democracy that 
are sometimes taken as signs of regime support. Unconventional participation, such as 
demonstrations and protests that dominated the 1960s in the United States, was not 
part of their study.  
Having gained independence mostly in the early 19th-century, the history of Latin 
America is speckled with caudillos110 and oligarchs.111 Twentieth century dictatorships 
across Latin America generally required citizens to vote, albeit in what would be better 
described as electoralism than proper democracy (Schmitter and Karl 1991).112 Many 
Latin American countries retained compulsory voting113 after the fall of dictators, even 
making proof of voting a requirement to obtain other necessary documentation like 
                                                          
110 “The Spanish term caudillo refers to a leader in Latin America. Its origins can be traced back to the 
colonial era with the system of patrón (patron) and peon (peon) on the haciendas of rural Latin America. 
The caudillo was seen as a local hero, or a strongman of the region. He required a clienta, or an armed 
band with a network of dependents, hence the connection to the patrón and peon. This was termed the 
mechanism of the caudillo system. The interactions in this network can be defined as informal and 
personal exchanges of resources between parties of unequal status. The system would grow into a pyramid 
scheme with the super-patrón, or the caudillo, on top” (Mitchell and Guerrero ND). 
111 See Garcia Calderon (1925) or Posada-Carbo (2000) for brief histories. 
112 See Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2015) for a detailed account of the reasons behind the fall of 
dictatorships. 
113 As of 2014, voting was compulsory in 22 countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Congo (Democratic Republic of), Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Honduras, 
Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Nauru, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Singapore, Thailand, and Uruguay 
(Santhanam 2014). Penalties for not voting vary (Frankal 2005).  
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passports (Figueiredo 1990), though enforcement of compulsory voting has declined 
somewhat in recent decades.114 This history nonetheless begets little variation in survey 
results: While just over half of worldwide respondents (56%) report always voting in 
national elections, nearly four-fifths of Latin Americans (78%) respond affirmatively to 
the question115 (WVS 6).116  
Due to the limited variation in voting behavior, I focus on other mechanisms of 
political participation. Non-voting conventional participation is the contribution of time 
or money to a political cause (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). I focus on measures 
of civic engagement related to expressing a desire for political change (Norris and 
Inglehart 2009).117 In the WVS survey, such non-voting participation is operationalized 
with four possibilities.118 WVS 5 and 6 had similar questions, but WVS 6 added the 
option of joining strikes, which was not asked about in WVS5: 
                                                          
114 Publicly available data (Electoral Commission 2006, accessed 03 March 2017) suggests variation as 
follows: Eleven countries (64.84% of the sample) might no longer be thought to have compulsory voting 
(Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela and four countries 
for which no information was available, suggesting the issue is not salient or applicable: Colombia, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua and Uruguay). Four countries (23.54%) retain compulsory voting but without 
penalties for not voting (Argentina, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay). Three countries (11.62%) were 
continue to have strict compulsory voting rules (Bolivia, Brazil and Peru). 
115 Question V227 
116 There is some recent evidence that the region reports high turnout, regardless of compulsory status. 
Effects of the individual correlates of voting in the region (Maldonado 2011a) or the fact that Election Day 
is, in many places, a holiday (Lapidos 2008) may be masked by the compulsory nature of voting.  
117 The behaviors in this chapter all load onto the same factor in Norris and Inglehart’s analysis (2009, 
245-246). This is not to say that membership in civic and political organizations, which loads on another 
factor, is less important. But, as culture has been shown to influence how people treat membership in 
communities, I focus on actions involving some expression of voice, not just solidarity, as public voice 
should be less culturally bound than membership. 
118 Norris and Inglehart (2009) base their analyses on questions 90 through 94, which question if the 
respondent has “recently” done any of the aforementioned activities. That dramatically reduces the overall 
sample size though – from 10124 to 2290 for petitions, from 9983 to 445 for boycotts, from 10184 to 1467 
for peaceful demonstrations, and from 8913 to 957 for strikes – rendering it less useful for regional 
analysis than it might be for worldwide analyses. 
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WVS5: Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of 
political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, 
whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would 
never under any circumstances do it: 
V96. Signing a petition  
V97. Joining in boycotts  
V98. Attending peaceful demonstrations  
 
WVS 6: Now I’d like you to look at this card. I’m going to read out some forms of 
political action that people can take, and I’d like you to tell me, for each one, 
whether you have done any of these things, whether you might do it or would 
never under any circumstances do it. 
V85. Signing a petition 
V86. Joining in boycotts  
V87. Attending peaceful demonstrations 
V88. Joining strikes119   
 
For both surveys, I reversed the original WVS coding, so that never was 0, might do was 
1, and have done was coded 2.  
Obviously reliance on a single survey measure is less than ideal. Therefore, the 
aforementioned concepts are interpreted broadly, to account for minor cultural 
differences (Birch 2008, 310). Since any questionable reliability would, if anything, 
depress significance levels, using these single-question outcome variables amounts to a 
more strict test of hypotheses than any index would.120 
 As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show, only signing a petition may be considered at all 
common. The median answer selection in both surveys for signing a petition and 
peacefully demonstrating was “might do,” but “never” for boycotting and, in WVS, for 
joining strikes. In fact, three-quarters of respondents responded that they would never 
                                                          
119 For both surveys, I opted not to use the question about “any other act of protest” (V99 in WVS5 and 
V89 in WVS6) because it is unclear. In other words, the question allows for each respondent to interpret 
what some other form of protest might be. The question also has a very low response rate. In WVS6, for 
example, only 6.8% responded affirmatively. And the question was not asked in Ecuador. 
120 Ordinal outcomes cannot be summed, of course. And, even were such statistically appropriate, it is 
unclear what summing “might sign a petition” and “might participate in a boycott” to a numerical 2 would 
actually mean. 
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participate in a boycott, and almost half of all respondents stated that they would never 
attend a peaceful demonstration. Because political activism is relatively more obvious 
and common121 in Latin America than in other parts of the developing world (Ortiz et al 
2013), suggesting these still quite low numbers might represent the upper end of any 
distribution of political activism worldwide. 
 
Figure 3.1: Political engagement in percent (WVS5) 
 
 
                                                          
121 Inglehart and Welzel note that public political activism – or protest – is most common in countries that 
promote self-expression values but in which citizens are experiencing disappointment, aka more 
developed countries (2005, 120). They note that disappointment in areas that do not prioritize self-
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Figure 3.2: Political engagement in percent (WVS6) 
 
 
Overall, the region shows a general aversion to boycotting. Signing a petition is, 
by contrast, the most frequently reported method of non-voting participation in both 
waves 5 and 6 of WVS. Demonstrating and striking fall in between the two 
aforementioned extremes.  
The crux of my argument is that historic variation in media relations should be 
manifested in modern day media consumption and participation. I therefore focus in 
this chapter on variation between countries for each of the aforementioned methods of 
political engagement and expect that consumers of news less aligned with government 
should participate more in change-oriented activities.  
As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show, there was significant variation between 
countries even for signing a petition, the most popular form of non-voting participation, 























Signing petition Joining boycott Peaceful demonstration Joining a strike
Political engagement (in percent) (WVS6)
Would never do Might do Have done
71 
modal response was “never” in Uruguay in both surveys, but was “might do” so in 
Argentina, Mexico and Peru in both surveys. The modal answer changed in Colombia, 
from “never” in WVS5 to “might do” in WVS6. Only in Chile and Ecuador did most of 
the population say they would never sign a petition. In Brazil in WVS5, more than half 
of the population had signed a petition, though the number was slightly below half in 
WVS6, bringing the median down to “might do” in WVS6 from “have done” in WVS5, 
though “have done” was the mode in both surveys. In summation, then, Ecuador and 
Brazil jump out as the most extreme cases of those unwilling and willing to sign 
petitions to participate. 
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Figure 3.4: Signing a petition (WVS6) 
 
 
That respondents were less willing to admit to even possibly joining a boycott122 
(Figures 3.5 and 3.6) is in line with concerns that consumer activism is an issue in the 
Global North that has not so far translated to the Global South (Griffiths 2011, Stolle and 
Micheletti 2013) since boycotts are historically less popular in Latin America than they 
have been in the United States, Canada, Japan and Europe (Klesner 2007).123 Colombia 
is the only country in either WVS5 or WVS6 to register double-digit participation in 
                                                          
122 The term “boycott” is more often used to describe parties’ not participating in elections seen as unjust 
or unfair than it is to describe a boycott or buycott like in industrialized democracies. 
123 Inglehart noted that boycotts tended to be more popular in post-materialist nations among citizens 
scoring high on cognitive mobilization (1990, 361-362). Latin American nations all score as having 
traditional (not secular-rational) values and, though they exhibit self-expression (not survival) values, 
score blow the English-speaking and Protestant Europe groupings (WVS6 cultural map). Uruguay, 
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boycotts. The modal response across the region was “never,” consistent with 
expectations from a decade ago (Klesner 2007).124  
 
Figure 3.5: Joining a boycott (WVS5) 
 
 
                                                          
124 Recent experimental results from Brazil show a greater generalized willingness to participate in 
business or social boycotts than in labor boycotts (strikes) (Andrade Cruz 2017). Such willingness is not 
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Figure 3.6: Joining a boycott (WVS6) 
 
 
Marches and assemblies as a form of protest are more common in Latin America 
than in other parts of the world (Ortiz et al 2013),125 as evidenced by the fact that, except 
for Ecuador, having demonstrated at some point yields double-digit response across the 
region (Figures 3.7 and 3.8). The topic of protest will be tackled in depth in the next 
chapter, but the WVS data covering only 8 countries already show important variation 
by country, with between 5% and 17% of persons who have joined a strike, a more 
extreme form of protest, according to WVS6 (Figure 3.9). These numbers roughly 
resemble other findings from the region, in which protest has only been “normalized” in 
Bolivia and Argentina, with all other countries reporting less than 20 percent who have 
participated, with the median country around 10 percent (Moseley and Morena 2010). 
                                                          
125 For reference to show that Latin America averages above the mean, in WVS6, on the whole sample, 
12.5% of respondents said they had attended peaceful demonstrations at some point, but the range was 
large: 1.7% in China, 2.6% in Azerbaijan, and 3.6% in Japan versus 24.7% in Nigeria, 24.9% in Spain and 
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Within this sample, Ecuador is the outlier, with almost three-quarters never even 
considering protesting and only 7.4% reporting they had done so. 
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Figure 3.8: Attending peaceful demonstrations (WVS6) 
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Overall, there is great variation in participation rates, both by activity and by 
country. The disaggregated results for boycotts and strikes in WVS6 show that boycotts 
are especially unpopular as a means of political activism in Latin America. But, on all 
measures, cross-national differentiation is apparent, suggesting different mechanisms 
or pressures at work that merit further investigation.  
   
Independent Variables 
News media consumption links media reputation to behavior. I operationalize news 
consumption as frequency of consumption and use WVS's standard frequency measure 
of news consumption. The response choices for these questions were binary in WVS5 
and ordinal in WVS6:  
WVS 5: People use different sources to learn what is going on in their country and 
the world. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you used it 
last week or did not use it last week to obtain information: 
V223. Daily newspaper 
V224. News broadcasts on radio or TV 
V228. Internet, Email  
 
WVS 6: People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various 
sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it to 
obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never:  
V217. Daily newspaper  
V219. TV news  
V220. Radio news  
V222. Email  
V223. Internet  
 
I reversed the WVS5 coding, so that “never” was 0 and “used last week” 1. WVS6 coding 
was also reversed so that “not used last week” was 0, “less than monthly” was 1, 
“monthly” was coded 2, “weekly” 3 and “daily” was 4. The result was that an increase in 
number reflects an actual increase in frequency of use for responses on both scales.  
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The most important difference between the two questions is not the scaling. 
Rather, WVS 5 combined television and radio consumption into one question. This 
assumes an overlap of audience and/or purpose for the two media platforms, which I 
would contend problematic given that, in some countries, television and radio may 
fulfill different roles or have different relationships with their government. 
Most Latin Americans consumes news – between 50% and 81% of people in each 
country – on a daily basis (Maldonado 2011b). Latin Americans consume more media 
than residents of any other region (Karaian 2015), but they vary in the platforms they 
use, as shown in Figures 3.10 and 3.11. 
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Figure 3.11: News consumption (in percent) (WVS6) 
 
 
Examining news consumption by country, television is the ubiquitous means to 
learn about current events, with around 90% of respondents in WVS5 saying they had 
used TV for news last week (Figure 3.12). That high usage held up through WVS6 
(Figure 3.13), with the finer grain of detail in that survey showing that over 70% of 
respondents across the region in fact use television daily for news. This lack of variation 
may make it difficult to draw inferences about the relationship between television news 
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Figure 3.12: Television news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5) 
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WVS6 shows much more variation by country after radio was decoupled from 
television (Figure 3.14), with between 35% and 59% using radio for news daily, but also 
between 10% and 36% never using it. There is no consistent tendency visible. For 
example, countries showing the highest radio news consumption, Uruguay and Peru, are 
at very different levels of human development (54 and 87, respectively, according to the 
United Nations) and on different sides of the continent. Argentina and Chile are the 
most developed countries in region (45 and 40, respectively, according to the United 
Nations) and show very similar radio use news numbers, while sharing a border. 
Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and share borders but exhibit different radio news 
tendencies. Finally, the distribution for Brazil is bimodal, with its skew different than 
any of the countries in the sample, save Mexico.  
This variation is important because radio is rarely considered as an explanatory 
variable in studies of behavior, which are dominated by studies from the industrialized 
world. Yet Stromback and Shehata (2010) show that political interest particularly drives 
consumption of radio news and public service broadcast television in Europe. And Sen 
(2003) finds that radio was important for Indonesian democratization, not merely 
because it was more economically and geographically accessible than other technologies, 
but in fact over and above that, since radio allows for multiple cultural narratives. Being 
able to extrapolate differences in this data offers a unique opportunity to compare radio 
to other media platforms and see if consumers behave similarly in areas where radio 
serves a potentially quite different purpose or demographic than it does in Europe or the 
United States.  
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Figure 3.14: Radio news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5) 
 
 
Newspapers have historically been luxury items in developing countries. 
Increases in wealth and prosperity tend to correlate with increases in newspaper 
readership, which has explained increased sales in the developing world in recent years 
(Economist 2008b).  But, in this sample in Latin America at least, there is no consistent 
pattern. Readership in Chile and Peru during WVS5, for example, are very similar 
despite notable differences in development and literacy (Chojkier 2012). Disaggregation 
of possible responses in WVS6 shows more weekly use than daily newspaper readership 
across the region. Some of the greatest variation across space seems to be among those 
who never or almost never (less than monthly) read a newspaper – from about 11% in 
Peru and 17% in Ecuador versus over 60% in Uruguay. 
Switching focus from across space to over time, weekly (or more) newspaper use 
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detailed question in WVS6 yielded higher reported (weekly or more) newspaper 
readership in Argentina, Brazil and Peru. Readership in Chile remained steady between 
the two survey waves. Newspaper circulation fell 8.4% in 2016 and 12.10% since 2011 
(World Press Trends 2017), suggesting that numbers in WVS7 may not be so robust. 
Despite worldwide declines in newspaper readership (Smith 2016), newspaper 
readership in Latin America was expected to grow over the past decade (Magro 2010). 
But surveys done in 2014 and 2016 by the Secretaria Especial de Comunicação Social in 
Brazil for example, found that over three-quarters and two-thirds, respectively, in all age 
groups reported never reading a printed newspaper (Statista NDc, Statistta NDd). 
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Figure 3.16: Newspaper use (in percent) by country (WVS5) 
 
 
As shown in Figures 3.17 and 3.18, Internet is the least used media platform in 
Latin America. Even among this sample of countries relatively developed for Latin 
America, over two-thirds of respondents in the sample reported not having used the 
Internet for news last week in WVS5. By WVS6, anywhere from 33% in Chile to almost 
60% in Uruguay still never used the Internet for news. Only in Chile in WVS6, in fact, 
was the number using Internet for news daily larger than the percentage never using the 
Internet for news. The most obvious pattern in the WVS6 data is that, across the 
sampled countries, the distribution is relatively bimodal, with respondents regularly 
using Internet for news or never doing so. This is intuitive in places where Internet 
access is more cost prohibitive than it is in industrialized democracies. 
To put this data in context, in 2008, as data collection for in WVS5 was drawing 
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increase to only 43 percent overall by 2012 (UNDP).126 In 2012, when WVS6 was in the 
field, only between 4 and 18 percent of Latin Americans used social media to express 
political views or learn about politics (Brunelle 2013).  
That said, thinking across time, equally notable is the increase in Internet news 
consumption between Wave 5 (2005-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014) five years later. 
Between 2010 and 2015, households online in Latin America nearly doubled (CEPAL 
2016). There is still marked regional variation not captured by WVS 5 or WVS 6, as 
household Internet penetration remains below 15% in three countries127 in the region 
(CEPAL 2016). 
 
Figure 3.17: Internet news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS5) 
 
 
                                                          
126 In 2012, 42.5 percent of Latins in the less developed countries were Internet users, suggesting a stark 
digital divide across the region, including in the higher income areas (UNDP). 
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Figure 3.18: Internet news consumption (in percent) by country (WVS6) 
 
 
Summary of regional media consumption 
While television news consumption is ubiquitous across the region, consumption 
of news via the other media platforms was less ubiquitous. Though responses in WVS5, 
with the combined TV/radio question, were seemingly driven by television news 
consumption (extrapolating from WVS6), radio news consumption in WVS6 was still 
quite high, with at least weekly radio news consumption being the median response in 
every country except Brazil. 
The distributions for regular radio and Internet news consumption in WVS6 are 
practically mirror images of each other, with 43 percent of respondents using radio daily 
for news and 49 percent never using Internet for news. Put another way, even in 2012, 
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Despite receiving the bulk of scholarly attention, Internet news consumption was still 
relatively rare for news consumption in Latin America, while conversely, radio news 
consumption remains quite popular despite being mostly bypassed by scholars.  
Consumption patterns vary widely by country. Uruguay, for example, despite 
having the highest literacy rate of the countries128 (about 98.5% in 2015 according to the 
World Bank), shows the lowest average use of newspapers in both waves of the survey. 
Chile in WVS5 and Peru in WVS6 showed the highest average use of multiple media 
platforms. No immediate reason for why the countries would have dominated news 
consumption in each wave is apparent. Neither country was holding a major election 
while the survey was being administered129 and, though 2006 was a World Cup year, 
neither country qualified. Chile and Peru are, of course, both within the Latin America 
section but nonetheless score quire differently on the Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Maps130 
for those successive waves.  
 
                                                          
128 Latest available data put literacy at just over 97% in Argentina, just under 92% in Brazil, just over 96% 
in Chile, and just over 94% in both Mexico and Peru. Literacy was lowest in the region in El Salvador and 
Honduras, at approximately 85%. 
129 Survey years 2006 for Chile in WVS5 and 2012 for Peru in WVS6.  
130 Inglehart and Welzel’s map rests on the idea that basic values are closely correlated and can be broken 
into two dimensions: traditional vs secular-rational values and survival vs self-expression values. “Each 
country is positioned according to its people's values and not its geographical location. To a large extent 
the two coincide, but the map measures cultural proximity, not geographical proximity. Thus, Australia, 
Canada, the U.S. and Great Britain are cultural neighbors, reflecting their relatively similar values, despite 
their geographical dispersion” (Inglehart and Welzel 2011, 4). 
88 
Other predictors 
 In high-choice media environments, political interest is an important predictor of 
news consumption (Strömbäck, Djerf-Pierre and Shehata 2013).131 WVS5 and WVS6 
include the same question to gauge political interest: 
How interested would you say you are in politics? Are you: Very interested; 
Somewhat interested; Not very interested; Not at all interested132 
 
I reversed the original WVS coding, so that “not at all interested” was 0, “not very 
interested” was 1, “somewhat interested” was coded 2, and “very interested” coded 3.  
 Across the Western Hemisphere, though interest in politics is highest in the 
United States and Canada, citizens in all countries average between “a little” and “some” 
political interest (Helms, Rosenjack, and Schultz 2016).  By comparison, for all 
countries across both surveys, the median response in Latin America was “not very 
interested,” as shown in Figures 3.19 and 3.20. The modal response though, for both 
surveys, was not at all interested. Interest in politics would seemingly drive news 
consumption less in Latin America than in other areas. But it should be included in 
analyses for maximal comparability with other regions. 
 
                                                          
131 The relationship is “both casual and reciprocal” (Strömbäck and Shehata 2010, 592), but strongest for 
political news. As shown above, the WVS survey question about news asks about finding out what is going 
on in the country, likely reflecting exposure to more political news than to non-political news. 
132 Question v95 in WVS5 and V84 in WVS 6 
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Figure 3.19: Relative frequency of interest in politics (WVS5) 
  
 
Figure 3.20: Relative frequency of interest in politics (WVS6) 
 
 
Country-by-country, the general lack of interest in politics holds up. The modal 
response across the region was “not at all interested” or “somewhat interested” in 
politics, with one notable exception: Brazil in WVS5. The modal response at that point 
in that country was “somewhat interested,” but was not replicated in WVS6. The survey 
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was fielded from November 1 to December 26, 2006. Brazil was knocked out of the 
World Cup in June 2006 and President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was reelected in 
October 2006. There had been an outbreak of gang violence in May 2006 (Economist 
2006b), but nothing so widespread later in the year. Peru also had elections in 2006, a 
few months before the survey was fielded there in December but shows no such 
anomaly. In fact, only in Brazil and Uruguay in WVS5 does the number “very” interested 
in politics reach double digits, a result not replicated in either country in WVS6, which 
calls into question how much weight should be attached to any findings about political 
interest in WVS5 if they are not replicated in analyses of data in WVS6. 
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Figure 3.22: Interest in politics by country (WVS6) 
 
 
Sex, education and income have repeatedly been shown to correlate with 
increased political participation (Brady, Verba and Scholzman 1995). Fifty-four percent 
of WVS5 and 53% of WVS6 Latin American respondents were female133, slightly higher 
than the sex ratio worldwide (World Bank). Latin America exhibits a notable surplus 
female population beginning around age 15 to a greater extent than the rest of the world 
does (Diniz Alves, Cavenaghi and Martine 2013), which might explain the slightly higher 
female representation in the sample.  
There is a 0.3899 correlation between education and income in WVS5 and 
0.3023 in WVS6.134 Because income questions on cross-national surveys have been 
criticized on validity grounds, especially with WVS (Donnelly and Pop-Eleches 2016), I 
                                                          
133 Question v235 in WVS5 and V240 in WVS6 
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opted to only include education. A 2016 survey by the Secretaria Especial de 
Comunicação Social in Brazil and IBOPE Inteligência showed that differences in media 
platform choice became more apparent when education level was considered (Statista 
NDe). The WVS question for education offers a nine-point response scale, with the 
options listed in Table 3.2.135 The scale is not exactly linear with regard to educational 
attainment, as it distinguishes between technical/vocational school and university, with 
incomplete university ranked higher than complete vocational school.136 
 
Table 3.2: Relative frequency distribution of educational attainment 
 WVS 5 WVS 6 
No formal education 2.85 1.81 
Incomplete primacy school 16.19 11.87 
Complete primary school 15.55 13.82 
Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 13.99 9.16 
Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 22.24 17.94 
Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 3.58 9.02 
Complete secondary: university-preparatory type 7.27 15.84 
Some university-level education, without degree 7.87 9.17 
University-level education, with degree 10.45 11.36 
n 7,458 10,218 
Median 5 5 
 
At the country level, median education was 4 in half the countries (Argentina, Brazil and 
Uruguay) and 5 in the other half (Mexico, Chile and Peru). Median education was 
highest (6) in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia and lowest (4) in Uruguay in WVS6.  
                                                          
135 Question v238 in WVS5 and V248 in WVS6 
136 As a point of comparison, the AmericasBarometer question on education (ED in the 2014 root 
questionnaire) asks about years of schooling between 0 and 18. It scores post-secondary non-university 
schooling as equivalent to university non-degree but does not distinguish between types of secondary 
schools. 
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Age is an especially important correlate of Internet use (Pew Research Center 
2015). For WVS 5, mean age was 41.04 (SD 16.63) with median 38. In WVS6, mean age 
was 41.05 (SD 16.54), with median 39. The range for both surveys was ages 18 to 97.137  
There is significant variation by country (Table 3.3). The sample in Uruguay 
skews much older than in the rest of the region. Mexico and Peru have the lowest mean 
ages. The standard deviations are highest in Uruguay and Argentina in both surveys. 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for age  
 Mean SD Min Max n 
ARG (WVS5) 42.55 17.59 18 88 1002 
ARG (WVS6) 43.17 17.61 18 92 1030 
BRZ (WVS5) 39.96 15.68 18 84 1499 
BRZ (WVS6) 42.82 16.37 18 98 1486 
CHL (WVS5) 42.93 16.98 18 85 1000 
CHL (WVS6) 43.89 16.29 18 85 1000 
COL (WVS6) 40.41 15.79 18 82 1512 
ECU (WVS6) 39.81 16.14 18 97 1202 
MEX (WVS5) 39.69 15.72 18 87 1550 
MEX (WVS6) 37.48 15.18 18 93 2000 
PER (WVS5) 37.62 14.90 18 89 1500 
PER (WVS6) 39.42 16.40 18 88 1210 
URU (WVS5) 46.53 18.65 18 97 1000 
URU (WVS6) 44.99 18.28 18 88 1000 
 
Age is important to consider in the model, as the opportunities for having done 
anything increases almost definitionally with age. For that same reason, it is also 
potentially problematic. Therefore, all models will be run with and without age as a 
variable.138 I further broke age into seven categories: below 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-
                                                          
137 Quantile breakdown was identical for both surveys, in fact, with age 27 at the 25th percentile and age 53 
at the 75th. 
138 There is no reason to believe that the effect of age on participation would be parabolic, as the 
operationalization of the dependent variable is. Were the question worded to ask about binary 
participation in the past year, for example, the time constraints on those in middle age might limit 
responses. But that is not the case for the questions in WVS5 or WVS6. 
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69, 70-79, and 80 or above. This preserves the effect of age, broadly conceived, without 
the noise of a yearly measure.  
Figure 3.23: Age distribution by country (WVS5) 
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Figure 3.24: Age distribution by country (WVS6) 
 
 
Urbanization is also important as a correlate of Internet use139 and potentially for 
the opportunity to participate in more political activities, as they are more likely in 
urban centers.140 At approximately 80%, Latin America is more urbanized than Europe 
(USAID 2010). but has a much bigger digital divide than industrialized democracies. 
Computer penetration also outpaces Internet penetration (CEPAL 2006), which may be 
exacerbated in rural areas. For example, across seven Latin countries studied, living in a 
rural area was negatively associated with computer and Internet use (Grazzi and 
Vergara 2014, 340-341).141  
                                                          
139 Galperin (2017) notes that supply-side determinants are only part of why people do not go online. 
140 Kawashima-Ginsberg and Sullivan (2017) note that many rural youth in the United States, for example, 
are systematically less exposed to opportunities for political learning or engagement. 
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WVS5 and WVS6 both have the interviewer note the size of the town, from under 
2,000 in habitants (coded 1) to larger than half a million (coded 8).142 For both surveys, 
median city size was between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. In both surveys, over 
two-thirds of respondents reported living in the largest cities of over 100,000 residents. 
I therefore collapsed the coding into four items: below 20,000; 20,000 to 100,000; 
100,000 to 500,000 (coded 7 in the original survey); and over 500,000. 
Table 3.4: Urban-rural distribution (in percent) 






ARG (WVS5) 19.96 9.98 7.98 62.08 
ARG (WVS6) 15.53 13.59 7.77 63.11 
BRZ (WVS5) 16.67 26.67 26.67 30.00 
BRZ (WVS6) 10.95 30.47 19.37 39.20 
CHL (WVS5) 0 16.10 83.90 0 
CHL (WVS6) 5.70 5.90 34.01 54.30 
COL (WVS6) 4.76 33.33 23.81 38.10 
ECU (WVS6) 2.41 27.95 52.75 16.89 
MEX (WVS5) 33.85 14.62 21.54 30.00 
MEX (WVS6) 42.38 32.06 7.30 18.27 
PER 
(WVS6)143 
37.36 19.59 40.50 2.56 
URU (WVS5) 34.90 21.50 0 43.60 
URU (WVS6) 14.60 30.97 0.14 54.30 
 
The centralized responses from Chile in WVS5 (with no responses at either 
extreme) are strange, since the question was worded the same as the other surveys and 
there was no issue with non-response, as it was an interviewer-filled item. In 2002, the 
Chilean census estimated the population of the capital Santiago at around 5.5 million in 
                                                          
142 Question V255 in WVS5 and V253 in WVS6. Full original coding: under 2000 (1); 2000 to 5000 (2); 
5000 to 10,000 (3); 10,000 to 20,000 (4); 20,000 to 50,000 (5); 50,000 to 100,000 (6); 100,000 to 
500,000 (7); 500,000 or more (8). 
143 Question not included for Peru in WVS5 
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habitants, or about one-third the population of the country, according to the World 
Bank.  
Ideology is a means to study political leanings when party affiliation or vote 
choice may not be comparable in a cross-national context. Put another way, comparing 
party identification is normal for one-country studies, but party identification does not 
translate across borders144 and may, in high turnover environments, be unreliable. For 
example, a quarter of Brazilian lower house members have changed parties since 2015 
(Clavery, Holanda and Bramatti 2017; @bruceecurb 2017). WVS mentions this problem 
itself. In the root questionnaire for WVS5, question V233a included the following 
caveat: 
“Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Christian Democrat, a Social 
Democrat, a supporter of some other party or don’t you have any strong party 
loyalty?” [NOTE: This question is optional because it may not work in societies 
having a fragmented or unstable party system.]” 
 
In such fragmented societies, the preferred alternative is to compare self-
reported ideology. Further, ideology has become salient to Latin American electoral 
politics in the past two decades, as the “pink tide” of leftist candidates have swept into 
office (Remmer 2012; Seligson 2007). WVS5 and WVS6 both operationalized the 
concept with the same question: 
In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place 
your views on this scale, generally speaking? (Code one number): 
Left  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Right145 
 
                                                          
144 WVS mentions this issue itself. In the root questionnaire for WVS5, for example, this question was 
included: “V233a. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Christian Democrat, a Social 
Democrat, a supporter of some other party or don’t you have any strong party loyalty? [NOTE: This 
question is optional because it may not work in societies having a fragmented or unstable party system.]” 
145 Question V114 in WVS5 and V95 in WVS6 
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The median and mode for both WVS5 and WVS6 was 5.146 At the country level, only 
Mexico (in both waves) and Colombia (in WVS6) had means not the center point, but 
rather at 6 (slightly right-leaning147).148 
Including race or some measure of indigenous status or colorism would be 
appropriate. Both surveys have the interviewer code race,149 but race or skin color is not 
included in the forthcoming models. The question (v256) was not asked in Argentina in 
either wave of the survey. More problematically, where it was asked, is not clearly 
scalable, nor was the question consistent: 
For Ecuador and Chile in WVS6 and Mexico in both waves of the survey, the 
question included the following options, which tracks to studies of colorism: White, light 
brown, dark brown, Black, Indigenous, other. For other countries, the same choices 
were not included: 
Uruguay (both waves): Caucasian/White, Black, South Asian (Hindu, Pakistani), 
East Asian (Chinese, Japanese), Arabic/Central Asian, other 
 
Colombia: Indigenous, Afro-Colombiano, Gypsy, none 
 
                                                          
146 Modal response at 32% of all respondents in both waves. 
147 The lack of left-leaning voices may be an artifact of the countries in WVS. There is also some evidence 
that the region is turning away from leftist leaders after years of economic stagnation or recession (Haynie 
2017, Kraul 2016, Sharma 2016) 
148 Before beginning regression analysis, it is important to check for multicollinearity, lest sampling 
variance be so large as to be useless (Fox 2008, 331). The only high correlation is between education and 
Internet news consumption, at 0.4965 and 0.4798 in WVS5 and WVS6, respectively. The variable 
inflation factor (VIF) provides an index that measures how much the variance of a coefficient might be 
increased due to collinearity. An index of 2 would mean that the standard error, used to construct the 
confidence interval, were 1.44 times (the square root of 2), as large as it would be if the factors are 
uncorrelated. VIF on the samples show no problematic collinearity. Testing for VIF in: 
• WVS5, none of the confidence intervals approach two, which would suggest collinearity: country 
(1.08), female (1.02), age (1.15), education (1.60), interest in politics (1.06), ideology (1.02), income 
(1.28), newspaper (1.20), TV/radio (1.05), Internet (1.42). 
• WVS6, none of the confidence intervals approach two, which would suggest collinearity: country 
(1.05), female (1.03), age (1.20), income(1.17), education (1.44), ideology (1.01), interest in politics 
(1.06), newspaper (1.18), television (1.05), radio (1.09), Internet (1.48). 
149 V256 in WVS5 and V254 in WVS6 
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Additionally, there was in-country variation between survey waves: 
Brazil WVS5: White, Black, Moreno (dark) or Pardo (brown), Asian, Indigenous, 
other 
 
Brazil WVS6: White, Black, East Asian, Indigenous, Mixed race, other 
 
Peru WVS5: White, Mestizo (European-indigenous), Quechua, Aymara150, 
Amazonian, Black 
 
Peru WVS6: White/European, Indigenous, Indigenous mixed, European-
indigenous, Afro-indigenous, Asian-indigenous, Other foreign/ethnic origin, 
other 
 
Arguably most problematically, in Chile in WVS5, the interviewer did not note 
ethnicity but the question was asked in a way to gauge self-identified race or ethnicity: 
“How would you describe yourself ethnically?”151 Choices were as follows: Asian, Black, 
Indigenous, Mestizo (European-indigenous), Mulato (Afro-indigenous), White, Other. 
The methodological appendix for the survey notes that answers were then recoded as 
follows: Asian cases were dropped, Black remained the same, Indigenous and Mulato 
were combined with “other” cases, and White and Mestizo were combined as White. 
This reflects not only a potentially quite important judgement call – for example 
assuming that White Chileans and Mestizo Chileans are similar enough to be grouped 
together – but also removed almost all variation from the question, as White and 
Mestizo accounted for 881 of 1000 respondents.  
For these various reasons, I have opted to exclude race/ethnicity/color from the 
cross-national analysis, as it could not be scaled by skin tone.  
 
                                                          
150 Quecha and Aymara are specific indigenous ethnicities in country. 
151 Question S1 substituted for V256: ¿A qué raza se considera perteneciente Usted? 
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Regression Model 
To test the importance of each individual medium on political participation, I 
constructed generalized ordered logit models for each country. My decision to do so was 
influenced by two factors. First, the limited number of countries available for analysis in 
the data render hierarchical linear modeling analysis (HLM) inappropriate.152  
Second, because the response levels for the participation variables are ordered 
categories, ranging from “never” (0) to “have done” (2), the logical alternative was to use 
ordered logit regression. However, using ordered logit assumes proportional parallel 
lines or parallel regressions (Williams 2006), meaning that the values for the 
independent variables should stay constant regardless of whether the response level for 
the dependent variable changes from the lowest to the middle category or from the 
middle to the highest category. However, a Brant test (1990) demonstrated that this 
assumption did not hold for most of the countries in my sample across all forms of 
political engagement. Specifically, for petitioning in WVS5, for example, all countries 
except Brazil fail the Brant test by showing a significant p-value on a Chi-squared test. 
Four of six countries in WVS5 fail the Brant test for demonstrating, with regular ordered 
logit only appropriate in Brazil and Chile. In WVS6, for petitioning, all eight countries 
failed the Brant test; and seven of eight fail the Brant test for striking, with only Ecuador 
passing the test for that form of participation. 
Generalized ordered logit regression relaxes the assumption of parallel lines 
without losing the ordering of the categories, as multinomial logit would have (R 
                                                          
152 Significant variations at the country-level, such as for political participation as well as for media 
consumption, usually calls for analysis using hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), but HLM usually 
requires having a minimum of 15 countries to yield unbiased results when the outcome of interest is at the 
individual level (Stegmueller 2013, 753). See Woltman et al (2012) for more on when HLM is appropriate 
to use.  
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Williams 2016).153 Relaxing the assumption of proportionality also allows for testing if 
the variables are truly ordinal (Williams 2006).154 For rare events, such as boycotting or 
strikes, committing to the decision to participate could be much different than changing 
one’s mind from “never” doing something to “possibly” doing something.   
Generalized ordered logit can be sensitive to over-specification. Specifically, 
overspecified models can yield negative predicted probabilities.155  If few in number, 
negative predicted probabilities are not a problem. But, when numerous, negative 
predicted probabilities suggest a simpler model is preferable (R Williams 2016). In 
those cases for which generalized ordered logit is too sensitive, the recommendation is 
to use ordered logit, dropping the variables that violate the Brant test (R Williams 
2016).156 In this analysis, that variable was age. That might be somewhat attributable to 
question wording in WVS or to a respondent’s becoming more comfortable with age 
saying she “might” or “has” participated. The results below report the most appropriate 
model for each possible political activity: generalized ordered logit for petitioning, 
regular ordered logit for boycotting, generalized ordered logit for peaceful 
demonstrations and ordered logit for joining a strike. 
                                                          
153 Generalized ordered logit models “can be less restrictive than proportional odds models, whose 
assumptions are often violated, and more parsimonious than methods like multinomial logit that ignore 
the ordering of categories altogether” (Williams 2010, 1)  
154 Boes and Winkelmann (2004) use generalized ordered logit to show more nuance in the relationship 
between income and happiness than ordered logit would illustrate. Using generalized ordered logit, they 
find that the marginal probability of increased happiness attributable to income increases by more than 
50% over findings employing regular ordered logit (2004, 20). 
155This warning message appears: WARNING! X in-sample cases have an outcome with a predicted 
probability that is less than 0. 
156 Whole models can violate the parallel assumption, but that is often attributable to specific variables in 
the model. Stata reports failures for the overall model as well as its component parts, allowing one to 
discern which variables are throwing off any given model.  
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To test the importance of each individual medium, the equation for WVS5 is: 
 
Type of Political participation = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education level 
+ β4Left-Right Ideology + β5City Size + β6Political Interest + β7Frequency 
of newspaper readership + β8Frequency of TV/radio news consumption+ 
β9Frequency of Internet news use + ε 
 
To test the importance of each individual medium, the equation for WVS6 is: 
 
Type of Political participation = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education level 
+ β4Left-Right Ideology + β5City Size + β6Political Interest + β7Frequency 
of newspaper readership + β8Frequency of TV news consumption+ 
β9Frequency of radio news consumption + β10Frequency of Internet news 
use+ ε 
 
The section below presents results. The next section will discuss implications of 
the statistical findings relative to theory presented in the previous chapter. 
 
Findings 
To begin extrapolating the relationship between news consumption and type of 
political participation, I first look at the least onerous type of activity: signing a 
petition.157 Results of the generalized ordered logit for signing a petition are provided in 
Table 3.7.  
 
                                                          
157 Using simple ordered logit, all countries except Chile in WVS6 show a violation of the parallel odds 
assumption, largely attributable to age. Grouping age into deciles solves the Brant problem only for Brazil 
in WVS5. Employing generalized ordered logit seems, therefore, preferable for petitioning. 
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Table 3.5: Generalized ordered logit model coefficients for petitioning by country in WVS5 and WVS6 
 Argentina 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




  0.2566   0.3262 - 0.1109   0.2418 
Age 
 
- 0.0060    0.0003 - 0.0005   0.1010 
Education 
 
  0.2681***   0.1988***   0.0915*   0.1187* 
City Size 
 
- 0.0839   0.3468***   0.1451*   0.0179 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0661 - 0.1609** - 0.1403** - 0.1790*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.5036***  0.3217**   0.5234**   0.4317*** 
News-
paper use 
- 0.0418   0.2945   0.0610   0.0442 
TV news 
use 
  0.3750   0.1574   0.3850***   0.0697 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0456   0.0025 
Internet 
news use 
  0.2702   0.2184   0.1224*   0.2072*** 
n 636 760 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit model coefficients for petitioning by country in WVS5 and 
WVS6 
 Brazil 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.0013 - 0.1675 - 0.1356 - 0.0088 
Age 
 
- o.0140** - 0.0063 - 0.0159** - 0.0039 
Education 
 
  0.2061***   0.1810***   0.0153***   0.1206*** 
City Size 
 
  0.2124**   0.3067*** - 0.0497   0.1497* 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0517 - 0.0366 - 0.0082 - 0.0488* 
Political 
Interest 
 0.4005***   0.2215***   0.3950***   0.3216*** 
News-
paper use 
- 0.1195 - 0.0295 - 0.0381 - 0.0445 
TV news 
use 
  0.8441***   0.5266**   0.0821   0.2060** 
Radio 
news use 
- 0.0335   0.0126 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1620   0.3385 - 0.0083   0.1087* 
n 1324 1014 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in 
WVS5 and WVS6 
 Chile Colombia WV6 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.0276 - 0.1347 - 0.1415   0.1703   0.0154   0.2314 
Age 
 
- 0.0033   0.0177*   0.0088   0.0216**   0.0083   0.0423*** 
Education 
 
  0.1628***   0.1942   0.0102   0.1395*   0.1965***   0.2151*** 
City Size 
 
- 0.3528 - 0.2703 - 0.3602** - 0.2867*   0.0551 - 0.0227 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0755 -0.0742 - 0.1336** - 0.1757***   0.0282 - 0.0410 
Political 
Interest 
  0.5831***   0.5723***   0.4592***   0.4601***   0.4575***   0.3594*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.2679  0.2025 - 0.0149  0.0882   0.1145*   0.0346 
TV news 
use 
- 0.8358*   0.2847 - 0.2431 - 0.0385**   0.0179 - 0.0264 
Radio 
news use 
- 0.0182 - 0.1830** - 0.0235 - 0.0055 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1037   0.3955   0.3128***   0.2891***   0.1841***   0.2232*** 
n 690 659 1206 




Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country 
in WVS5 and WVS6 
 Ecuador WVS6158 Mexico 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




  0.0320   0.2107 - 0.1478 - 0.8463 - 0.1277   0.0588 
Age 
 
- 0.0003   0.0131*   0.0007   0.3147*** - 0.0012   0.0301*** 
Education 
 
  0.0627   0.0993*   0.116***   0.1561***   0.1839***   0.2042*** 
City Size 
 
  0.4775***   0.3510** - 0.0272   0.0114 - 0.1159* - 0.0650 
Left-right 
ideology 
-0.0965*** - 0.0511 - 0.0109 - 0.0123   0.0138 - 0.0007 
Political 
Interest 
  0.3258***   0.0594   0.5028***   0.6019***  0.3860***   0.3021*** 
News-
paper use 
- 0.1283*   0.0947   0.4192   0.0244   0.0589   0.0345 
TV news 
use 
-0.1471   0.0794   0.3545   0.0939   0.0742   0.0762 
Radio 
news use 
  0.1227* - 0.0041 - 0.0193   0.0010 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1687***   0.0663   0.3904*   0.3180   0.1225**   0.1086** 
n 1138 1251 1872 




                                                          
158 Three cases returned a negative predicted probability. 
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Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country 
in WVS5 and WVS6 
 Peru 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.1222 - 0.2344 - 0.2331   0.0635 
Age 
 
  0.0010   0.0222***   0.0005   0.0219*** 
Education 
 
  0.1273***   0.2071***   0.0943*   0.0989* 
City Size 
 
  - 0.1183 - 0.2060* 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0359 - 0.0425 - 0.0208 - 0.0345 
Political 
Interest 
  0.5701***   0.4647***   0.3877***   0.4967*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.1208   0.0258   0.0153 - 0.1618 
TV news 
use 
  0.0712   0.2446   0.1238   0.4153 
Radio 
news use 
- 0.1932*** - 0.1629* 
Internet 
news use 
- 0.1222 - 0.4569**   0.0320   0.0190 
n 1083 924 





Table 3.5 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for petitioning (coefficients) by country by country in 
WVS5 and WVS6 
 Uruguay 
 WVS5 WVS6159 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




  0.0328   0.0460 - 0.1912   0.1457 
Age 
 
- 0.0016   0.0121* - 0.0035   0.0299*** 
Education 
 
  0.1243*   0.1830***   0.1691***   0.0981 
City Size 
 
  0.0619   0.1559* - 0.0430 - 0.1882* 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0782* - 0.1185** - 0.0354 - 0.1398*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.6278***  0.5743***   0.3064**   0.4423*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.1119   0.3322   0.0885   0.0465 
TV news 
use 
  0.6850*   0.6014 - 0.1669   0.0115 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0394 - 0.0851 
Internet 
news use 
- 0.2277 - 0.0498   0.0100   0.2509*** 
n 848 580 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                          
159 Nine cases returned a negative predicted probability. 
109 
Beginning by comparing within each wave, among the six countries in WVS5, 
only political interest and education were consistently significant for petitioning, with 
no media consumption variables at all consistently significant across the sample. Within 
WVS6, only Internet news consumption shows up regularly as a media predictor of 
petitioning, with political interest and education the most regular non-media predictors. 
The significance of the other media variables in WVS6 is sporadic. 
Changing gears to look across space instead of time, only Internet news 
consumption performed in line with expectations, but only in WVS6. In WVS5, there 
was no relationship between petitioning and Internet news consumption. I did observe 
the relationship being significant, though in opposite directions, in two outlier countries 
for WVS5: for transitioning from the “would never” to either “might” or “have done” 
response levels in Mexico and for transitioning move from “would never” or “might” to 
“have done” in Peru. In Mexico, when all else is held constant, answering in the 
affirmative for Internet news consumption in the previous week results in a 47.8% 
increase in the odds of the respondent indicating that she might sign or had signed a 
petition. In Peru, however, answering in the affirmative for Internet news consumption 
resulted in a 46.7% decrease in the odds of the respondent indicating that he “has 
signed” as opposed to “might sign” or “would never” sign a petition. WVS5 was fielded 
in Mexico in late 2005 and in Peru in late 2006, at which time Internet penetration was 
only about 16% in both countries (Mexico Internet Association and Computer Industry 
Almanac cited by Internet World Statistics).160 A large impact on a small portion of the 
population could have appeared as an outsized effect.  
                                                          
160 Retrieved from Internet World Statistics country pages for Mexico and Peru (April 28, 2018).  
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For seven out of eight countries in WVS6, Internet news consumption had a 
consistently positive and significant relationship with petitioning. For Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Mexico, Internet news consumption was positive and significant for both 
cutpoints for petitioning (“would never” to “might do” or “have done” and “would never” 
or “might do” to “have done”). For Ecuador, Internet news consumption was significant 
for going from “would never” to “might” or “have done” and, in Uruguay, it was for the 
move from “would never” or “might” to “have done.” In most cases, the significance 
represented an 11% to 25% change. The outlier was Chile, with an over 30% impact on 
both decision points.161 Interestingly, in Peru, Internet news consumption was not 
significant for petitioning in WVS6, despite having been in WVS5. 
There were very few instances in which newspaper readership was significant for 
petitioning in either waves: positive and significant in Colombia and negative and 
significant in Ecuador, in both cases for the move from “would never” to “might” or 
“have done” in WVS6. In Colombia, newspaper readership was associated with a 12% 
increase in likelihood for responding that one had petitioned; whilst in Ecuador the 
same was associated with a 12% decrease.162  
For the combined TV/radio measure in WVS5, answering in the affirmative for 
TV/radio news consumption in the previous week almost doubles the odds for a 
respondent to move from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Uruguay.163 In 
Chile, someone who consumed TV/radio news in the previous week was almost 60% less 
                                                          
161 Odds ratios in WVS6: Argentina 1.13026 and 1.2302; Brazil 1.1148 for the move from “would never” or 
“might” to “have done;” Chile 1.3673 and 1.3352; Colombia 1.2021 and 1.2501; ECU 1.1839 for the move 
from never to “might” or “have done; Mexico 1.1190 and 1.1148; and Uruguay 1.2852 for the move from 
“would never” or “might” to “have done.” 
162 Odds ratio 1.1213 in Colombia and 0.8796 in Ecuador 
163 Odds ratio 1.9838 
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likely to report considering (“might do”) or having signed a petition.164 In Brazil, the 
impact of moving from “would never” to “might” or “have done” is much larger than the 
impact of moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done” – a 133% increase in 
the odds for the former versus a 69% increase in the odds for the latter.165 
Disaggregated in WVS6, the importance of television and radio news 
consumption is easier to tease out. Television news consumption was positive and 
significant in Argentina and Brazil, and negative and significant in Chile. Specifically, a 
one-unit increase in television news consumption in Argentina was associated with a 
46% higher probability of going from “would never” to might sign or “have done” and 
was associated with a 23% increase in Brazil in having gone from “would never” or 
“might” to “have done.” Conversely, in Chile, respondents were 32% less likely to go 
from “would never” or “might do” to “have done” with a one-unit increase in the 
consumption of television news.  
Relative to radio news consumption, findings are even more muddled. Radio 
news consumption was positive and associated with the move from “would never” to 
“might” or “have done” in Ecuador, as well as negative and significant with the move 
from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Chile. In Peru, radio news 
consumption in WVS6 was negative and associated with both cutpoints. Specifically, in 
Peru, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption resulted in a 15-17% decrease in 
likelihood of petitioning.166 In Chile, the same was associated with a 17% decrease, 
                                                          
164 Odd radio 0.4335 
165 Odds ratios 2.3259 and 1.6931, respectively 
166 Odds ratios 0.8243 and 0.8501, respectively 
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whilst in Ecuador, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was related to a 13% 
increase in likelihood of moving from “never” to either response above that.167 
In terms of other independent variables, not limited to those of interest with 
media, political interest had a significant and positive relationship with petitioning 
across all countries for both cutpoints, save one (the move from never or might to “have 
done” in Ecuador in WVS6). Education was also positive and significant for 24 out of 28 
instances in this combined dataset, only insignificant for Chile (twice), Ecuador and 
Uruguay, at times. Ideology was insignificant more than it was significant; and even 
when it was, the relationship was not consistently positive or negative across countries. 
City size, rarely significant, was also inconsistently associated with petitioning, 
suggesting that the relationship between opportunities to sign petitions and 
urbanization may not be monotonic.  
Finally, gender was at no point significant for any instance of petitioning; but age 
was significant in every instance of the survey in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, 
Peru & Uruguay for moving from “would never” or “might do” to “have done.”168 
However, in most instances, age had a small impact, with a one-year increase in age 
increasing the likelihood of having participated about 1.2% to 2.2%. The (relative) 
outlier was Mexico, where an older person was about 3% more likely to move from 
“would never” or “might do” to “have done,” relative to petitioning.  
Only in Brazil was age negative and significant, making it less likely one would 
move from “would never” to “might do” or “have done.” Put another way, with an odds 
                                                          
167 Odds ratio 1.1306 in Ecuador and 0.8328 in Chile 
168 Odds ratios as follows: Chile WVS5 1.017851, Mexico WVS5 1.031968, Peru WVS5 1.022438 and 
Uruguay WVS5 1.01219 
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ratio in WVS5 of 0.9861, an older person is less likely to have considered or signed a 
petition, or, a younger person is more likely. 
 
Joining a boycott 
With regard to the boycott participation model, the parallel lines assumption is 
violated only for Uruguay in WVS5; in WVS6, it is violated for five countries, with the 
ordered logit models only valid for Brazil, Peru and Uruguay. Though generalized 
ordered logit appear to be the most appropriate candidate, negative predicted 
probabilities appear in over half of the models.169 More importantly, with generalized 
ordered logit, the number of negative predicated cases is substantial: 23 in Chile in 
WVS5, 29 in Colombia in WVS6 and 72 in Uruguay in WVS5. In other words, there was 
a non-trivial number of cases for which generalized ordered logit was inappropriate. 
Dropping age from the model resolves the parallel assumptions issue in almost all 
cases.170 Therefore, I have excluded age as an explanatory variable in the ordered logit 
regression analysis on all countries for the propensity to boycott.  
 
                                                          
169  Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in WVS5. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Uruguay in WVS6. 
170 Except for Uruguay in WVS5 and Chile and Ecuador in WVS6 
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Table 3.6: Ordered logit output for boycotting (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves  
 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia  
WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6171 
Female 
 
- 0.2303   0.0101 - 0.2555* - 0.5517*** - 0.2495 - 0.1293 - 0.0905 
Education 
 
  0.1145*   0.0654   0.1317***   0.1355***   0.0877 - 0.0762   0.1563*** 
City Size 
 
  0.1499   0.0139   0.1512*   0.0731   0.1886 - 0.0201 - 0.1401* 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.1315* - 0.1557** - 0.0821** - 0.0312 - 0.0937 - 0.1978*** - 0.0968*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.3303**   0.2948**   0.2788***   0.4033***   0.2787**   0.4140***   0.3268*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.3021   0.0210   0.0864   0.1007*   0.2793 - 0.1397   0.0859* 
TV news 
use 
- 0.4082 - 0.1620   0.5172* - 0.1641* - 0.4687 - 0.2431   0.1428 
Radio 
news use 
  0.1547* - 0.0421   0.0363   0.0453 
Internet 
news use 
  0.0860   0.0694   0.4516**   0.0228 - 0.2195   0.2580***   0.1730*** 
n 624 751 1297 973 692 658 1215 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
                                                          
171 Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.000) 
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Table 3.6 (cont): Ordered logit output for boycotting (coefficients) by country for both WVS waves 
 Ecuador  
WVS6172 
Mexico Peru Uruguay 
WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5173 WVS6 
Female 
 
- 0.0586 - 0.4535** - 0.3160* - 0.1627 - 0.4375* - 0.4867* - 0.6705** 
Education 
 
- 0.0445   0.0501   0.0633*   0.0671   0.0630   0.0813   0.1209 
City Size 
 
  0.5847*** - 0.1550 - 0.0500    0.0020   0.2358*   0.2126* 
Left-right 
ideology 
  0.1033* - 0.0371   0.0018 - 0.0975** - 0.0632 - 0.1045 - 0.1307* 
Political 
Interest 
  0.4113***   0.3886***   0.3516***   0.3138***   0.2537**   0.3439**   0.5551*** 
News-
paper use 
- 0.0012   0.0397 - 0.0795   0.0894 - 0.0793   0.5657*   0.0355 
TV news 
use 
- 0.2792* - 0.0914 - 0.0937 - 0.3990 - 0.0902 - 0.0186 - 0.3230** 
Radio news 
use 
  0.1988*   0.0247 - 0.0110 - 0.0975 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1680*   0.3144   0.0825   0.3948**   0.1449**   0.3137   0.2045** 
n 1138 1171 1829 1066 919 845 580 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                          
172 Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.010) 
173 Fails Brant test (Chi-square 0.009) 
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Again, beginning looking within each wave (Table 3.8), the only consistent 
predictor in WVS5 was political interest, with no media variables regularly predictive in 
that iteration of the survey. In WVS6, along with media variables, both education and 
ideology become sporadically significant, but, again, no variable other than political 
interest appears as important everywhere. 
Though Internet news consumption was widely significant for petitioning in 
WVS6, it was significant in only half of the cases for boycotting (Table 3.8). Among the 
six countries in both WVS5 and WVS6, only in Peru was Internet news consumption 
significant for participating via boycott. It was never significant in Argentina or Mexico 
in either survey wave. 
Though always positive, the impact of Internet news consumption varied widely, 
and the impact was much larger in WVS5 than in WVS6. In WVS5, Internet news 
consumption was only significant for boycotting in Brazil and Peru, in both cases 
making it dramatically more likely that a person would boycott: a Peruvian respondent 
who had consumed Internet news in the past week was 48% more likely to report 
willingness to protest and a similar Brazilian respondent was 57% more likely. In WVS6, 
Internet news consumption was significant in five of the eight countries in the sample. A 
one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated with a 15.6% to 29% 
increase in propensity to boycott.174 
Newspaper readership was rarely significant, just once in WVS5 and twice in 
WVS6. In Uruguay in WVS5 the impact was large: someone who consumed news via 
print the following week was 76.6% more likely to express a willingness to consider 
                                                          
174 Odds ratios as follows: 1.1559 in Peru, 1.1829 in Ecuador, 1.1889 in Colombia, 1.2269 in Uruguay and 
1.2943 in Chile. 
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boycotting or to actually do it. In Colombia and Brazil in WVS6, though, the impact was 
modest: a one-unit change in newspaper readership was associated with a 9% and 10.6% 
increase in the likelihood of expressing willingness to boycott. 
Neither television news consumption nor radio news had consistent relationships 
with boycotting. The combined item in WVS5 (when the news consumption variable was 
binary) was significant only once, in Brazil where consumption of TV/radio news the 
previous week was associated with a 67.7% increase in willingness to boycott. 
Disaggregated in WVS6, television news consumption was negative and significant in 
Brazil, Ecuador and Uruguay. In these countries, a one-unit increase in television news 
consumption was associated with a 15.2%, 24.4% and 27.6% decrease in likelihood of 
boycotting, respectively. Disaggregated radio news consumption was positive and 
significant twice, in Argentina and Ecuador. In Argentina, a one-unit increase in radio 
news consumption was associated with a 16.7% increase in the likelihood of boycotting, 
whilst in Ecuador that number was 22%. It is important to note that, from WVS5 to 
WVS6, the sign changes for significance in Brazil and, though both television and radio 
were significant for boycotting in WVS6, they were not when measured as a combined 
variable in WVS5 (possibly because of the different directions of the signs in WVS6). 
The only control variable that consistently predicted likelihood of boycotting was 
political interest, which was positive and significant in every country in both waves. 
When significant — both survey waves in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, and additionally 
in Peru in WVS6 — being female rendered one less likely to join a boycott. Education 
was positive and significant in four of the eight countries, with a one-unit increase in 
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education corresponding to a 6% to 21% increase in likelihood to boycott.175 City size 
was significant in four countries, but in different directions. Ideology was significant in 
all countries except Mexico in at least one survey wave, with being more left-leaning 
associated with higher willingness to boycott in all but Ecuador, where being more right-
leaning associated with greater likelihood to boycott. 




In WVS5, the propensity to participate in a demonstration was the only question 
about any kind of public protest. In WVS6, that question was disaggregated into 
peaceful demonstrations and strikes. For both waves, ordered logit models failed the 
Brant test in all countries except Brazil and Chile in WVS5 and Brazil and Ecuador in 
WVS6, suggesting that the decision calculus for demonstrating is very different for 
transitioning from “would never” to “might do” than it is from “might do” to “have 
done.”176 
 
                                                          
175 Odds ratios 1.21 in Argentina in WVS5, 1.14 in Brazil for both survey waves, and 1.16 in Colombia and 
1.06 in Mexico in WVS6 
176 Employing generalized ordered logit, very few cases yield negative predicted probabilities (4 cases in 
Uruguay in WVS5, 7 cases in Uruguay in WVS6, 1 case each in Chile and Ecuador in WVS6). Referring 
back to Williams (2016), with few cases of negative predicted probabilities, a researcher should continue 
with generalized ordered logit.   
119 
 
Table 3.7: Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both  
WVS waves 
 Argentina 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




  0.2736 
 
  0.5505** 
 





  0.0045 
 
- 0.0114*   0.0034 
Education 
 
  0.2248*** 
 
  0.2233*** 
 





  0.2370* 
 












  0.3991*** 
 







  0.0258   0.0654 
TV news 
use 





  0.1659 - 0.1161 
Radio 
news use 
  0.1212*    0.0977 
Internet 
news use 
  0.2159 
 
  0.1368 
 
  0.1394**   0.0630 
n 643 764 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both 
WVS waves 
 Brazil 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 






  0.0069 
 





  0.0033 
 
- 0.0222*** - 0.0004 
Education 
 
  0.2038*** 
 
  0.1876*** 
 














- 0.0309 - 0.0501 
Political 
Interest 
  0.4166*** 
 
  0.4365*** 
 





  0.1273 
 
  0.0495   0.0435 
TV news 
use 
  0.5013**   0.3397 
 
  0.0416 - 0.0147 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0140   0.0789 
Internet 
news use 
  0.0962 
 
  0.4042* 
 
  0.0240   0.1220 
n 1321 1022 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
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Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both 
WVS waves 
 Chile Colombia WV6 
 WVS5 WVS6177 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.0639 - 0.0956 - 0.2900 - 0.0785 - 0.2061 - 0.1847 
Age 
 
- 0.0118* - 0.0058 - 0.0076 - 0.0060 - 0.0140**   0.0141* 
Education 
 
  0.1213*   0.0657   0.0791   0.0974   0.1073***   0.2344*** 
City Size 
 
- 0.0218   0.0002 - 0.2447*   0.1230   0.0272 - 0.1293 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.1242** - 0.1560*** - 0.2487*** - 0.2967*** - 0.0305 - 0.1099*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.6271***   0.5831***   0.6304***   0.4124***   0.5147***   0.5329*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.0337 - 0.1865 - 0.1349 - 0.0821   0.0180   0.1800** 
TV news 
use 
- 0.1947   1.1880 - 0.0826 - 0.3034*   0.1992   0.2140 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0782 - 0.0416   0.0016   0.0936 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1805   0.5055*   0.3020***   0.2361*   0.1131*   0.1444** 
n 690 666 1220 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                          
177 One case returned a negative predicted probability. 
122 
Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both 
WVS waves 
 Ecuador WVS6178 Mexico 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 








- 0.3004** - 0.2986 
Age 
 
- 0.0035   0.0071   0.0058 
 
  0.0371*** 
 
- 0.0020   0.0347*** 
Education 
 
  0.0857*   0.1717**   0.0760* 
 
  0.0789* 
 
  0.1046***   0.1695*** 
City Size 
 
  0.3044**   0.3699** - 0.0841 
 
  0.0660 
 
- 0.0489   0.0868 
Left-right 
ideology 




- 0.0288 - 0.0604* 
Political 
Interest 
  0.2710***   0.1492   0.5814*** 
 
  0.5527*** 
 
  0.3581***   0.4230*** 
News-
paper use 




- 0.0367   0.0135 
TV news 
use 




  0.0332 - 0.0608 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0569   0.2229*   0.0407   0.0242 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1065   0.0196   0.4813** 
 
  0.6040** 
 
  0.1025**   0.0197 
n 1139 1260 1874 




                                                          
178 One case returned a negative predicted probability. 
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Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both 
WVS waves 
 Peru 
 WVS5 WVS6 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.2666 - 0.1455 - 0.4084** - 0.2493 
Age 
 
  0.0060   0.0302*** - 0.1177*   0.0116 
Education 
 
  0.1064**   0.2038***   0.0428   0.0937 
City Size 
 
  - 0.2763*** - 0.2041* 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.0330 - 0.0670* - 0.0504 - 0.0730 
Political 
Interest 
  0.5458***   0.5475***   0.3941***   0.3869*** 
News-
paper use 
- 0.1404   0.1573 - 0.2040** - 0.2037* 
TV news 
use 
  0.3272 - 0.1280   0.1124   0.2116 
Radio 
news use 
- 0.0153   0.0837 
Internet 
news use 
  0.4943**   0.0646 - 0.8001 - 0.0615 
n 1091 939 





Table 3.7 (cont): Generalized ordered logit output for demonstrating (coefficients) by country for both 
WVS waves 
 Uruguay 
 WVS5179 WVS6180 
 Will never 
to might do 
Might do to 
have done 
Will never 
to might do 




- 0.0677   0.0060 - 0.5220** - 0.3909 
Age 
 
- 0.0083   0.0089 - 0.0095   0.0296*** 
Education 
 
  0.0808   0.0868   0.2047***   0.1209 
City Size 
 
  0.1130   0.2024**   0.1761* - 0.0161 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.1344*** - 0.2489*** - 0.1116** - 0.2383*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.5162***   0.6785***   0.3925***   0.5800*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.1507   0.5987** - 0.0354 - 0.1326 
TV news 
use 
  0.4214   0.1121 - 0.3383** - 0.0819 
Radio 
news use 
  0.0560 - 0.0574 
Internet 
news use 
  0.0174   0.0129   0.0142   0.2029* 
n 848 586 
* p< 0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001 
 
 
                                                          
179 Four cases returned a negative predicted probability. 
180 Seven cases returned a negative predicted probability. 
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Political interest and ideology were fairly consistent across the sample of six 
countries in WVS5, with education and Internet news consumption after that for many 
if not all the sample (Table 3.9). Within the eight countries in the sample in WVS6, 
neither ideology nor education was particularly repeated as a consistent predictor, with 
more media variables significant but varying based on the country. 
For peaceful demonstrations, Internet news consumption was significantly 
associated with demonstrating in all countries except Ecuador in at least one WVS wave 
(Table 3.9). In all significant cases, the relationship was positive as expected, though the 
importance of Internet news consumption was equally divided between the two 
cutpoints. Interestingly, Internet news consumption was only significantly associated 
with one of four possible cutpoints (between the two survey waves) in Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru and Uruguay. In Mexico, it was twice associated with the decision to move from 
“would never” to “might” or “have done” and once with the decision to move from 
“would never” or “might” to “have done.” In Chile, Internet news consumption was 
significantly associated with moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in 
WVS5 and with both cutpoints in WVS6. Only for cutpoint 1 in Chile WVS6 did 
significance reach the 0.001 level.  
The impact of Internet news consumption on demonstrating was much stronger 
in WVS5 than in WVS6. Having read news online last week was associated with no less 
than a 50% increased chance of expressing willingness to demonstrate in Brazil (for the 
move from “would never” or “might” to “have done”), and that effect was as high as 83% 
for the same move in Mexico.181 In WVS6, the impact of a one-unit change in online 
                                                          
181 Odds ratios 1.4981 for “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Brazil and 1.6577 for that same 
decision point in Chile, 1.6181 for “would never” to “might” or “have done” in Mexico and 1.8295 for the 
second cutpoint in that country, 1.6393 for “would never” to “might” or “have done” in Peru 
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news consumption was smaller but still notable, ranging from 10% to 26% when 
significant.182 One datapoint in Chile was an outlier, with an odds ratio of 1.3525, 
meaning a one-unit change in Internet news consumption there was associated with a 
35% increase in the probability of moving from “would never” to “might” or “have 
done.”  
Newspaper readership was only significant for demonstrating in four instances. It 
was positive in Colombia in WVS6 and in Uruguay in WVS5 for the move from “would 
never” or “might” to “have done.” Newspaper readership was significant but negative for 
that move in Mexico in WVS5 and for both cutpoints in Peru in WVS6. Magnitude was 
relatively small: having read a newspaper the following week was associated with an 
increase of 11.9% probability of expressing willingness to demonstrate in Uruguay.  A 
one-unit increase in newspaper readership was associated with a 19% increase in 
propensity to demonstrate in Colombia and that level decrease in Peru. The outlier was 
Mexico in WVS5, when having read a newspaper last week was associated with a 31.33% 
decrease in likelihood of expressing willingness to demonstrate.  
The combination of TV/radio news was only significant in two countries in 
WVS5: negative in Argentina and positive in Brazil. Having consumed television or 
radio news last week made one almost half as likely to move from “would never” or 
“might” demonstrate to expressing that she “had done” so.183 In Brazil, having 
consumed television or radio news last week was associated with a 65% increase in 
                                                          
182 Odds ratios 1.1496 for “would never” to “might” or “have done” in Argentina, 1.2663 in Chile, 1.1079 in 
Mexico for that same move. In Uruguay, the move from “would never” or “might” to “have done” had an 
odds ratio of  1.2250 in Uruguay. In Colombia, the move from “would never” to “might” or “have done” 
had an odds ratio of 1.1969 and the move from “would never” or “might” to “have done” of 1.1554. 
183 Odds ratio 0.5259 
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propensity to move from “would never” to “might” or “have done” and with a 40% 
increase in the second cutpoint.  
Even disaggregated, television and radio consumption was rarely statitistically 
significant for demonstrating, but there were a few instances: TV is negative in Chile and 
Uruguay in WVS6 and radio positive in Ecuador and Uruguay. The impact of a one-unit 
increase in television news resulted in a 29% decrease in propensity to move from 
“would never” to “might” or “have done” in Uruguay and a 26.2% decrease in likelihood 
of moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done” in Chile. In Ecuador, a one-unit 
increase in listening to radio news was associated with a 25% increased probability of 
moving from “would never” or “might” to “have done.” That same one-unit increase in 
radio news was associated with a 5.5% decrease at that cutpoint in Uruguay.  
In terms of other variables, political interest was significant and positive in all 
countries in both waves, except for the decision to go from “would never” or “might” to 
“have done” in Ecuador. A one-unit increase in political interest was associated with at 
least a 50% increase in moving up the scale on boycotting in all cases, except the other 
cutpoint in Ecuador, where it was associated with a 30% increase. Age was significant in 
11 of 28 decision points across the two waves of the survey, but in both directions, 
depending on the country. In Colombia, in fact, it was negative for “would never” to 
“might” or “have done” and positive for “would never” or “might” to “have done.” The 
magnitude for each was about 1.4%. City size also changed sign, depending on the 
country, significant and positive in Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay, but significant and 
negative in Chile and Peru. More left-leaning ideology was significant at least once in all 
countries except Ecuador. Finally, gender was rarely significant but negative when it 
was. The outlier was the move from “would never” or “might” to “have done” for 
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demonstrating in Argentina in WVS5, with females 31.5% more likely than males at that 
cutpoint.  
 
Joining a strike 
Finally, in WVS6, the likelihood of joining a strike was specifically disaggregated 
from more peaceful protest. All countries in the sample, save Chile, fail the Brant test. 
As such, generalized ordered logit was the next step in the analysis. But generalized 
ordered logit returned negative predicted probabilities in five of the eight Latin 
American countries in the WVS6 sample (five cases in Brazil, 12 in Chile, one each in 
Mexico and Peru, and 18 cases in Uruguay). Equal to what was done with boycotting 




Table 3.8: Ordered logit output for joining a strike (coefficients) by country for WVS6 
 ARG BRZ CHL COL ECU MEX PER URU 
Female 
 
- 0.0706 - 0.2523* - 0.3962* - 0.2169 - 0.3534* - 0.4973*** - 0.4209** - 0.4375* 
Education 
 
  0.1232**   0.1033***   0.0761   0.1290***   0.0191   0.1077***   0.0001   0.1431** 
City Size 
 
- 0.0520   0.1423 - 0.3395** - 0.1365   0.4038*** - 0.0887 - 0.2757***   0.0342 
Left-right 
ideology 
- 0.1703*** - 0.0577** -0.2820*** - 0.0850**   0.0336 - 0.0377* - 0.0632* - 0.1611*** 
Political 
Interest 
  0.1569*   0.2593***   0.3359***   0.3515***   0.1389   0.3172***   0.4036***   0.4426*** 
News-
paper use 
  0.0908   0.0359 - 0.0840   0.1404** - 0.0451   0.0116 - 0.1407*   0.0090 
TV news 
use 
  0.0760   0.0916 - 0.1109   0.0670 - 0.1066   0.0079   0.0437 - 0.0685 
Radio 
news use 
  0.1313* - 0.0578   0.0362   0.0049   0.0544   0.0454 - 0.0576 - 0.0126 
Internet 
news use 
  0.1698***   0.0910*   0.2018***   0.1765***   0.1486**   0.1034**   0.0005   0.0663 
n 756 1023 657 1222 1139 1880 943 591 




Internet news consumption is positive and significant in six of the eight 
countries, only not so in Peru and Uruguay. A one-unit increase in Internet news 
consumption was associated with in a 10% to 20% increase in likelihood of expressing 
willingness to strike.184 Among traditional media, there are only three instances in 
which news consumption is significant: newspaper readership is positive and significant 
in Colombia, but negative in Peru. In both cases, a one-unit increase resulted in an 
approximately 14% change, higher in Colombia and lower in Peru. Radio listenership is 
positive and significant in Argentina, with a one-unit increase in radio news associated 
with a 14% increase in likelihood of joining a strike.  
In fact, even political interest is not a consistent predictor of striking in this 
sample, as it is not significantly associated in Ecuador. Nor is ideology significant there, 
though being more left-leaning is significant in the other seven countries in the sample. 
Education is positive and significant in five of the countries, with being female negative 
and significant in six. In terms of magnitude, women were at least 30% less likely than 
men to express willingness to consider striking or do so.  
Finally, city size was significant in three of the countries, but with different signs: 
negative in Chile and Peru, but positive in Ecuador. Magnitude varied: in Chile a one-
unit increase in city size was associated with a 25% decrease in likelihood to strike, while 
that same change in Peru resulted in only a 6% decrease. In Ecuador, a one-unit 
increase in city size was associated with a 15% increase in propensity to strike. 
 
                                                          
184 Odds ratios 1.1850 in ARG, 1.952 in Brazil, 1.2236 in Chile, 1.1931 in Colombia, 1.1602 in Ecuador and 
1.1089 in Mexico 
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Discussion 
Returning to the theory presented in the previous chapter, I expected that media 
entities perceived as more independent of the government would be more likely to 
challenge the status quo; and, consequently, consumers of those outlets would be more 
likely to behave in ways to challenge the status quo. Across the full sample, media was 
significant for political engagement on median 9 times (out of 39 for the six countries in 
both waves and out of 24 possible instances for Colombia and Ecuador). In no country 
were results exactly in line with expectations. The closest was in Mexico, where results 
were in line with expectations for newspaper, television and Internet news 
consumption, but where there was no expectation (but one significant finding) for radio 
news listenership. As in Mexico, at no point in Chile were findings against expectations. 
But, in the other six countries in this chapter, at least at one time, findings were against 
expectations (Table 3.11). 
Specifically, findings met expectations as follows: 
Internet news consumption: There was exactly one instance in which significant 
findings for Internet news consumption went against expectations. That was for 
petitioning in WVS5 in Peru.185 In the other 27 instances of significance across other 
behaviors, consumption of Internet news was associated with increased participation 
challenging the status quo, as expected. Put another way, across the two waves of WVS, 
out of the 50 possible instances in which Internet news consumption might have been 
significant for behavior, results were in line with expectations in over half of those cases.  
                                                          
185 For demonstrating, the sign was negative (but not significant) in Peru in WVS6. 
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Newspapers: For petitioning, findings were once in line with expectations and 
once against. For boycotting, of the three instances of newspaper significance, two were 
against expectations, and there was no expectation from literature for the third country. 
For demonstrating, findings were split – two countries in line with expectations and two 
against. Finally, for striking, findings were again split – once in line with expectations 
and once against. This sums to slightly more evidence against the theory presented in 
the previous chapter than for it, at least for newspaper readership.  
Television and radio news, because of the combined measure in WVS5, are the 
toughest to connect to theory. Given the expectations laid out in Table 3.1, in which the 
expectations about challenging the status quo for television and radio news were 
different for two-thirds of the countries in the region (12 out of 18), interpreting the 
results of the TV/radio news consumption variable in WVS5 is difficult. For petitioning, 
findings from two countries ran contrary to results and there was no expectation for the 
third country in which TV/radio news consumption rose to significance. For boycotting, 
TV/radio in WVS5 was only significant (and positive) for Brazil, against expectations for 
television, but there was no directional expectation for radio in Brazil. The finding for 
demonstrating was similarly muddled: TV/radio was significant in both Argentina and 
Brazil (negative in the former but positive in the latter), but, in both countries, the 
expectation for television was to depress participation and there was no expectation for 
radio. That the findings were in different directions for those two countries further 
confuses any possible analysis. 
One would hope that the disaggregation of television news from radio news in 
WVS6 would add some clarity. For television, for petitioning, two findings were against 
expectations (Argentina and Brazil), with another without any directional expectation 
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(Chile). For boycotting though, the three negative findings were all in line with 
expectations. For demonstrating, the negative finding was as expected in Uruguay but 
there was no directional expectation for Chile. 
Finally, for radio news, for petitioning, findings in Ecuador and Peru are against 
expectations presented in Table 3.1. There was no directional expectation for Chile. For 
boycotting, the finding for Ecuador is against expectations; and there was no directional 
expectation for radio in Argentina. For demonstrating, findings for radio in Ecuador 
were against expectations. Finally, for striking, there was a positive association with 
radio in Argentina but no expectation from literature for that country. In short, for 





Table 3.9: Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country  
 Argentina 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
- WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper            
TV news   +         
TV/radio        -    
Radio      +   +  + 
Internet   + +     +  + 
 
 Brazil 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper      +      
TV news    +  -      
TV/radio + +   +  +     
Radio            
Internet    + +   +   + 
 
 Chile 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper            
TV news    -      -  
TV/radio -       +    
Radio    -        
Internet   + +  +  + + + + 
Red = against expectations, Yellow = unclear, Green = in line with expectations 
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Table 3.9 (cont): Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country 
 Mexico 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper        -    
TV news    -        
TV/radio            
Radio    -        
Internet +  + +   +  +  + 
 
 Peru 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper         - - - 
TV news            
TV/radio            
Radio   - -        
Internet     + + +     
 
 Uruguay 
 Petition Boycott Demonstration Strike 
 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 WVS5 WVS6 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper     +   +    
TV news      -   -   
TV/radio +           
Radio            
Internet    +  +    +  




Table 3.9(cont): Summary table of media consumption significance for political engagement by country 
 Colombia 
 Petition Boycott  Demonstration Strike 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper +  +  + + 
TV news       
Radio       
Internet + + + + + + 
 
 Ecuador 
 Petition Boycott  Demonstration Strike 
 Cut 1 Cut 2 Cut 1 Cut 2 
Newspaper -      
TV news   -    
Radio +  +  +  
Internet +  +    






The ambiguity (denoted in yellow) can be attributed to two issues: first, a lack of 
clear directional expectation from existing literature (as denoted by 0 in Table 3.1); and, 
second, the combination of the TV/radio measure, as the histories of those media 
platforms followed similar but nonetheless different tracts in many places. In fact, eight 
of the 14 instances of significance with ambiguity can be attributed to the combined 
TV/radio measure in WVS5.  
In 35 of the 45 instances in which findings were in line with expectations, that 
finding can be attributed to the significance of Internet news consumption. That only 
five of those 35 instances occurred in WVS5 illustrates the increased prominence of 
online news consumption between the fifth and sixth waves of the World Values Survey. 
The remainder of the expected findings relate to the depressed participation, in the 
aggregate, of heavier consumers of traditional media. 
Results against expectations were clustered largely to identifiable irregularities 
between expectations and findings. The increased activity of newspaper readers in 
Colombia is surprising, with newspaper readership significant and positive for each 
activity at least once, despite being highly aligned with successive administrations. 
Similarly, the increased activity related to radio news consumption in Ecuador, 
significant for three out of four means of participation, is surprising. In both cases, 
revisiting the classification system, should new materials become available, seems more 
than appropriate. The other instances in which findings were contrary to expectations 
were sporadic: once each in WVS6 in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, and twice in WVS5 in 
Uruguay. 
Comparing behaviors, media consumption was least noticeable for striking, the 
rarest of the types of participation included in the survey. Between countries, media had 
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the least measurable impact in Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. In Mexico especially, 




If anything, findings in this chapter show that news consumption is mostly 
positively associated with political engagement that challenges the status quo, but not in 
any clear way, even within each country. The fact that media was so rarely negatively 
associated with these four methods of political engagement lends support to the notion 
that greater consumption of political news likely does not depress political activity. The 
overwhelming importance of Internet news consumption in this sample, more than any 
traditional medium, suggests that the growing body of literature about the special 
importance of Internet news for political behavior is looking at the correct question. 
That said, the magnitude of impact of Internet news consumption was greater in WVS5 
than in WVS6. This could mean that the impact of Internet news consumption will 
decrease further in the forthcoming WVS7, as worldwide online news consumption 
becomes more regularized.  
This chapter was limited to the countries surveyed in WVS5 and WVS6. The next 
chapter includes countries at lower levels of development in Latin America and focuses 






Chapter 4: SECOND QUANTITATIVE TEST 
The previous chapter examined how an individual’s consumption of media with a 
reputation of more latitude to challenge the status quo might be associated with political 
engagement among those consuming it. Data analysis suggested limited support that 
media that developed under conditions making it easier to criticize the status quo 
related to people’s willingness to petition, boycott, demonstrate and strike. These 
findings indicate that the medium most associated with overall political engagement is 
the Internet. Internet news consumption was associated with increases in propensity to 
petition, boycott, demonstrate, and strike in half of the cases tested. In contrast, 
consumption of media more aligned with the status quo, such as television and 
newspapers, exhibit little effect on these same behaviors.  
However, the analyses undertaken in the last chapter explored the relationship 
between news consumption and political behavior in just eight countries. In this 
chapter, I extend that analysis by including more than double the number of countries 
within Latin America using a different dataset – the AmericasBarometer. This survey 
also includes measures at three points in time over a five-year span. If media reputation 
truly proxies for content and is related to political engagement, that should be visible at 
more than one point in time.  
Though the AmericasBarometer provided an expanded breadth of countries, it 
also limited my analysis to respondent information on whether they had ever engaged in 
“protest” during the past year. This limit means that there is no inherent age bias, as 
someone age 30 has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; 
and limiting the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In 
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other words, this question wording should have higher validity than the question 
wording in WVS. 
In the common parlance, protest encompasses boycotting, demonstrating, and 
striking.186 Protest187 is traditionally defined as a public display of displeasure or call for 
change (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, 12).  Marches and assemblies are, by far, the most 
common methods of protest (Ortiz et al 2013, 32-33). The definition of protest in this 
chapter, then, is more general than the definition of peaceful demonstration or strike in 
the previous chapter.188 There are both advantages and disadvantages to this approach. 
It is arguably a more blunt measure, but it should also capture more of what 
respondents themselves consider to be protesting, which more specific terminology like 
“strike” might miss. Further, since measuring protest participation can be quite 
complex, a more general though more blunt measure may actually be more trustworthy. 
After all, respondents may not know if an activity in which they participated qualified as 
a boycott, demonstration or strike, but they know if they were protesting. 
Multiple scholars during the previous decade, especially those looking at events 
in Europe, observed a consistently positive relationship between Internet news 
                                                          
186 Clearly there are other actions that might also be considered protest, but marches, demonstrations and 
other means of making public claims are the most common (Tilly and Tarrow 2007, Ortiz et al 2013). See 
Quaranta (2015, ch 2) for an explanation of how different forms of protest can be conceptualized along 
one continuum.  
187 Unlike the World Values Survey (WVS), the AmericasBarometer does not disaggregate between 
participation in peaceful versus non-peaceful demonstrations. Also distinct from the previous chapter, the 
question in the AmericasBarometer is not about having ever protested, but only about the past year. 
Unlike the previous chapter, in which the question was worded to ask if a respondent had ever joined a 
demonstration or strike, the question in the AmericasBarometer limits the chronological scope of the 
question to within the past year. This limit is better for two reasons: (1) There is no inherent age bias, as 
someone age 30 has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; and (2) limiting 
the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In other words, this question 
wording should have higher validity than the question wording in WVS. 
188 Questions in the World Values Survey explicitly cue peaceful demonstrations (manifestaciones 
pacíficas in Spanish and manifestações pacíficas in Portguese) and strikes (paro in Spanish and greves in 
Portuguese). 
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consumption and propensity to protest (See Boulianne 2009, 2015 for review). Most 
posited that the positive relationship was due to some unique property of the Internet, 
but few studies have corroborated that assumption in areas with lower Internet 
penetration or that contain other media platforms that present information outside the 
status quo, as the Internet is widely acknowledged to do. I argue that, if heavy news 
consumption is associated with protest, then that relationship should be visible for any 
medium not associated with the status quo. What scholars have observed about news on 
the Internet and protest may be a remnant of the platform’s explosive development 
outside of established channels in this subset of countries. Simply put, what we observe 
to be digital news’s ability to criticize the status quo may not be specific to the Internet 
as a news medium.  
Instead, as I argued in the previous chapter, the rapid and largely free spread of 
the Internet in Latin America means news on that platform may have greater latitude to 
criticize the status quo than traditional outlets that historically experienced greater 
regulation, such as newspapers and television.189 I investigate whether persons who 
consume news from media platforms that developed with greater freedom from 
government regulation are more likely to have protested in the past year. Using data 
from the only three iterations of the AmericasBarometer that disaggregated media 
consumption (2004, 2006, 2008), I show that consumption of media most likely to 
criticize the status quo was associated with greater likelihood of protesting, even before 
the spread of Internet news consumption in the developing world.  
                                                          
189 Boczkowski (2004, 2010) has argued that online news is, in the United States and Argentina, merely an 
extension of existing news structures. His analysis is at a different level of development, specifically the 
media outlet. Additionally, Bockowski and I tackle different questions: he looked at how technological 




Research Design and Data 
In order to examine the relationship between consuming news on platforms with 
different historical development across Latin America, this chapter draws on data from 
the AmericasBarometer surveys. The AmericasBarometer is part of the Global 
Barometer Series (GBS), which covers 55 countries and almost half of the world’s 
population. The Barometers employ a standard starter set of questions and similar 
research methodology.190 The longest-running is EuroBarometer, which dates back to 
1973.191 The others are: EurAsianBarometer192 (since 1989), AfroBarometer (1999), 
AsianBarometer193 (2003), AmericasBarometer (2004) and ArabBarometer (2006). 
Exact timing of the surveys varies by region, but they are probability samples or 
stratified and often multi-lingual even within one nation, which is important in 
countries where the main language may be less prominent in rural areas or where 
regional languages dominate.  
The AmericasBarometer is administered every other year by the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project (LAPOP)194 and covers all of the Western Hemisphere except 
                                                          
190 Country organizers generally add additional specialized, region- or country-specific questions as well, 
depending on the budget available to each organizer. 
191 Originating in France and run by the European Commission, the survey began with nine member states 
to gauge public opinion across the continent. Promoting public opinion was also aimed at helping 
continental integration by making it easier for citizens in one country to understand what citizens in 
another country felt, both about Europe and the world (European Commission 2008, 1). 
192 Founded to cover post-Communist Europe and post-Soviet Eurasia 
193 South Asia (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bagladesh and Nepal) only included in 2005  
194 Not all countries are covered by all iterations of the AmericasBarometer though.  The first iteration in 
2004, called the “Democracy Audit: Central American, Mexico and Colombia 2004,” included only eight 
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panamá, México and Colombia). 
The 2006 survey expanded to also include Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela as well as four non-Iberian countries (Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica 
and Trinidad). In 2008, Argentina, the United States and Canada were included, completing coverage of 
the Iberian countries. Since 2010, only French- and English-speaking nations have been added, with 34 
countries included in the 2016 release 
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Cuba.195 The survey project is currently hosted by Vanderbilt using the following 
methodology: 
“Each country survey is implemented based on a national probability 
design. In some cases, oversamples are collected to allow precise analysis 
of opinion within sub-national regions. Survey participants are voting-age 
adults interviewed face to face in their households, except in Canada and 
the United States where the interviews are Web-based.”196 
 
All surveys were stratified samples but there was variation by country in how that 
stratification occurred. For example, in Colombia 2006 it was multi-stage197 but in 
Mexico in that year both stratification and clustering were employed. Most surveys were 
unweighted, with a few exceptions, for example Ecuador, where people in the Amazon 
region were oversampled. Nicaragua in 2004 was probabilistic, clustered, multi-stage, 
with random selection at all stages.198 All included both urban and rural areas, though 
some hard-to-reach areas are excluded, for example in Panama in 2004.199 Margins of 
errors for all surveys were 2.1-3.1%. 
Many of the technical information pages note that, while nationally 
representative, results at lower levels, such as region or state, would not be valid from 
the samples. In 2004 in the Dominican Republic, the technical information includes the 
detail that each face-to-face interview lasted approximately 45 minutes200 and the 
technical information for Mexico in 2004 notes that the survey was in the field days 
after a corruption scandal came to light.201 The only oddity was in Uruguay in 2006, 
                                                          
195 The survey actually covers countries outside the Western Hemisphere as well: Albania, Israel, 
Madagascar.  
196 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php (June 6, 2018) 
197 There were six regions that were then broken into, first, municipalities, then census tracts, then 
sections and finally by block. https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/colombia/2006-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 
2018) 
198 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/nicaragua/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018) 
199 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/panama/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018) 
200 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/dr/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018) 
201 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/mexico/2004-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018) 
144 
which is listed as “self-weighted” such that the selection of the four strata “is 
proportional to their weight in the population.”202 
As is common in the study of Latin America,203 I limit the analysis to those 
countries that countries share Iberian colonial histories (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela), 
exempting former colonies of other countries.204 The shared history, similar languages, 
and similar government structures among these countries create the conditions for a 
“most similar” research design (Mill 1843, Przeworski and Teune 1970).  
 
Model 
Unlike the previous chapter, in which participation was measured using the 
frequency of occurrence and analyzed using ordered logit regression analysis, surveys 
usually first ask about whether if a respondent has taken part in unconventional 
participation as a yes or no question. Therefore, my analysis uses binary logit regression 
models, with the full model specified below: 
Protested = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education + β4Skin color + β5Left-Right 
Ideology + β6Urbanization + β7Political Interest + β8Frequency of 
newspaper readership + β9Frequency of television news viewership + 
β10Frequency of radio news listenership + β11Frequency of Internet 
news consumption + ε 
 
                                                          
202 https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/uruguay/2006-techinfo.pdf (June 8, 2018) 
203 Recent examples of this limitation in political science include Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2011), 
Carlin and Love (2015), Carreras and Irepoglu (2013) and Seligson (2006). 
204 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and the United States 
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Hypotheses 
In my classification of media platform reputations in the region (see Appendix 
A), at no time are newspapers or television classified as distanced from government or 
challenging the status quo.205 Besides the new medium of Internet news, the only 
traditional medium classified as being not close to the government in Latin America is 
radio.206 As such, extrapolating from my hypotheses in Chapter Two, I only expect to see 
that consumption of Internet or radio news are associated with an increased likelihood 
to protest. 
H1:  People who consume radio news with will be more likely to protest.207 
H2:  People who consume Internet news will be more likely to protest. 
 
Response Variable 
Protest, my response variable,  is defined by Tilly and Tarrow (2007) as a public 
display of displeasure or call for change (12). Unlike the World Values Survey (WVS), 
the AmericasBarometer does not disaggregate between participation in peaceful versus 
non-peaceful demonstrations. Also distinct from the previous chapter, the question in 
the AmericasBarometer is not about having ever protested, but only about the past year. 
This limit is better for two reasons: (1) There is no inherent age bias, as someone age 30 
has had a decade more to participate in a protest than someone age 20; and (2) limiting 
the question to the past 12 months should minimize problems of recall. In other words, 
this question wording should have higher validity than the question wording in WVS. 
                                                          
205 This is not to say that the same does not exist, but not with sufficient historical information to justify a 
classification as such in this sample. 
206 In Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay 
207 When it is oppositional, not aligned with government 
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The wording of the question about protest in the AmericasBarometer has varied 
slightly over the years: 
2004:  Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or 
protest? Do you do it often, rarely or never?208 
2006/2008:  Have you ever participated in a public demonstration or 
protest? Sometimes, almost never or never?209  
And now thinking about the last 12 months, have you 
participated in a demonstration or protest march? Sometimes, 
almost never or never?210 
 
The Spanish-language questionnaire asks specifically about having participated in a 
manifestación o protesta pública. The Portuguese questionnaire asks about 
manifestação ou protesto público. The definition of protest in this chapter, then, is 
more general than the definition of peaceful demonstration or strike in the previous 
chapter.211 I recoded survey responses to simply reflect having protested or not in the 
past year without regard to frequency.  
Protest participation information is not available for some countries in 2004 and 
2008, as shown in Table 4.1. The question was also never asked in Paraguay or in 
Argentina. Only in 2006 was the question about protest participation asked in all 
                                                          
208 Question PROT1 
209 Question PROT1 
210 By 2010, when all Latin countries were included in the AmericasBarometer, the question had been 
rewritten to a binary choice: 
2010/2012: In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Yes or no. 
If yes, then how many times have you participated in a demonstration or protest march in the last 
12 months?    
2014: In the last 12 months, have you participated in a demonstration or protest march? Yes or no. 
The 2012 survey even went on to ask about specific activities:  
 PROT7: And, in the last 12 months, have you participated in blocking any street or public space 
as a form of protest? Yes or no. 
 PROT6. In the last 12 months have you signed any petition? Yes or no. 
 PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through 
any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? Yes or no. 
211 Questions in the World Values Survey explicitly cue peaceful demonstrations (manifestaciones 
pacíficas in Spanish and manifestações pacíficas in Portguese) and strikes (paro in Spanish and greves in 
Portuguese). 
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remaining countries in the region. Forthcoming analyses are, therefore, limited to the 
countries in which relevant questions were asked. 
Table 4.1: Relative frequency for having protested by country (in percent)  
 2004 2006 2008 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Costa Rica 15.01 84.99 17.21 82.79 19.70 80.30 
Colombia 25.71 74.29 19.14 80.86 22.39 77.61 
Guatemala 10.69 89.31 11.80 88.20 13.68 86.32 
Mexico 13.99 86.01 14.61 85.39 16.41 83.59 
El Salvador 6.10 93.90 8.63 91.37   
Honduras 9.01 90.99 14.51 85.49   
Nicaragua 18.25 81.75 9.03 90.97   
Panama 20.12 79.88 18.77 81.23   
Brazil   14.86 85.14 18.55 81.45 
Peru   28.62 71.38 31.95 68.05 
Bolivia   38.70 61.30   
Chile    21.11 78.89   
Dominican 
Republic 
  15.16 84.84   
Ecuador   20.63 79.37   
Uruguay   25.81 74.19   
Venezuela   23.95 76.05   
n 12,023 out of 15,396 26, 786 out of 28,212 8,925 out of 29,917 
 
There are clear differences by country, with protest much less common in El 
Salvador and Honduras than for countries in the Andean region, such as in Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru.212 Bolivia in 2006 and Peru in 2008 are the only data points where 
more than 30% of the population admits to having protested. The Andean numbers may 
be anomalous, as the mid-2000s was the height of the Pink Tide,213 when protests were 
                                                          
212 For comparison, in 2006, Uruguay was the most stable country in the region, ranked 45 out of 194 for 
Political Stability Index. Chile was 65 and Argentina 101st. The lowest Latin country that year was 
Colombia at 186, with Venezuela slightly ahead at 167. Both El Salvador and Honduras and the 
aforementioned Andean countries fell between those, ranking 112 and 142 and 149, 151 and 153, 
respectively. So there is no clear line between government stability and likelihood of having protested.  
213 The pink tide refers to the election of multiple left-leaning leaders across the region in the early part of 
the century. They were referred to as pink to show that, though more left of the governments of the 1990s, 
the leaders were not as leftist as historically more hardline, “red” leftist movements (Allen 2008) and also 
distinct from the so-called red governments of Eastern Europe during the Cold War (de Santiago 2013). 
See also Beasley-Murray, Cameron and Hershberg (2009), Remmer (2012) or Seligson (2007) for 
overviews of the Pink Tide phenomenon.  
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especially common. El Salvador jumps out as the only country in the region with single-
digit affirmative protest responses at more than one data point. These numbers suggest 
that, though arguably less common than other forms of political engagement, protest in 
the region is not an activity unique to fringe political actors (e.g., Norris, Walgrave and 
Van Aelst 2005).  
Over the mid-2000s, there was an overall increase in protest activity across the 
region. Of the countries where the question about protest was asked in 2008, all 
registered double-digit affirmative responses, which was not the case in the previous 
surveys. Only in Colombia, Nicaragua and Panama did the proportion of people 
responding in the affirmative decrease between survey rounds, with the more than 9% 
drop in Nicaragua appearing especially anomalous. In all other countries, there is a clear 
upward trajectory for the percentage of population having protested between the 
survey’s 2004 wave and its 2008 wave (Table 4.2). This is congruent with a worldwide 
trend of an increase in the reported number of protest events around the world in recent 
years (Caruso 2017, Stuster 2013, Carothers and Youngs 2015, de Jong 2017).214 
Table 4.2: Year-on-year percentage change in reporting protest 
participation (from Table 4.1) for countries with one more than one data 
point (AmericasBarometer) 
Honduras +5.50 
Costa Rica˚ +4.69 
Guatemala˚ +2.99 





˚ indicates 2004-2008 increase, not just one survey cycle 
                                                          
214 See Rucht (2007) for a review across both time and space of the spread of protest in politics. 
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Total possible n in the sample is 73,525. Though only 47,734 respondents 
answered the question on protest participation, most of that reduction is attributable to 
the question not being asked in eight countries in 2004 and in ten countries in 2008.215 
Where the question was asked, non-response is minimal: less than one percent each 
year. There were no pockets of especially high non-response in any country in any year. 
The n above is not, therefore, reflective of non-response bias, but mostly an artefact of 
where the question was fielded and where it was not by survey administrators.  
Further, Peru and Bolivia were strong outliers, registering much more protest 
activity than the rest of the region (Table 4.1). Their exclusion from the analysis should 
depress any aggregated findings. Analysis within countries, which is most important to 
linking media reputation and behavior when the country is the level of analysis, is not 
compromised. Analysis across time periods, especially 2006 to 2008, is limited by the 
exclusion of the question in the so many countries in the later survey year. So there is no 
way to know if findings would have held up, had the question been asked in more 
countries in 2008. 
 
Explanatory variables 
As in the previous chapter, the predictor of interest is media consumption by 
platforms. While more recent iterations of the AmericasBarometer only ask about total 
media consumption, iterations that were issued in the mid-2000s collected responses 
on media consumption that had been disaggregated by platform:  
                                                          
215 In 2004, the survey was not fielded in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Peru, 
Uruguay or Venezuela. In 2008, the question about protest was not asked in Bolivia, Chile, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay or Venezuela. 
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2004/2006/2008 question216:  
How often do you (A1) listen to news on the radio? (A2) Watch news on 
television? (A3) Read the newspaper? (A4) Read news on the Internet?  
Every day, one or two times per week, rarely, never217  
 
The scale ranged from zero for never to three for daily.218 Descriptive statistics for each 
measure are below. It is important to note that only Mexico, Honduras and Panama in 
2004 included an Internet news question. 
 
Television 
Table 4.3: Daily television news consumption (in percent) 
(AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   57.91 
Bolivia  56.19 55.66 
Brazil  74.38 76.54 
Chile   76.07 74.72 
Colombia 72.33 67.52 77.31 
Costa Rica 71.67 74.07 81.26 
Dominican Republic  56.90 62.82 
Ecuador 67.07 71.85 67.78 
El Salvador 61.04 61.31 65.27 
Guatemala 43.88 47.39 45.93 
Honduras 47.23 54.73 48.58 
Mexico 63.43 58.77 61.79 
Nicaragua 43.73 59.82 68.75 
Panama 63.94 71.84 75.99 
Paraguay  70.82 70.84 
Peru  64.38 66.49 
Uruguay  76.08 76.20 
Venezuela  65.47 66.87 
                                                          
216 Protest was measured in later iterations of the survey, but media platforms were not disaggregated 
then. It is therefore impossible to know how respondents got their news, only who overall consumed news 
more frequently than others. 
217 Original Spanish questionnaire: Con qué frecuencia… 
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio  
A2. Mira noticias en la TV.  
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos  
A4. Lee noticias vía Internet 
Todos los días, Una o dos veces por semana, Rara vez, Nunca 
218 Descriptive statistics for 2014 show a mean of 3.39 out of 4 and a median of 4 out of 4, undoubtedly 
driven by daily television news consumption.  
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Table 4.3 shows that more than half the population consumes television news 
daily in every country at every data collection point. The exception is Guatemala, where 
daily use is around 45% across the timespan, and Honduras, where it hovers just slightly 
under 50%. Highest reported daily TV news use is in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Costa 
Rica, with around three-quarters of respondents using television for news daily in those 
areas. Only in Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua do the number of respondents 
answering “never” using television for news reach double-digits. 
Equally notable are the figures for those who never consume news on television 
(Table 4.4): 
Table 4.4: Percent of respondents reporting never using television for news 
(AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   6.08 
Bolivia  9.11 9.64 
Brazil  2.22 2.47 
Chile   1,91 1.83 
Colombia 3.38 2.55 2.13 
Costa Rica 3.40 3.33 3.41 
Dominican Republic  7.72 7.84 
Ecuador 3.10 1.92 2.21 
El Salvador 9.88 7.69 6.13 
Guatemala 24.50 14.73 14.18 
Honduras 26.68 12.12 17.18 
Mexico 4.31 3.60 4.42 
Nicaragua 28.03 15.95 13.87 
Panama 8.37 10.95 4.89 
Paraguay  4.55 2.92 
Peru  4.14 3.27 
Uruguay  4.17 4.00 
Venezuela  3.98 4.27 
 
Only in the Central American countries of Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and 
Panama does “never” using television for news reach double digits. In all other countries 
152 
in the region, the number is well below 10%, a testament to the ubiquity of TV news 
consumption, but also a possible reason for why media effects are so very hard to find. 
 
Newspaper 
Newspaper use within countries remains fairly constant across time, but there is 
great variation between countries (Table 4.5).  Uruguay and Venezuela represent the 
extremes: daily use of 8% and 10% in 2006 and 2008 for the former, and 41% in each of 
those years for the latter. In all countries at all time points, approximately half of 
respondents (or more) said they “never” or “rarely” used a newspaper, with Venezuela 
(at 35%) as the sole exception.  
Table 4.5: Daily newspaper consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   21.95 
Bolivia  7.07 6.22 
Brazil  15.83 17.25 
Chile   18.13 16.97 
Colombia 9.76 7.33 10.13 
Costa Rica 24.70 24.03 36.55 
Dominican Republic  11.95 14.00 
Ecuador 17.53 15.79 17.37 
El Salvador 19.95 15.44 19.82 
Guatemala 25.41 31.17 25.62 
Honduras 16.28 13.31 18.75 
Mexico 14.62 12.03 13.65 
Nicaragua 9.38 10.75 10.74 
Panama 24.68 32.86 30.72 
Paraguay  11.85 9.02 
Peru  21.58 22.99 
Uruguay  8.34 9.95 
Venezuela  41.83 40.74 
 
Newspaper use is relatively rare across the region, in line with findings from 
other areas that newspapers are expensive, but were, at the time of the surveys, expected 
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to expand in use (“El diario en papel crecerá en los próximos cinco años,” Magro 2010, 
Economist 2011). Only four countries – Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama and Venezuela 
– register more than one-quarter of the population reading newspapers daily. In Bolivia, 
Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay, the number of newspaper readers daily does not 
reach double digits, suggesting the lack of readership is not merely attributable to the 
rate of literacy or economic development.219 
 
Radio 
Radio news consumption also varied widely through the region but was fairly 
stable within countries across time (Table 4.6). While over half of respondents in each 
survey in Honduras and Uruguay used radio for news daily, half in Costa Rica never did. 
That said, the lowest daily use in the region approaches 20%, which is a substantial 
amount. Throughout the region, about half of respondents never or rarely used radio for 
news, and about half used radio for news either daily or weekly.  
                                                          
219 Uruguay is an outlier in Latin America – highly peaceful, economically developed, with 98% literacy. 
Bolivia is very poor, with 85% adult literacy. Guatemala, where a quarter of the population reads 
newspapers daily, has one of the lowest adult literacy rates in the region at only 68% (UNESCO 2003). 
The distribution of who reads newspapers does not seem to fall linearly with either economics or literacy.  
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Table 4.6: Daily radio news consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   44.61 
Bolivia  40.11 32.49 
Brazil  33.11 41.39 
Chile   31.05 33.92 
Colombia 37.32 31.19 34.13 
Costa Rica 20.61 19.68 33.09 
Dominican Republic  32.45 37.98 
Ecuador 39.73 36.74 31.27 
El Salvador 34.05 30.48 35.38 
Guatemala 34.80 35.56 33.62 
Honduras 53.77 54.20 56.38 
Mexico 36.21 28.68 29.29 
Nicaragua 43.71 50.74 37.85 
Panama 41.17 39.01 35.33 
Paraguay  48.67 38.88 
Peru  47.00 44.23 
Uruguay  58.00 56.47 
Venezuela  34.44 34.56 
 
Internet 
Highest daily Internet news consumption in 2008 was in Uruguay, Chile, Brazil 
and Argentina (Table 4.7). This is entirely consistent with expectations about Internet 
penetration in richer, more-stable democracies. Lowest daily use was in Nicaragua, 
Guatemala and Paraguay. Almost 30% of respondents in Argentina used the Internet for 
news at least weekly in 2008, which is a strong outlier from the rest of the region. In 
most of the region, even in 2008, daily Internet use was under 10%. In some countries, 
like Guatemala, Nicaragua and Paraguay, even weekly Internet news use was still under 
five percent, with “never” using the Internet for news still near 90% (Table 4.8). 
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Table 4.7: Daily Internet consumption (in percent) (AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   15.66 
Bolivia  2.36 2.15 
Brazil  7.11 11.07 
Chile   8.31 9.26 
Colombia  2.09 4.94 
Costa Rica  2.41 3.76 
Dominican Republic  1.92 3.98 
Ecuador  0.55 2.37 
El Salvador  2.03 3.49 
Guatemala  1.02 1.84 
Honduras 0.81 0.95 2.32 
Mexico 1.43 2.65 2.89 
Nicaragua  1.83 1.62 
Panama 2.70 3.01 3.00 
Paraguay  1.03 1.73 
Peru  3.08 4.01 
Uruguay  4.10 7.48 
Venezuela  4.32 4.38 
 
The most noticeable jump in Internet news consumption was in Honduras, the 
poorest of the three countries in which the Internet question was asked. However, the 
increase was not about increasing daily use. Rather, the more notable shift between 
2004, 2006 and 2008 was a nearly 10% decrease in respondents who “never” used the 
Internet for news (Table 4.8). In other words, as access to the Internet expanded, people 
adopted it at least occasionally for news. This is a strong indicator that, despite the 
ubiquity of Internet news consumption among the monied middle class and elite in the 
developed world, the actual impact of digital news in the developing world may remain 
small, as consuming news via digital platforms remains the exception and not the 
rule.220
                                                          
220 As of 2018, Internet penetration in Latin America remains at 55% (Statista NDa), with much of that 
usage driven by Brazil and Mexico. 
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Table 4.8: Percent of the population who “never” use the Internet for news 
(AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
Argentina   52.27 
Bolivia  78.23 77.76 
Brazil  74.05 70.09 
Chile   77.11 68.75 
Colombia  83.31 77.79 
Costa Rica  88.10 86.59 
Dominican Republic  90.55 85.47 
Ecuador  90.84 81.26 
El Salvador  87.38 84.41 
Guatemala  91.44 86.20 
Honduras 93.59 89.92 84.62 
Mexico 84.76 85.94 83.16 
Nicaragua  90.76 89.97 
Panama 86.17 87.89 82.79 
Paraguay  90.30 90.03 
Peru  76.27 72.37 
Uruguay  80.17 76.95 
Venezuela  73.01 76.50 
 
Finally, correlations between news consumption are quite low, generally below 
0.30 with two exceptions, throughout the region. First, there was a small correlation 
(around 0.32) in some countries between newspaper readership and Internet news 
consumption.221 The highest correlations were in Central America—specifically, in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama—where the correlation between television and 
newspaper consumption was above 0.40.222  
 
                                                          
221 In El Salvador in both 2006 and 2008 and in Argentina in 2008, that correlation, at 0.32. In Bolivia 
and Chile in both 2006 and 2008, that same relationship registered 0.38 and 0.35 correlations, 
respectively. In Brazil, newspaper and Internet news use correlated at 0.30 in 2006 and 0.38 in 2008, 
whereas in Colombia and the Dominican Republic in those years it was 0.30 and 0.33. 
222 0.40 in 2004, 0.48 in 2006 and 0.41 in 2008 in Guatemala; 0.45 in 2004 and 0.59 in 2008 in 
Honduras; and 0.41 in 2004 and 2006 in Panama 
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Control variables 
As in the previous chapter, sex, age, education, ideology, city size and political 
interest223 remain salient to the analysis here. The interviewer noted the respondent's 
sex224 , with women coded as 1 and men 0. For 2004-2008, 51.91% of respondents were 
female. Age225 ranged from 16 to 99, because the minimum age of respondents was 18 in 
all countries except Brazil and Nicaragua, where it was 16. Maximum age ranged from 
81 in Argentina to 99 in Mexico, Brazil and the Dominican Republic. The one outlier for 
that was Paraguay, where the oldest respondent was only 65. The median for all 
countries was between 33 and 38, except for Nicaragua (30), Chile (42), Uruguay 
(44).226 
Educational achievement227 was measured in number of years of schooling, 
ranging from zero years to 18+. The exception was Colombia, for which the maximum 
number of years was set at 17+. The scale on the root questionnaire (in both Spanish and 
English) treated post-secondary, but non-university education, as equivalent to early 
university education. Root questionnaires are always somewhat subject to variation. In 
2014, for example, Mexico added the option of apprenticeship equivalent to late high 
school; and Peru and Panama did not include a technical post-secondary option. The 
scale is designed to be comparable cross-culturally. 
                                                          
223 Not asked in 2004. So, analyses for that year are run without the variable. 
224 Q1  
225 Q2 
226 This is slightly higher than the median age for the countries, presumably an artefact of only adults 
being sampled. The median age for each country is: Argentina 31, Brazil 32, Colombia 30, Costa Rica 31, 
Dominican Republic 28, Ecuador 27, El Salvador 27, Guatemala 22, Honduras 23, Mexico 28, Nicaragua 
25, Panama 29, Paraguay 28, Peru 28, Uruguay 35, Venezuela 28 (CIA World Factbook 2017 estimates).  
227 ED in 2014, EDU in previous versions  
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Overall, the median educational attainment (Table 4.9) was as low as the end of 
primary school (six year) in Guatemala, Honduras and the Dominican Republic, and as 
high completing high school (12 years) in Chile.228 Eleven years of education (not quite 
finishing secondary school) was the most-repeated median. 
Table 4.9: Education level by country (AmericasBarometer) 
 2004 2006 2008 
 Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD) Median Mean (SD) Median 
Argentina     10.89 (4.06) 11 
Bolivia   9.85 (5.24) 12 9.95 (4.89) 11 
Brazil     7.29 (4.33) 7 
Chile    10.46 (3.98) 12 10.48 (3.83) 12 
Colombia 8.73 (4.26) 10 8.56 (4.39) 9 8.75 (4.28) 10 
Costa Rica 8.27 (3.98) 7 8.80 (4.48) 8 8.16 (4.20) 8 
Dominican 
Republic 
  7.76 (4.78) 7 7.32 (4.24) 6 
Ecuador 9.74 (4.28) 10 10.08 (4.17) 11 10.17 (4.26) 11 
El Salvador 7.38 (4.99) 7 7.91 (5.06) 9 8.40 (5.31) 9 
Guatemala 5.76 (4.57) 6 6.52 (4.50) 6 6.01 (4.77) 6 
Honduras 5.78 (4.21) 6  7.23 (4.16) 6 7.25 (4.32) 6 
Mexico 8.22 (4.42) 9 8.57 (4.30)  9 8.27 (4.47) 9 
Nicaragua 6.43 (4.81) 6 7.34 (4.23) 7 8.01  (4.75) 8 
Panama 9.97 (4.45) 11 9.22 (4.39) 10 10.24 (3.97) 12 
Paraguay   8.59 (4.54) 8 8.99 (4.47) 9 
Peru   10.82 (4.09) 11 10.67 (4.23) 11 
Uruguay   9.30 (4.09) 9 8.98 (3.87) 9 
Venezuela   10.49 (4.44) 11 9.96 (3.63) 11 
 
Political interest229 ranged from “none” to “much.” I recoded the variable such 
that none was zero, little was one, some was two and much was three. The median for all 
countries was “little,” with the exception of Chile in 2008 and Guatemala in 2006, 
where the median was “none.”  
                                                          
228 There is a 0.35 correlation between education and newspaper readership and Internet news 
consumption. That is the highest correlation between any control variables. 
229 POL1. How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? 
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Party membership or identification is an unreliable measure in Latin America.230 
As explained in the previous chapter, self-reported ideology is a means to study political 
leanings when party affiliation or vote choice may not be comparable in a cross-national 
context.231 Ideology is also a strong and consistent predictor of voting in many areas of 
Latin American (Colomer 2005) (See Seligson 2007 for review). It is also preferable to 
party identification for cross-national analysis, when electoral systems are not the same 
(presidential versus parliamentary, for example) or during times of electoral volatility 
(such as the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America).  
The AmericasBarometer measures ideology with a single question.232 The 
wording has changed slightly over the years233 but the meaning has remained 
consistent: 
2004: In this card there’s a one to ten scale that goes from left to right. Today, when 
people talk about politics they mention left wingers and right wingers, referring to 
people that sympathize with the left or the right. According to your sense of “left” 
and “right” in politics, where would you place yourself in this scale? 
Left  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Right 
 
2006/2008: On this sheet there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. Today, 
when we speak of political tendencies, we talk of those on the left and those on the 
right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with 
                                                          
230 Coppedge (1998) describes the situation bluntly: “Most Latin American party systems change so often 
and in so many respects that the ‘typical’ party system of each country can be described only in imprecise 
terms, if at all” (547).  
231 Argentina, for example, as of 2015, had over twenty identifiable political parties; Brazil had almost 
thirty; and Mexico had nine, to give a few examples (LANIC 2015). 
232 Question L1 
233 Wording actually changed again in 2010 and then in 2012: 
2010:  On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 
10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left 
and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others 
with the right. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and 
thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale?  
2012/2014: On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 
10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left 
and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others 
with the right. According to the meaning that the terms “left” and “right” have for you, and 
thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me 
the number. 
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the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, 
and thinking of your own political tendency, where would you place yourself on this 
scale? Indicate the box that comes closest to your own position. 
Left  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 Right 
 
Scholars have found the unidimensional nature of questions like those above to not fully 
capture the nuanced nature of ideology, which may be multidimensional, an issue that has 
received a great deal of attention in American politics (Converse 1964, Achen 1975, 
Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder 2008, Feldman 1988). But this question is the best 
means available to gauge political predispositions across both time and space for the 
analysis in this chapter and, as noted above, demonstrates a consistent relationship with 
variables of political engagement and activity. 
The median for ideology was five or six for all countries, with few exceptions.  
Since the scale is even-numbered, the exact middle would be 5.5, meaning that both 5 
and 6 are fairly centrist positions. The exceptions were the Dominican Republic with 
median 8 (right of center) in 2006 and 2008, El Salvador with median 7 in 2004 and 
Honduras with median 7 in 2006. 
Scholars hold that location plays a role in the evolution of contention (Leitner, 
Sheppard and Sziarto 2008; Nicholls, Miller and Beaumont 2013; Rucht 2007; Sewell 
2007). Put very simply, “the physical assembling of large numbers of people into limited 
spaces is an important feature of nearly all forms of contentious politics” (Sewell 2007, 
58). That is certainly more political opportunity234 for protest in cities than in rural 
                                                          
234 Eisinger (1973) introduced the concept of political opportunity: “exogenous factors enhance or inhibit 
prospects for mobilization” (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1457). See Meyer (2004) for review of literature on 
political opportunity and protest. 
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areas,235 and scholars have suggested that urbanization itself is one reason for an 
increase in protests (e.g., Weiner 1967).236  
For that reason, it seems important to consider geography in the analysis of 
protests. Urbanization is operationalized in a relative way in the 2004, 2006 and 2008 
surveys the interviewer noting whether the respondent lived in the capital city, a large, 
medium, or small city, or a rural area.237 This captures more local or cultural nuance 
about what is relatively large or relatively rural than a simple population number 
would.238 I recoded the measure so that rural was 0, small city 1, medium city 2, large 
city 3, and the national capital was 4. The modal answer in each country was either 
“rural” or “large city”/capital: 
Rural: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, 
Panama, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay 
Large city or capital: Peru, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, 
Dominica Republic 
 
The exception was Colombia, where the mode was “small city.” For countries where the 
mode was “rural area”, the second most frequent answer was either capital city or large 
city. 
                                                          
235 This is not to say there are not rural protests (See Reed 2008 for a review of rural protests in England 
since the 1980s, for example) – but rather that rural issues have traditionally been addressed in ways not 
involving protests (Woods 2003). 
236 In recent years, the geography of protest has been a topic of interest in sociology and geography, but 
less so in political science. 
237 Tamano  
238 Further, in an overwhelming number of countries in the region, the capital is the largest city (Mexico, 
Peru, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Uruguay, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic and 
Guatemala). There are three instances of this being a possibly problematic measure: Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro (as well as other cities) in Brazil are larger than the capital Brasilia. Guayaquil in Ecuador is 
slightly larger than the capital Quito, and Santa Cruz is larger than the Bolivia capital, La Paz. For 
Ecuador and Bolivia, the capital city is the second-largest city. Brasilia is the third-largest city in Brazil, 
with one-third the population of Rio and less than one-quarter the population of São Paulo. Since Brazil 
was not included in the earliest iterations of the survey, any introduced bias by employing the localized 
measure should be minimal. 
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Issues of racism239 in Latin America are intertwined with matters of indigenous 
persecution in some countries and by the history of slavery in others (see Yasher 2015 
for review). 240 In the Southern Cone countries241, for example, the situation of 
indigenous persons is analogized to Native Americans: “not integrated into colonial 
society… [but also] not available to become exploited workers, not condemnable to 
forced labor for the colonists” (Quijano 2000, 562). The Brazilian government’s official 
stance until 2001 was that racism was a myth, despite having one of the most color-
stratified cultures in the world (Htun 2004). Ecuador treats all citizens as mestizos but 
that does not equate to racial egalitarianism (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 378).242 
Yet, until recent decades, indigenous or ethnic status was not highly salient, 
making Latin America famously the exception to the rule about the importance of race 
(Jalali and Lispet 1992, 588; Madrid 2012, 1).243 For example, in battles for land rights, 
peasants unions or farmers associations were more likely to focus on peasant or rural 
status, not necessarily indigenous status with which peasant or rural status was 
correlated (de la Peña 2005, 730, Yasher 1998, 1999). Ninety percent of Latin America’s 
indigenous population is concentrated in five countries: Bolivia, Guatemala, Peru, 
                                                          
239 Race and ethnicity are distinct topics, one biological and one cultural (bluntly) but few persons (or 
scholars) consistently make clear distinctions between the two, nor do scholars agree completely on where 
any line between the two should be. Analytically, they overlap quite a bit (Wade 1997, 18-21), and can also 
be intermingled with class or inequality (Hoffman and Centeno 2003). Is black a racial distinction but 
Indian ethnic? Or is race imposed by others and ethnicity self-declared? (Wade 1997, 23). By that 
definition, as this topic is addressed via survey questions, I would be focusing on ethnicity. But that would 
arguably impose intention upon multiple countries in which the word “ethnic” is not necessarily salient. 
For this reason, I focus on phenotype. I use the words ethnicity and race interchangeably.  
240 “In Latin America, the term indígena has been used by many social scientists and politicians, in 
contradistinction to other terms such as indio (Indian), tribesman, or ethnic group” (de la Peña 2005, 
718). 
241 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
242 For example, “in Ecuador, the appearance of a black beauty pageant winner caused a scandal (Rahier 
1998)” (Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 379).  
243 See Wade (1997) for a detailed analysis of how race and ethnicity have been viewed – and studied – in 
Latin America over time.  
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Ecuador and Mexico (Yasher 1998, 24). But, even there, supposedly indigenous 
revolutions or voting blocs did not highlight indigenous status or feature indigenous 
leaders (Madrid 2012, 1 FN1).  
Yet ethnic or indigenous parties have flourished in recent years, even winning 
national elections in some of the countries with the highest self-declared244 indigenous 
populations (van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012). No such political wave has yet happened for 
black Latin Americans (Hoffman and Centeno 2003).245 Discussions about the 
Declaration of Indigenous Rights in the 1990s concurrent with backlash against 
privatization economic policies (neoliberalism) are partly credited with the topic’s 
recent salience (de la Peña 2005).  
The issue, then, is how to address race and ethnicity with a measure applicable 
across the region, since the recent elections of pro-indigenous parties shows that the 
issue may be one around which cleavages may beget protests. The question246 – which 
was not asked at all in 2004 – in the merged AmericasBarometer dataset is:  
Do you consider yourself to be a white person, mestizo (white-mixed), 
indigenous, black, mulato247 (black-mixed) or other? (If the person says Afro-
anything, code as black.)  
 
However, the issue is not so simple when we examine it. For example, some countries do 
not include “indigenous” as an option. The Bolivia 2006 questionnaire offers two 
different responses, each with its own numerical coding, both of which may be 
                                                          
244 Race and ethnicity are not necessarily considered purely biological in Latin America (Hoffman and 
Centeno 2003, 377). Nor is speaking an indigenous language a pre-requisite of claiming indigenous status 
in some cases. In Bolivia’s 2001 census, for example, over 60 percent of the population self-declared as 
indigenous. That number fell to 48% in the 2012 census (Mallén 2013), suggesting some instability in the 
measure. 
245 Only in Venezuela do non-whites who do not identify as indigenous figure prominently in national 
politics (Sansone 1998 cited in Hoffman and Centeno 2003, 377). 
246 Etid 
247 Though commonly referring to mixed white and black ancestry in the United States, in Latin America, 
mulatto has been applied anyone of mixed African descent, be they part-white or part-native. 
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considered to stand in for indigenous status: indigena and originaria. The Peruvian 
questionnaire offers an extra “Asian” option. To give some more extreme examples, the 
Paraguayan questionnaire in 2014 included ten options for ethnicity, including four 
different ways to self-declare as an indigenous person, but without offering a general 
indigenous option. And the Brazilian 2014 questionnaire included “yellow” as an option. 
Any cross-national analysis including the measure would have to account for these 
differences in the surveys (across both country and year) and construct a measure 
appropriate to that researcher’s question.  
Researchers focusing on race and politics opt to consider skin tone in cross-
national analysis where ethnicity, race or color might be important. Colorism is “the 
discrimination that privileges light-skinned people of color over their dark-skinned 
counterparts. Colorism is concerned with actual skin tone, as opposed to racial or ethnic 
identity” (Hunter 2007, 237).248 It has a documented association with opportunity 
structures in many countries, often considered a lingering effect of colonialism and 
slavery (Hunter 2013, 248).249 Simply put, darker skin tone is correlated with more 
discrimination.250 
I opted to construct an ordinal four-item classification focused on colorism. After 
all, throughout the region, “white” is considered lighter than “mestizo,” which is lighter 
                                                          
248 The distinction is defined as: “While color is used in racial assignment and categorization, colorism 
refers to the tendency to make further preference judgments based on gradations of color and afrocentric 
features within race; thus, it captures the fact that darker-skinned, more afrocentric blacks undergo more 
extreme racial bias. Unlike racism, all people recognized as a belonging to a subordinated racial group do 
not face identical discrimination” (Weaver 2012, 163). 
249 The AmericasBarometer actually addressed this matter in 2010, employing a skin-color palette. There 
was a negative and significant relationship between darker skin tone and educational attainment across 
the region, with Guatemalans and Bolivians penalized even more than darker-skinned persons in other 
countries (Telles and Steele 2012).  
250 To give one example, Weaver (2012), for example, found that darker-skinned candidates are penalized 
more than lighter-skinned (but still “black”) candidates when running for office. See Taylor (1996) for a 
sociological critique of how political science has treated race and ethnicity as measurable items. 
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than “indigenous,” which in turn is lighter than “black” or “mulatto.”  This simplification 
and ordering also recognizes the reality of racism from indigenous persons to Afro-
Latinos, as only three countries in the region (Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua) 
explicitly guarantee dark-skinned persons equal rights (Hooker 2005, 286).  
Specifically, I combined the black and mulatto categories into one; and I 
aggregated all possible version of “indigenous” into one general “indigenous” category 
for each country. 251 Distributions for each year are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2: 
Figure 4.1: Racial breakdown in the AmericasBarometer 2006 (in percent) 
 
 
                                                          









Distribution by skin color (2006 AmericasBarometer)
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Figure 4.2: Racial breakdown in the AmericasBarometer 2008 (in percent) 
 
 
There were, of course, many differences by country. Whereas 71% in Argentina 
said they identified as white, that same number in Bolivia identified as mestizo. Five 
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay) had 
less than 1% declare as indigenous in either 2006 or 2008. The mode was, 
unsurprisingly, white or mestizo in every country. The Dominican Republic had the 
largest proportion of Blacks, about one-third of respondents in both waves; but Brazil, 
Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela included more than 10% of respondents who 
identified as dark-skinned. 
 
Lost n 
As explained in the previous chapter, non-response on surveys is high in Latin 
America and the drop in n becomes especially noticeable in multivariate analysis 









Distribution by skin color (2008 AmericasBarometer)
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did not answer some of the survey items included in the analysis. Luckily, as explained 
above, the drop in n for the forthcoming analyses is largely attributable to questions not 
being asked in all countries in all years. Specifically, in eight countries in 2004 and ten 
countries in 2008 did not collect protest participation data from respondents, and, in 
2004, on political interest or on race. The countries vary from very stable (Uruguay) to 
protest-heavy (Bolivia). The question wording did not change. And questions about 
specific types of protest were asked in the World Values Survey in countries where the 
question about protest was not asked, suggesting it was not a taboo topic.  
Rather than limit the analysis to just 2006, when there was still no measure of 
race or political interest in Brazil, I have opted to examine all possible iterations of 
protest in the AmericasBarometer dataset when disaggregated media questions were 
included. That means that, for 2004, all analyses are run without race or political 
interest. I understand this means the models are not perfectly comparable across years. 
But, as explained in Chapter One, since so little analysis involving the news media and 
political behavior is done in developing countries in general and in Latin America 
specifically, I contend that imperfect models are a reasonable start.  
 
Findings 
Unlike the previous chapter, which considered each form of protest individually, 
as there is only one form of political engagement of interest here: protest. My analysis 
will first examine data by country within each survey wave (2004, 2006, 2008) to 
capture any regional trends (such as the Pink Tide). Then, after statistical results are 
presented, the analysis shifts to findings within each media platform and then within 
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each country. In countries where data for the dependent variable, protest, was available 
for multiple years, I compare those values within that country across time.  
In the previous chapter, with just two survey waves and fewer countries, 
presenting results together was intended to be easier for reader comprehension. In this 
chapter, with so many countries included, some with just one datapoint and some with 
three, presenting by country first could seem very choppy.  
 
2004 
Table 4.10 presents findings from the analysis of protest in 2004, again done 
without a measure of race or political interest. To reiterate, only Mexico, Honduras and 
Panama in 2004 included an Internet news question. 
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Table 4.10: Logit output for having protested (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2004)  
 Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
Female 
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(0.1123) 
n 1263 1014 1361 1151 969 1230 992 1313 





Television news consumption was at no point significant for protest activity in 
the region. But newspaper readership and radio news listenership appeared positive and 
significant twice in models.252 In those cases, increased news consumption, via 
newspaper or radio, registered a positive (direct) association with having protested. In 
Colombia, a one-unit increase in newspaper readership was associated with a 22% 
increase in likelihood of having protested; and the same one-unit increase in newspaper 
readership Mexico was associated with an almost 29% increase in likelihood of having 
protested.253 A one-unit increase news consumption via radio was associated with a 17% 
increase in likelihood of having protested in Panama and with a 38% increase in El 
Salvador.254 Only three countries included questions about Internet news consumption 
in 2004 and it was not statistically significant in any.  
  In 2004, absent a measure for interest in politics, the biggest predictor of having 
protested was education level, which was significant in five of the eight countries in the 
sample that year: Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama.255 In most 
of those places, a one-unit increase in education was associated with a 10-12.5% increase 
in likelihood of having protested.256 The outlier was Costa Rica, where a one-unit 
increase in education was associated with a 17% increase in likelihood of protesting.257 
Ideology was also significant in five out of eight countries, but in different 
directions. A one-unit move to the left was significant in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico 
                                                          
252 In Mexico, radio news consumption barely missed minimal significance in the positive direction, with a 
p-value of 0.101. 
253 Odds ratios 1.22357 and 1.2878, respectively 
254 Odds ratios 1.1713 and 1.3810, respectively 
255 The correlation between political interest and education was as low as 0.02 in some country-years and 
reached no higher than 0.26. 
256 Odds ratios: 1.1226 in Colombia, 1.1038 in Costa Rica, 1.1021 in Nicaragua and 1.1240 in Panama. 
257 Odds ratio 1.1741 
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and Nicaragua was associated with a 7-20% increase in likelihood for having 
protested.258 But in Panama259, a one-unit increase to the right was associated with a 
13% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested in the 2004 survey.260 Fourteen 
percent of respondents in Panama in 2004 reported ideology far to the right (10 out of 
10 on the ideological scale); and about a quarter of the population self-described as 8 or 
above on that scale. Less than 10% of the population reported being far left (3 or less on 
the scale) in Panama in 2004. It seems Panama may be an odd outlier on ideology.  
Being female reduced the likelihood of having protested in two places: Nicaragua 
and Panama. In those countries, women were 43% and 33% less likely to report having 
protested.261 Age was only statistically significant in Panama, but a one-unit increase in 
age was not particularly meaningful, as it only translated to a one-percent increase in 
likelihood for having protested.262 City size was at no point statistically significant. 
 
2006 
The sample of countries included in the 2006 AmericasBarometer doubled in size 
and the question about protest was asked in all countries except Paraguay (Table 4.11).  
                                                          
258 Odds ratios 0.8852, 0.7911, 0.8986 and 0.9301 respectively 
259 I am unaware of any particular reason for this. The US State Department (2005) reports: 
“September 2003 protests… turned violent when construction workers led by [a] labor union 
attached police. In 2002, there were several public demonstrations, including a major public protest 
against corruption in Panama City. Several times during the year, rural groups protested against the 
presence of Panama Canal authorities in the watershed and potential expansion of the Canal. In 
August 2002, rioting broke out in Colon for two days, ostensibly to protest persistently high 
unemployment, halting commerce and causing minor property damage… 
“Two high-profile incidents in 2001 were triggered by the government's decision to allow bus 
owners to raise fares and by the delay in raising the minimum wage (which was raised in August 
2003). The former led to weeklong riots that caused over 20 injuries, hundreds of arrests, and 
sporadic looting in the capital. Opposition to the proposed privatization of the state water utility in 
1998 also led to vociferous, but generally nonviolent, protests.” https://2001-
2009.state.gov/e/eeb/ifd/2005/42100.htm (May 30, 2018) 
260 Odds ratio 1.1311 
261 Odds ratios 0.5746 and 0.6662, respectively 
262 Odds ratio 1.0157 
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Table 4.11: Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2006)  
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(0.2604) 
n 958 1314 1145 1086 1256 1829 1131 951 





Table 4.11 (cont): Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2006)  

















































































































































































n 1292 1198 1376 1199 1313 1070 1243 






In 2006, as in 2004, television news consumption was not associated with 
protest participation in any country. Newspaper readership was statistically significant 
in five cases, each time in a positive direction. A one-unit increase in getting news via 
newspaper was associated with an 18% increase in protest activity in Ecuador, a 28% 
increase in Uruguay, 29% in Nicaragua, 30% in Brazil and 38% in Honduras.263  
Radio registered a positive and statistically significant association in four cases. 
In Ecuador, a one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 16% 
increase in likelihood to report having a protested.264 That same one-unit radio news 
consumption increase in Chile was associated with a 20% increase in protest propensity 
and with a 24% increase in Peru.265 The largest increase was in El Salvador, where a 
one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 46% increase in 
likelihood for having protested.266  
   Internet news consumption was statistically significant in four countries in 
2006: Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela. In each case, the effect was positive. The 
impact was notable. A one-unit increase in Internet news consumption was associated 
with a 27% - 42% increase in having protested.267 That impact is approximately the 
same size as that of political interest across the region, which was significant in every 
country except Costa Rica and Honduras.  
When statistically significant, the impact of political interest in all countries was 
large and in a positive direction. A one-unit increase in political interest was associated 
                                                          
263 Odds ratios 1.1846, 1.2773, 1.2921, 1.3074 and 1.3808, respectively 
264 Odds ratio 1.1621 
265 Odds ratios 1.1974 and 1.2406, respectively 
266 Odds ratio 1.4567 
267 Odds ratios: 1.3667 in Brazil, 1.38236 in Ecuador, 1.4195 in Mexico and 1.271293 in Venezuela 
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with no less than 25% increase in reporting having protested.268 Most effects were 
between 30% and 50%.269 The outliers were El Salvador, Guatemala, Uruguay and 
Venezuela, where a one-unit increase in political interest was associated with a 60% to 
80% increase in likelihood to have protested.270 Median interest in politics in Guatemala 
(“none”) was lower that year than in the rest of the sample (“little”), which might explain 
part of the outsized impact, but not so for the other three. Information about protest 
was only collected in Uruguay and Venezuela in 2006, meaning no within-country 
comparisons are possible. In both El Salvador and Guatemala, those responding in the 
affirmative about protesting had increased a little over one-percent year-on-year.  
As expected, education was also a strong predictor of having protested, 
statistically significant in all country models, save El Salvador and Mexico. A one-unit 
increase in education was associated with an approximately 8% increase in reporting 
having protested.271 In Chile, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay, the impact was 15%.272 
Respondents who self-reported more leftist ideology were more likely to report 
having protested. In Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Peru, 
a one-unit shift left was associated with an approximately 10% increase in likelihood of 
having protested.273 In Chile and Mexico, a one-unit shift to the left was associated with 
an approximately 19% increase in likelihood of having protested.274 In El Salvador and 
                                                          
268 Lowest significant odds ratio 1.2597 in Peru 
269 Odds ratios: 1.3130 in Panama, 1.3637 in Nicaragua, 1.3812 in the Dominican Republic, 1.3835 in 
Colombia, 1.4289 in Mexico, 1.4852 in Ecuador, and 1.5296 in Chile 
270 Odds ratios: 1.6376 in El Salvador, 1.6806 in Guatemala, 1.7839 in Uruguay and 1.7297 in Venezuela 
271 Odds ratios: 1.0718 in Colombia, 1.1104 in the Dominican Republic, 1.0785 in Ecuador, 1.0640 in 
Honduras, 1.0954 in Nicaragua, 1.0749 in Peru, and 1.0641 in Venezuela   
272 Odds ratio: 1.1581 in Chile, 1.1166 in Costa Rica, 1.1362 in Panama, and 1.1139 in Uruguay 
273 Odds ratios 0.8707, 0.9043, 0.9314, 0.9319, and 0.9001, respectively 
274 Odds ratios 0.8076 and 0.8266, respectively 
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Uruguay, a one-unit shift to the left was associated with an approximately 27% increase 
in likelihood of having protested.275 
In nine countries, being female was negative and statistically significant for a 
protesting. Women were between 30% and 50% less likely to protest than men.276 Age 
was statistically significant in about half the countries but had little impact. A one-unit 
increase in age was associated with a 2% increase in likelihood of protesting.277  
Though not statistically significant at all in 2004, city size was significant four 
times in 2006, but in different directions. A one-unit increase in city size was associated 
with an 19% decrease in likelihood of protesting in the Dominican Republic, but with a 
17% increase in Panama.278 In Uruguay and Venezuela, the impact was even larger, with 
a one-unit increase in city size associated with an over 30% increase in likelihood of 
having protested.279 Having not been included in the previous model because the 
question was not asked in 2004, race/ethnicity/skin tone was statistically significant 
only once, in Venezuela, with a one-unit increase in skin darkness associated with a 20% 
increase in having protested.280  
 
2008 
The question about having protested was only asked in six countries in the 2008 
survey: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru (Table 4.12). 
                                                          
275 Odds ratios 0.7439 and 0.7223, respectively  
276 Odds ratios: 0.6888 in Chile, 0.6784 in Costa Rica, 0.5012 in the Dominican Republic, 0.499 in 
Ecuador, 0.5065 in El Salvador, 0.57867 in Honduras, 0.5937 in Nicaragua, 0.5573 in Panama, and 
0.6927 in Peru 
277 Odds ratios: 1.0212 in the Dominican Republic, 1.0247 in El Salvador, 1.0205 in Guatemala, 1.0232 in 
Mexico, 1.0136 in Panama, 1.0185 in Peru and 1.0166 in Uruguay 
278 Odds ratios 0.8282 and 1.1730, respectively 
279 Odds ratios 1.3457 and 1.3025, respectively 
280 Odds ratio 1.201252 
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Table 4.12: Logit output for protesting (coefficients) by country (AmericasBarometer 2008)  



























































































































































n 1017 1184 1035 1007 1214 1270 




As with the previous two survey years, television news consumption was at no 
point statistically significant for protest activity. Newspaper readership was only 
significant in Brazil, with a one-unit increase in consumption associated with a 24% 
increase in likelihood to report having protested.281 Radio news listenership in 2008 
was positive and significant for protesting in Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. In Mexico, a 
one-unit increase in radio news consumption was associated with a 22% increase in 
protesting.282 In Guatemala and Peru, that effect was over 33%.283 
Most surprising relative to media in 2008, Internet news consumption was only 
significant for protesting in two of six countries, but in different directions: positive in 
Colombia, but negative in Guatemala. In Colombia, a one-unit increase in Internet news 
consumption was associated with a 26% increase in likelihood for having protested.284 
In Guatemala, that same one-unit increase in news consumption was associated with 
one-third less chance of reporting having protested.285 In 2008, over 25% of Colombia’s 
population used the Internet (Statista NDb) but only 8.3% of Guatemala’s population 
did (World Bank). 
Unsurprisingly, interest in politics had the biggest impact on a respondent’s 
reporting protest participation, with a one-unit increase in political interest associated 
with no less than a 36% increase in likelihood of protesting.286 Overall, a one-unit 
increase in political interest was associated with a 55-60% increase in likelihood of 
                                                          
281 Odds ratio 1.2387 
282 Odds ratio 1.2155 
283 Odds ratios 1.3771 and 1.3360, respectively 
284 Odds ratio 1.2569 
285 Odds ratio 0.6798 
286 Odds ratio 1.3630 in Costa Rica 
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having protested.287 Mexico was an outlier, with a one-unit increase in political interest 
associated with an over 80% increase in having protested.288 
Education was significantly associated with protesting in four of six countries in 
2008, always in the positive direction. A one-unit increase in education was associated 
with an 8% increase in likelihood of protesting in Guatemala and Peru, with an 11% 
increase in Costa Rica, and with a 16% increase in Colombia.289 Being more left-leaning 
was also significant for protesting in four countries. A one-unit shift to the left was 
associated with about a 10% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested in the 
past.290 The impact was larger in Peru, where a one-unit shift to the left was associated 
with an 18% increase in protesting.291  
Gender was statistically significant for protesting only in Colombia in 2008, with 
woman about 30% less likely to report having protested than men.292 Age was only 
statistically significant in Mexico and Peru, with a one-unit increase in age associated 
with a 1-2% increase in likelihood of reporting having protested.293 City size was only 
statistically significant in Mexico, with a one-unit increase in city size associated with a 
30% increase in having protested.294 Skin color was nowhere statistically significant in 
this sample of countries in 2008.  
 
                                                          
287 Odds ratios: 1.6157 in Brazil, 1.5924 in Colombia, 1.6296 in Guatemala, and 1.5504 I Peru 
288 Odds ratio 1.8094 
289 Odds ratios 1.0780, 1.0752, 1.1134, and 1.1622, respectively 
290 Odds ratios: 0.9234 in Colombia, 0.8968 in Costa Rica, and 0.8706 in Mexico 
291 Odds ratio 0.8241 
292 Odds ratio 0.7155 
293 Odds ratios 1.0230 and 1.0131, respectively 
294 Odds ratio 1.3047 
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Discussion 
As detailed in Appendix A, there are different expectations for the impact of 
media platform reputation in each country. In terms of expectations relative to those 
classifications, results shown in Table 13 were quite mixed. First and foremost, in three 
countries (Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic and Venezuela), no media consumption 
was at any point in the mid-2000s significant for protesting. Conversely, only in Brazil, 
Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico in 2006 was more than one media platform significant 
at any given time. In every other instance, only one media platform was associated with 
protest behavior.  
It seems that the link between media and protesting—which has become more 
obvious to scholars in the past few years thanks to the Internet—may have been 
fomenting before Internet news consumption became the norm in many places. But 
findings are too sporadic to draw strong conclusions. If media reputation were 
significant—especially arguably for community radio, for example—then these findings 
should be repeated over time, and they should be stronger in places with more 
balkanized or contrarian media. 
In Table 4.13 a checkmark indicates significant findings in line with expectations. 
An x indicates significant findings against expectations. A question mark indicates 
significant and positive findings without a directional expectation. The dash indicates 
the one instance of significant and negative findings absent a directional expectation.  
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Table 4.13: Comparison with expectations 
 Brazil Chile Colombia 
 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 
TV          
Paper  ? ?       
Radio     ?     
Internet  √       √ 
 
Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations 
 Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador 
 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 
TV          
Paper        x  
Radio        x  
Internet        √  
 
Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations 
 El Salvador Guatemala Honduras 
 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 
TV          
Paper        x  
Radio √     ?    
Internet      -    
 
Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations 
 Mexico Nicaragua Panama 
 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 
TV          
Paper  x   x     
Radio   ?    √   
Internet  √        
 
Table 4.13 (cont): Comparison with expectations 
 Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 2004 2006 2008 
TV          
Paper     x     
Radio  √ √       




Nowhere did I expect newspaper readership to have a positive impact on 
protesting – that is to say nowhere were newspaper classified as challenging the status 
quo – but newspaper readership was positive and significant in six countries: Mexico in 
2004; Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Uruguay in 2006; and Brazil in both 2006 
and 2008. This is against expectations for every place but Brazil, for which there was not 
expectation drawn from reputation (see Appendix A). I suspect that there may be more 
nuance in newspapers, even within any country, than be captured with the blunt 
measure available in this survey.  
Radio news consumption was positive and significant in six countries: El 
Salvador and Panama in 2004; Chile and Ecuador in 2006; Guatemala and Mexico in 
2008; and Peru in both 2006 and 2008. This conforms with expectations for El 
Salvador, Panama and Peru. There was no expectation for Chile, Guatemala or Mexico. 
For Ecuador, this positive association is against expectations, as radio in that country 
was categorized as status quo-reinforcing.  
Finally, the Internet was only significant in five countries: positive and significant 
in Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico in 2006, and in Colombia in 2008; but the negative and 
significant finding for Guatemala in 2008 is against expectations. There were 8.3 
Internet users per 100 in Guatemala in 2008 (World Bank); and about 90% of 
respondents in the survey used the Internet for news rarely or less. The negative 
association may be related to a lack of Internet penetration at all, much less for news 
consumption. Nonetheless, the Internet’s having a negative relationship with protest is 
at odds with much of existing literature and may be anomalous.  
Overall, results went against expectations as much as conformed to them. As in 
the previous chapter, the findings about newspapers are the most surprising. The 
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history of social movements would suggest that elites – especially young, affluent, 
educated men295 – are most likely to spur democratic transitions.296 That the young are 
least likely worldwide to get news via newspapers (Nielsen 2017) makes this finding 
even less intuitive. In Latin America overall, newspapers are less strongly affiliated with 
status quo or government positions than television is (which was at no point significant 
for protesting), but I did not have them classified as agents of change. Only in Brazil, 
where there was no expectation, was this finding repeated at more than one data point 
though, suggesting it may be anomalous. 
Radio was categorized as critical of government in Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. Of those, there were only significant findings in 
three. The other three places where radio was significant were not categorized as having 
a directional expectation. And radio was not statistically significant for protest in places 
where I most expected it to be, such as Nicaragua. When and where radio was 
significant, daily radio news consumption was between 30 and 40%, neither very low or 
very high in the region. In fact, when radio was statistically significant, daily use was the 
                                                          
295 “It is obvious that privileged class backgrounds provide leaders with financial resources, flexible 
schedules and social contacts often unavailable to the rank and file. These resources are important 
because social movements often champion the interests of resource-poor groups... A host of social 
movement activities – framing grievances and formulating ideologies, debating, interfacing with media, 
writing, orating, devising strategies and tactics, creatively synthesizing information gleaned from local, 
national, and international venues, dialoguing with internal and external elites, improvising and 
innovating, developing rationales for coalition building and channeling emotions – are primarily 
intellectual tasks… Formal education, especially at the university level, is the main avenue through which 
people acquire advanced reading, writing, speaking, and analytic skills, and colleges and universities are 
settings in which many individuals absorb new ideas from different cultures… This does not mean that all 
movement leaders hail from the privileged classes or receive higher education… Yet we believe that even 
for those who come from working and lower classes, educational capital is crucial.” (Morris and 
Staggenborg 2004, 175)  
296 This is not to discount the role of women in social movements. But they historically have not been 
leaders of movements, except in rare cases (for women’s rights or the abolition of slavery, for example). 
Many early leaders in the US civil rights movement were men, for example, because the path to leadership 
for that movement went largely through black churches, where over 99% of pastors were men (Morris and 
Staggenborg 2004, 176) 
184 
same as in places where radio news consumption was not significant. El Salvador is one 
country in which radio, historically, is quite contrarian or against the status quo, even 
explicitly employed by guerillas, whilst newspapers aligned with military dictatorships 
(Henriquez Consalvi 2010, Rockwell and Janus 2003); and the finding there was barely 
statistically significant. Perhaps with radio more detailed one-country studies are 
needed before it is appropriate to speculate about generalizable or universal tendencies, 
even at the individual level.  
Changing the analysis from cross-national to within country, ten countries had 
data from at least two points in time about both about protest and media consumption: 
Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama and Peru. Of those, no media was ever significant for protesting in Costa Rica 
or Honduras. Only in Brazil was the significant relationship between newspaper 
consumption and protest participation replicated from 2006 to 2008. Though 
significant in 2004 in Colombia and Mexico and in 2006 in Nicaragua, the relationship 
for newspaper readership did not hold across survey iterations. A significant 
relationship between radio news consumption and protest participation remained 
constant over time for El Salvador (2004, 2006) and Peru (2006, 2008) but did not for 
Panama, Guatemala or Mexico, which registered radio as significant only once. The 
significance of the Internet was not duplicated in any country, with significance only 
found once in Brazil (2006), Mexico (2006), Colombia (2008) and Guatemala (2008).  
In every place in which a media platform was statistically significant one year, it 
was not another year. That raises doubts about the importance of media reputation for 
challenging the status quo, as, without more data points to connect, any one-time 
relationship could be spurious. Minimally, it suggests that the media reputation is less 
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important than some other underlying factor. There were no particularly high 
correlations among the variables employed in this chapter. But inconsistent findings 
cross-national and within-country over time suggest a different mechanism at work.  
That said, protest is exceptionally rare. Walgrave, Wouters and Ketelaars (2016) 
caution that survey data on protest behaviors may pose validity concerns because of the 
sensitive nature of the topic.297 If protest participation were underreported, then that 
would make it harder to find any relationship. In addition, logistic regression 
notoriously underestimates the probability of predicting rare events (King and Zeng 
2001), such as protest.298 Since the method begets ballooned standard errors, any 
findings are notable.  
Theoretically, the takeaway from this chapter is that, above and beyond 
demographics,299 even without analytics, there may be ways to gauge who is more likely 
to protest—namely by identifying individuals who consume more Internet and radio 
news. But such findings would need to replicated across the continent at another point 
in time before making such a claim with any conviction.  
Finally, nothing in the analysis for this chapter can speak to the direction of the 
relationship between media and protest. The path dependent relationship described in 
Chapter Two would suggest that media consumption would drive participation, but that 
need not be the case. For example, Wolfsfeld, Segev and Sheafer (2013) contend that 
                                                          
297 There is no reason to expect people would over- or under-report having protested. 
298 King and Zeng (2001) recommend statistical fixes to employ in the collection of rare event data. For a 
survey in which respondents answer yes or no, such fixes are not useful. 
299 Multiple scholars have noted that unconventional means of participation may reduce gender and age 
discrepancies observed in more conventional forms of participation (e.g., Marien, Hooghe and Quintelier 
2010; Dietlind, Stolle and Marc Hooghe 2011). In this sample, neither was a consistent predictor of 
protest activity. Without a conventional means of participation to compare with, it is impossible to know 
if gender is less relevant for protest than it might be for something else. 
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protests during the Arab Spring begot increased social media activity, not the reverse as 
many claimed. That said, since young people worldwide show higher levels of literacy 
and adoption of technology, these findings are likely conservative, with the importance 
of Internet news consumption especially potentially underrated.  
Unfortunately, since 2008, AmericasBarometer has combined their media 
consumption questions to collect information only on frequency, not frequency by 
platform. Given the differing impact of media consumption on protest shown here, that 
is likely to the detriment of future scholarship. The previous chapter and this, as well as 
a wide range of studies from other disciplines, show that there may be something 
especially impactful about Internet news consumption for protest (Bennett and 
Segerberg 2013, Scheufele and Nisbet 2002, Shah, Kwak and Holbert 2001, Shah, 
McLeod and Yoon 2001, Corrigall-Brown and Wilkes 2014, Boulianne 2009, 2015 or 
Skoric, Zhu, Goh and Pang 2015, Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Valenzuela 2013, Kenski and 
Stroud 2006, Norris and Inglehart 2009, Abbott 2012, Valenzuela 2013, Gainous, 
Wagner and Abbot 2015, Ruijgrok 2016, Garrett 2006, Howard 2010). A combined 
media measure would miss that.  
Having explored participation generally and protest specifically, the next chapter 
narrows the theory further, focusing on one country unlike those so far studied – 




Chapter Five: THIRD QUANTITATIVE TEST 
Though comparative coverage of the world has improved considerably in recent 
years, media data available for Latin America is still limited in scope (countries) as well 
as depth (topic). World Values Survey administers surveys only in the most developed of 
the Latin American countries, and while the AmericasBarometer collects data from all of 
Latin America, space limitations have limited its coverage of media usage in recent 
iterations to one question about total news consumption.300 The convergence of these 
factors result in a dearth of information about the impact of media on Latin American 
countries that are lower developed.  
 I was given a unique opportunity to insert media consumption questions into a 
pre-electoral survey for the 2014 presidential campaign in Bolivia, the second poorest 
country in the hemisphere. Since voting is compulsory in most of Latin America, as 
explained previously, the media’s impact on merely voting would be inconsequential. 
Additionally, for a multitude of reasons related to social desirability bias, asking after-
the-fact about vote choice is not necessarily accurate. Asking who someone intends to 
vote for is more valid, especially close to the election. That provided me the opportunity 
to test if the reputation of media platforms might be associated with vote choice, in 
addition to its association with political behaviors outlined in previous chapters. This 
case study allows me to examine the association between media consumption of 
platforms that challenge the status quo and candidate preference in Bolivia’s 2014 
presidential election. 
                                                          
300 Question GI0 on the core questionnaire: About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on 
TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few 
times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never 
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 The 2014 Bolivian election was the second under the 2009 constitution. 
Incumbent President Juan “Evo” Morales Ayma, leading the Movement Toward 
Socialism (MAS) ticket, ran against 4 opponents from across the political spectrum: 
Fernando Vargas of the Green Party to his left, and to the right of Morales, centrist Juan 
Del Granado of the Movement Without Fear (MSM) party, conservative former 
President Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga representing the Christian-Democratic PODEMOS 
party, and libertarian Democratic Unity (UD) party candidate Samuel Doria Medina.  
 The context of the 2014 Bolivian presidential election was one of regional, ethnic 
and societal tension. Bolivia is also unlike the Western, educated, industrialized, rich, 
democratic (WEIRD) countries in which most political communication and behavior 
theory has been formed and tested (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010).  The 
polarized environment, coupled with the country’s high poverty and uniquely strong 
history of counter-culture media, especially radio, make Bolivia a valuable test case for 
the importance of mass media consumption for political engagement. My analysis 
suggests that consumption of media reputed to be aligned with or supportive of certain 
candidates correlates with voting for those candidates. This complements the theory 
employed in the previous two chapters that reputation guides media consumption in 
part.  
 Like the previous chapter and unlike Chapter Three, media reputation and 
consumption seem to have little impact on candidate choice. The impact of anti-
establishment media — radio and Internet — shows no clear pattern. Taken together, 
the scant findings from Bolivia suggest that, though news media consumption – and 
Internet news especially – has been shown to be positively associated with political 
engagement in the previous chapters, there may be much less of a relationship between 
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Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, second only to Haiti 
(Soruco and Pinto 2009, 89) and ranking 119 out of 188 countries on the 2015 Human 
Development Index (UNDP 2015).301 It is considered a medium human development 
country, with only three Latin American countries ranked lower.302 As an illustration in 
practical terms, thirty percent of homes in Bolivia did not have access to sanitation in in 
2012 (INE 2012, 19). 
One of only two landlocked countries in South America303, Bolivia is situated in 
the middle of the continent, with a population estimated at just over 11 million in 2017 
(INE). The country’s three largest cities – La Paz/El Alto, Santa Cruz and Cochabamba – 
help roughly map out the country’s geographic divides: the largely indigenous Altiplano 
(high plain) in the west, the wealthier mestizo agricultural areas in the east, and the 
fertile coca growing lands in the middle.  
Independent since 1825, military dictatorships or juntas ruled Bolivia for much 
of the middle of the 20th century, with the last falling in 1982 (Klein 2011). The 
restoration of valid elections did not coincide with the emergence of any dominant 
party. Coalition governments were the norm in Bolivia in the last decades of the 20th 
century, leading to policy enactments that surprised some observers (Klein 2011).  
                                                          
301 Down from 113 in 2013 
302 Nicaragua 125, Guatemala 128 and Honduras 131 
303 The other being Paraguay 
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Bolivia’s modern democratic trend began with the election of President Victor 
Paz Estenssoro in 1985.304 Amidst hyperinflation above 20,000 percent (Chavez 1985), 
he broke with his own past policies and instituted economic liberalization in the late 
1980s, adopting a program known as the Washington Consensus (Sachs 1987). That 
program of economic reform and privatization305, which would later be known 
pejoratively as neoliberalism (Metcalf 2017), would be essential to the rise of indigenous 
and anti-establishment parties in the following years (Grissafi 2010).  
The timing of Paz Estenssoro’s dismantling of the Bolivian bureaucracy coincided 
with an increase in demand for a traditional Bolivia product: coca (Klein 2011, 247). At 
the same time that state bureaucracy was being disassembled, revenue was streaming 
into traditionally underserved coca-growing areas populated by the descendants of 
indigenous peoples306, whose rights had been suppressed under military junta rule. 
 Though the fight for indigenous rights in Bolivia goes back to the early 1970s 
after the demise of the last military dictatorship, it was the confluence of privatization 
and growth of the coca trade in the 1980s brought the fight for indigenous rights to the 
forefront (Klein 2011, 248-263). Indigenous rights organizations gained their first seats 
in Bolivian politics in the early 1990s, when the societal effects of dismantling of the 
state employment apparatus were becoming apparent. Indigenous and workers’ parties 
                                                          
304 Paz Estenssoro has previously held the position from 1952–1956 and 1960–1964 before he was 
overthrown in a coup d’état and subsequently exiled. 
305 The ten tenets of the Washington consensus are: fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, trade liberalization, 
liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization, deregulation and property rights 
(Williamson 2004, 196) 
306 Grissafi (2010) makes the point that the residents of the coca-growing regions were not the original 
indigenous persons there, but largely rather transplants from other areas who still identify as indigenous. 
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confronted the traditional political establishment on the grounds of racism and 
economic malaise throughout the 1990s.  
 Though indicators of human development had been increasing for all Bolivians 
since educational and societal reforms began in the 1950s, the less indigenous part of 
Bolivia remained significantly richer and healthier (Klein 2011, 279). Though Bolivia’s 
Gini coefficient has decreased in this century from a high of 61.6 in 2000, it still stood at 
47.8 in 2014 (World Bank).307 Many blame Washington consensus policies for enduring 
inequality (Rice 2011, 286). 
 The building strength of indigenous rights groups was first felt in the 2002 
election, in which the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party under Juan “Evo” 
Morales Ayma and the Indian Pachakuti Movement (MIP) party under Felipe Quispe 
won one-third of the seats308. This begot a new political opposition from the western 
part of Bolivia, which had many fewer indigenous residents and generated much of the 
country’s agricultural and natural gas exports (Klein 2011, 264).309  
 The ideological and political divide between the indigenous western highlands 
and mestizo eastern lowlands was further inflamed by the election of Morales as 
President in 2005. During the election campaign, Morales promised to nationalize the 
country’s natural gas companies in 2006 and to rewrite the constitution (Zissis 2006, 
Economist 2006a) to expand indigenous rights and reshape government (Romero 2009, 
                                                          
307 A Gini coefficient of zero represents perfect equality in which every resident earning an equal amount. 
A Gini coefficient of one represents a country in which one person holds all wealth, with everyone else 
earning nothing. “South Africa, Namibia and Haiti are among the most unequal countries in terms of 
income distribution … while Ukraine, Slovenia and Norway rank as the most equal nations” (Barr 2017). 
308 Quispe’s party grew out of an explicitly anti-Western movement from the 1970s (Rice 2011, 290). 
309 For details on the “Media Luna” (half moon) backlash from the Eastern states, see Eaton (2007) or 
Bebbington and Bebbington (2010)  
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Taylor 2009) away from elites and more toward the needs of the poor and 
disenfranchised (Economist 2006a).310 
 The 2014 election was the second presidential election under the new 2009 
constitution. By then regional tensions were running high (“New Bolivia constitution in 
force”). The 2009 constitution allowed presidential reelection for the first time in 
Bolivia, and the constitutional court did not count Morales’ 2005 term against him, 
allowing him to run again in 2014 (Castillo and Carrasco 2013).  
 
Bolivian media  
Bolivia has a rich radio history (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 78). The first 
commercial station in the country began broadcasting in 1929 (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 
95). The political import of radio can be traced back to the aftermath of the miners 
strikes of 1948, after which the miners’ union founded its first network of 25 radio 
stations to spread its message in 1952 (Moreira Gomes 2011).311 The overt political 
nature of Bolivian radio renders it quite unlike radio in other countries (O’Connor 1990, 
102): 
“Lozada and Kuncar identify three roles played by the Bolivian miners’ 
radio stations. In ‘normal’ times of democracy the radios link the miners’ 
union and its members, and the everyday culture of the miners and 
campesinos. In times of emergency, when the country and the workers 
face a military coup, the stations form a network of resistance against the 
approaching armed forces, broadcast decisions made at public and 
organizational meetings, and allow union leaders and members, women, 
and students to offer advice, encouragement, or criticism. Finally, in times 
of military control, when the stations are closed, they are a focus of 
underground organizing, and the people demand their return to the 
airwaves (1, 14, 21, 25, 26)” (O’Connor 1990, 104). 
                                                          
310 For more details on Bolivia’s 2006-2007 Constituent Assembly see Guigale et al (2006) or de la Fuente 
Jeria (2010) 
311 There is some disagreement among historians about when the first radio station started, but it was no 
earlier than 1945 and no later than 1952 (O’Connor 1990). 
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Community radio312 goes back decades and continues to grow in the 21st century. 
Radio Soberanía, run by the cocalero313 union, promoted the causes and candidacy of 
now-President Juan “Evo” Morales (Ledebur 2002, 10) when he was the de facto 
opposition leader in the first years of this century. Radio Kawsachuan Coca (“long live 
coca”), another station promoting the coca industry, was built after Morales was elected 
to the office of the Presidency and occupies one of the largest buildings in Bolivia’s 
third-largest metropolitan area, Cochabamba (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 287). 
As part of its Socialist agenda, the Venezuelan government under Hugo Chavez 
supported the establishment of new community radio stations in Bolivia (Waisbord 
2013, 134) as part of Venezuela’s support for Morales’ socialist party.  
As of 2015, there are over 40 radio stations with sufficiently large reach to be 
listed nationally (Grupo MediosMedios) and over 800 regional and local radio stations 
across the country (Freedom House 2007).314 Seventy-four percent of homes own a 
radio, compared to 67 percent television ownership (INE 2012, 23). More people in 
Bolivia listen to radio in a day than read a newspaper in a month (Equipos Mori 
2014).315  
                                                          
312 UNESCO defines community broadcasting as “generally characterised by three principles: 
• Independence: Not-for-profit in nature and independent of government and commercial forces. 
• Governance: Owned and/or managed by the community, who participate in policy, programming and 
operations.  
• Service: They focus on issues of local concern and represent the interests of all in the community” 
313 Defied by Oxford dictionaries as “one who dedicates him or herself to the growing of coca,” the raw 
material for cocaine, but also a stimulant grown and chewed for centuries by workers in the mountain 
region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 291).  
314 These are conservative numbers, as Torrico Villanueva places the number above 900 (2008, 34): “The 
total number of community radio stations in Latin America are around 10,000, with Peru having the 
largest proportion and Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil in second, third, and fourth place. If unlicensed 
stations are also taken into account, the overall numbers are much higher. Recent surveys by UNESCO, 
for example, show there are more than 10,000 community radio stations still waiting for licenses in Brazil 
alone” (“Statistics on Radio”). 
315 Data from the AmericasBarometer survey reports similar readership/viewership/listenership 
(Salzman 2011a, Salzman 2011b). 
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Television and newspapers, on the other hand, are owned by the business 
oligarchy. The main newspaper in the capital, for example, was founded in 1903 with the 
express purpose of representing business interests (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 93). 
Commercial television was first licensed in 1984 (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 33), and like 
newspapers, most television news stations are owned by families with substantial 
business interests. Those families and the others in the mestizo and immigrant oligarchy 
(Becerra and Mastrini 2009, Torrico Villanueva 2008), such as the politically active 
Monaterio, Kuljis, Rivero, Doria Medina and Marinkovic families (Tabbie Saenz, 
personal correspondence, December 13, 2016) 316, controlled Bolivian politics through 
most of the 20th century.  
The Santa Cruz media played a large part in the conservative, mainstream 
opposition to then-candidate Morales in his first election (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 38). 
In response to that coverage, Morales has attacked various newspapers and television 
outlets for lying and opposing his government, including before the 2014 election, even 
referring to one station as part of the oligarchy to reinforce public perceptions of their 
being against him and, by extension, for his more traditional opponents (Quintanilla 
2014). 
In the case of Bolivia in 2014 then, the incumbent was not just reputationally but 
actually associated with media and causes that challenged the traditional status quo. 
And opposition candidates (especially a media owner and former president) represented 
                                                          
316 Corroborated by Branko Marinkovic (personal correspondence, December 12, 2016). The breakdown of 
ownership is: Monasterio owns Unitel (television), Klujis Red Uno (television), Rivero El Deber 
(newspaper Santa Cruz), Garafulic Pagina 7 (newspaper La Paz), Duran El Mundo (newspaper La Paz), 
Canelas Los Timpos (newspaper Cochabamba), Marinkovic El Dia (newspaper La Paz). Additionally a 
Venezuelan businessman named Gil holds a large stake in the government television stations: PAT, 
Cadena A and ATB. 
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the more traditional elements of Bolivia’s political and economic climate. In this case, 




Bolivian inequality is reflected in its digital divide, which one scholar called 
“more of a gaping crevasse” than a mere divide (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 99). This 
inequality is reflected in both Internet and mobile technologies. From 2005 to 2013, cell 
phone use worldwide increased from 33.9 subscriptions per 100 people to 93.1 per 100. 
Though cellular penetration in Bolivia increased eleven fold, from nine to 98 per 100 
people, during the same period, the vast majority of those are not smartphones (World 
Bank 2014). 
In 2014, Bolivia ranks 95th in the world (out of 217) for total Internet use (CIA 
2014), with only 9.4% of the national population living in homes with access to the 
Internet, and only the richest, most populous state reporting more than 10% home-
based access (INE 2012, 23).317 “Almost 80 percent of Internet users are concentrated in 
the three main urban cities” (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 36). Broadband is slow, 
expensive and sparse even in some secondary cities (Lancaster 2015), with just 1.2 
broadband subscribers per thousand in 2008 (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 99).  
 
                                                          
317 The average is under 7% nationally when Santa Cruz’s 23% of the population and 15.8% Internet 
penetration is exempted from the calculation.  
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Research Design and Data 
In Chapter Two, I theorize that consumers use the reputations of various media 
platforms as independent or affiliated with the political status quo as guidance for 
identifying media that align with their preferences; and that consumption of these 
different platforms affects political behavior. In the third chapter, I employed ordered 
and generalized ordered logit to draw a link between media consumption and four 
means of political participation in eight countries. In the previous chapter, I looked at 
the relationship between media consumption and protest across the region. In this 
chapter, I employ another form of logistic regression — multinomial logit — to examine 
the connection between media consumption and vote choice in the hemisphere’s poorest 
Iberian-origin country.  
As explained above, newspaper and television are owned by the business 
oligarchy in Bolivia, whilst radio has a history of taking on the government elites that 
have worked alongside that oligarchy. In Chapter 3 (and Appendix A), Bolivian media 
were categorized as follows: television and newspapers with reputations as less likely to 
present information outside the status quo; radio with a reputation as disrupting the 
status quo.  
In other words, exposure to media associated with status quo policies might be 
less mobilizing than media associated with change. One way to extend that question to 
candidates is to investigate if media better situated to challenge the status quo are 
associated with support for politicians who promise change. In Bolivia in 2014, Morales 
and del Granado were two such politicians. Both led parties that grew out of the 
indigenous rights movements mentioned earlier. Quiroga, on the other hand, is a former 
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head of state and Doria Medina had served as a government minister in the 1990s. They 
are literally manifestations of Bolivia’s traditional past.  
To investigate the association between media platform and candidate preference, 
I employ data from an original survey administered by Equipos Mori, a prominent and 
respected survey and market research firm in South America, from July 17 – 28, 2014. 
The short survey, funded by a group of news stations, gauged pre-electoral sentiment 
and vote intent.318 The survey polled 2009 voters eligible for the October 2014 election 
across the country’s nine states. I duplicated questions from the fifth wave of the World 
Values Survey, using the Spanish-language wording from neighboring Chile, to collect 
information on the respondents’ preferred methods of news consumption, including 
frequency, primary means of getting news and trust/confidence in various media 
platforms. Those questions were: 
• People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various 
sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you use it 
to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or never 
(read out and code one answer for each): daily newspaper; printed magazines; 
TV news; Radio news; mobile phone; email; Internet; or talk with friends or 
colleagues319  
 
• Could you please tell me, how do you principally inform yourself about what is 
going on in the country? (Do not read options, mark just one). Options: TV 
news; work colleagues; newspapers; radio; friends; neighbors; Church; 
Internet sites (excluding newspapers); community center; social networks; 
school; or family  
 
• I’m next going to name various means of communication. For each one, could 
you please tell me how much confidence you have in it? (Newspapers, TV 
news, radio)  
 
                                                          
318 The survey did not ask about non-voting political engagement. 
319 For this first question, survey administrators independently chose to modify the question to include “2 
to 3 times per week” between daily and weekly. This change was not reported until the results were 
returned to me. 
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• Finally, drawing from WVS question 225, respondents were asked, “How 
often, if ever, do you use a personal computer?” and “How often, if ever, do 
you use a cell phone?” with never, occasionally and frequently as possible 
responses.  
 
For the fourth question, the original World Values question includes “Don’t know what a 
computer is” as a possible response. Survey organizers found this implausible, and 
suggested the question be modified to include “don’t know how to use a computer/cell 
phone” and “don’t have access to a computer/cell phone” instead. Organizers fielded the 
stratified random sample survey face-to-face in cities with 20,000 registered voters or 
more.320 
Voting is compulsory and enforced in Bolivia (Electoral Commission 2006, “Voto 
obligatorio y nuevo mapa electoral en Bolivia”), so looking merely at the likelihood of 
voting is uninformative. One must look at how a person intends to vote: Either for a 
given candidate321 or for none of the choices (a blank ballot322), as shown in Figure 
5.1.323  
                                                          
320 The survey was designed in April and May 2014 with the intention of polling in cities of all sizes, 
including with less than 20,000 registered voters. During the actual July survey though, all respondents 
came from cities with 20,000 registered voters or above. To extrapolate out what this means: In the 2001 
census, out of 326 cities polled, only 17 had a population of more than 50,000 residents and only 10 cities 
had populations above 100,000 (INE 2001). In 2012, 69% of the population was 15 or older (INE 2012). 
Assuming approximately two-thirds of the population of voting age, a city would need a population of 
75,000 to have 50,000 registered voters. Equally, to have 20,000 voters, the population might be around 
30,000. Effectively then, the Equipos Mori survey looks at cities from 30,000 to 75,000 residents, as well 
as capital cities in each state. The capital city is the most populous city in each state. Though not perfectly 
capturing opinions of the most rural residents, the distinction from 30,000 to 75,000 to the state capital 
should, nonetheless, capture the essence of any urban-rural divide. 
321 P9. Si este domingo fueran las elecciones para elegir PRESIDENTE DE BOLIVIA, ¿Por Cuál candidato 
UD votaría? 
322 Power and Garand (2007) reviews literature on causes of blank voting and then tests the three main 
themes in the literature against each other. They find support for all three causes: “socio-demographic 
factors (literacy, education, wealth), institutional factors (electoral system and ballot structure), and 
political factors (alienation and protest)” (2007, 32). They caution scholars to suggest one root cause for 
invalid voting, but do note that it is distinct from casting a valid or countable ballot. 
323 In the 2014 survey on which this paper is based, 10.3% of respondents stated a pre-electoral intention 
to cast a blank vote, significantly higher than the 2% of the population who actually did so in the October 
2014 election (OEP 2014).  
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Figure 5.1: Vote choice in Bolivia 
 
 
Political parties ally, break up and change names in Bolivia frequently324, making 
party identification a less useful identifier in Bolivia than it would be in the United 
States or other democracies that support more stable party systems. That said, though 
party names may change, the players in Bolivian politics do not necessarily change. Of 
the candidates running for President in 2014, only one was a new candidate. The others 
were distributed across the ideological spectrum, including the incumbent, a former 
President and two candidates from the 2009 presidential election.325 
To compensate for the lack of consistent party identifier, I ordered candidates 
based on their public stances: Green Party candidate Fernando Vargas Mosua is the 
farthest left candidate, with incumbent President Morales coded as left-leaning. La Paz 
mayor Juan del Granado is a centrist. Former President Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga is right-
leaning and (self-described) libertarian business owner Samuel Doria Medina far right.  
                                                          
324 Rice refers to a “weakly institutionalized multiparty system” (2011, 284). 
325 Only three of those were mentioned by survey respondents and would eventually go onto capture 
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The Presidential incumbent, Evo Morales, enjoyed a substantial lead in a 
majority of states, garnering nearly four times as many responses as his nearest 
competitor (51.52% of responses versus Doria Medina’s 13.94%). Even taken as a group, 
the other candidates did not enjoy more than one-third of the declared vote intention in 
any single state. 
In a multi-candidate election, multinomial logistic regression is the optimal 
method, as, despite representing different points on the ideological spectrum, they are 
not perfectly orderable. That said, it can be difficult to interpret since all results are 
pairwise – in other words, the coefficients are all relative to the base category, usually 
the candidate receiving the largest vote-share. With three candidates, that would mean 
that multinomial logit would show two sets of coefficients: the first measuring the effect 
of the independent variables on the likelihood of voting for candidate A as opposed to 
candidate C, the second set showing the effect of the variables on the probability of 
voting for candidate B as opposed to candidate C (Gold 2005, 529). With five 
candidates, using the incumbent as the base category, multinomial logit shows how each 
independent variable has an impact on a candidate’s chance relative to Morales, but not 
relative to the other candidates in the race. Given Morales’ strong incumbent advantage 
in 2014, binary logit will also be employed to gauge how the totality of the other 




The predictor of interest is disaggregated media consumption. Following the 
World Values Survey, the questions in Bolivia asked about the consumption frequency 
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for a number of ways that respondent could have used to find out about politics and 
happenings in the country (Figure 5.2): 
Figure 5.2: Frequency of news exposure by platform (in percent)  
 
 
Television is, by far, the most used and most trusted platform. It is ubiquitous and 
widely accessed. The digital divide is notable, with social media accessed daily by only 
ten percent of the sample and never accessed by three-quarters of respondents.326  
The breakdown between getting information via cell phone, Internet, social 
media or email assumes that respondents remember exactly via which format they 
receive political news. It also may be an artificial distinction, since some surveys have 
shown more people using Facebook than claim to use the Internet (Mirani 2015). All 
                                                          
326 Speaking with friends – or political talk – is not the topic of this dissertation. So that category was 






















































Paper TV Radio Internet Cell phone Social
media
Email Magazines Friends
Media consumption by platform (in percent)
Never Less than monthly Monthly Weekly 2-3 times per week Daily
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show relatively rare usage and high correlations (Table 5.1) in this survey; so I opted to 
focus on Internet use alone in subsequent analyses.327  
Table 5.1: Correlations between media platforms used for news  
 Newspaper TV Radio Cell phone Internet Social 
Media 
Newspaper  ***      
TV 0.2473 ***     
Radio 0.0625 0.0126 ***    
Cell phone 0.1690 0.0992 0.0020 ***   
Internet 0.2968 0.1461 -0.0665 0.4998 ***  
Social 
Media 
0.2414 0.1245 -0.0638 0.7767 0.7767 *** 
 
The “average” consumer of each platform varies.328 Women use radio and 
television more than men, who are more likely to consume news via newspapers and 
Internet. Newspaper readers are relatively older and less educated, which may be an 
artifact of younger, more educated persons having more access to Internet news than 
other demographics.329 The average television viewer is more urban and slightly more 
educated than the average radio listener, even though only seven percent of the sample 
reports watching news on television less than at least once a week and over three-
quarters do so daily. 
Socio-economic status (SES) and education are strong predictors of conventional 
political participation, such as voting (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978, Brady, Verba and 
Scholzman 1995). For that reason, as in the previous chapters, gender, age and 
education level are included as control variables in this analysis. Respondents in this 
                                                          
327 Analyses were run using a combined digital index as well, with no notable changes. So only Internet 
was retained, for parsimony. 
328 Found using R package modeest to discern the modal response for each category. 
329 This is presumably a reflection of widespread illiteracy in the mid-20th century before education 
became more universal (“Illiteracy Rate Drops to Historic Lows in Bolivia”). 
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survey were 50.82% female and 49.18% male. Respondent age ranged from 18 to 92.330 
The modal response on age, 25, approximates statistics published by the US government 
(CIA), but the mean and median of the sample (35 and 38.3, respectively) skew higher, 
as the sample is limited to eligible voters.  
Education ranged from no formal schooling (1) to post-graduate work (10) 
(Figure 5.3). Both the mean and median were for completing high school (5).  




 Rural residency331 and poverty332 are both correlated with access to fewer media 
options overall and increased radio news listenership, respectively (Salzman 2011a). 
                                                          
330 The voting age is 18, though 16 has been repeatedly proposed (“Cómo se vota en los países del 
Mercosur”). 
331 Question Estrato 
332 Income questions were omitted, as it was a short media-run survey. The closest question was a Likert-
scale on the respondent’s satisfaction with her personal economic situation. But the question is inherently 
temporal, not truly about wealth or general economic level, which is more what the literature addresses as 






























Bolivia’s protests early in the 21st-century were also driven by campesino groups 
(Freedom House 2008). Accounting for residency, therefore, is important in the 
analysis of political choice. The distribution is shown in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Urban-rural divide (in percent) 
 
 
Kasfir (1979) argued that membership in an ethnic333 or indigenous group is not 
an inherently political predictor, as its salience varies.334 However, indigenous status is 
highly salient in Bolivia and has intertwined with matters of society, economics and 
politics since the 1990s (McNeish 2006, Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014). The 
incumbent Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party has particularly courted 
indigenous voters in the past two decades and touted itself as representing Bolivia’s 
indigenous majority (for review on the mixing of indigenous agendas with MAS 
activities, see Webber 2010).  President Morales even refers to his agenda as “indigenous 
                                                          
333 In a review of the history and state of the subfield, Varshney provides a good definition of ethnicity: 
“Following Horowitz (1985 [2000]), ethnicity as a term designates a sense of collective belonging, which 
could be based on a common descent, language, history, culture, race, or religion (or some combination of 
these)” (2009, 277). 
334 “Political situations that evoke participation along class lines may appear and disappear just as they do 
for participation along ethnic lines” (374). And “identifying someone as a member of an ethnic category at 
a particular time and in a particular place does not mean that, for political purposes, he will continue to 





Respondents by city size
20,001-30,000 registered voters 30,001-40,000 registered voters
40,001-50,000 registered voters State capital
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socialism” (Pretel 2014). Respondents’ self-declaration as a member of one of Bolivia’s 
35 recognized indigenous groups (INE 2012) should, therefore, be salient to voting in 
2014. Just over half, 55.19%, of the sample self-declared as indigenous, in line with the 
over 60% who self-declared as indigenous in the 2001 census and the 48% that did so in 
the 2012 census (Mallén 2013). 
Though ideology is a strong and consistent predictor of voting in Latin America 
(Colomer 2005), respondent ideology is not included in the model, as it was not asked in 
the survey. There was a question about the respondent's candidate choice in the 2009 
election, but the inclusion of previous vote choice presented both theoretical and 
statistical problems. First, theoretically, media reputation would have preceded that 
decision as well. So, if media reputation preceded both votes, including information 
about the 2009 vote would add no value to the analysis in 2014.335 Second, including 
previous vote choice immediately cut the sample size from 2009 to 1088, most 
obviously among those too young to have voted in 2009. In a country in which 
approximately half the population is below age 24 (World Bank), excluding persons who 
could vote in 2014 but not in 2009 seems irresponsible. Finally, from a methodological 
standpoint, in addition to the reduction in sample size overall, the reduced small sample 
of 1088 included multiple overly influential points that skewed the data.336 Obviously, 
there remains some risk of omitted variable bias; but the opportunity to employ 
originally collected data in an area in which research on political communication and 
behavior is limited merits such risk.  
                                                          
335 “You’re assuming path dependency (your theoretical story), so I don’t see that you gain any analytical 
leverage by entering previous vote in the model” (Scott Althaus, personal correspondence, November 3, 
2016). 
336 See Appendix B for detailed statistical justification 
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To reiterate, this paper asks: How is media consumption associated with 
candidate preference in 2014 Bolivia?  
Vote choice = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education level + β4Indigenous status + 
β5City size + β6Newspaper use + β7Television news use+ β8Radio 
news use + β8Internet news use+ ε 
 
Findings 
The multinomial model (Table 5.2) shows that only education and indigenous 
status are relatively and consistently associated with vote choice: higher education is 
associated with more right-leaning vote choice and indigenous status with opting for 




Table 5.2: Using incumbent Morales (center left) as the base outcome, did 
media consumption matter in the 2014 Bolivian election? 
 
Candidate| Coef. SE 
Fernando Vargas (far left) 
Female  | - 0.1722    0.7892  
Age  |  0.0064    0.0269      
Education  | - 0.2697    0.2343    
Indigenous  |  0.2949     0.8624      
City size  |  0.4165    0.3844  
Newspaper  |  0.3273    0.2439   
TV |  0.3981    0.6791 
Radio  |  0.2431    0.2733 
Internet  | - 0.0182    0.2976 
Juan del Granado (center) 
Female  | - 0.1828 0.2388 
Age  |  0.0149   0.0083 * 
Education  |  0.1965    0.0569 ***   
Indigenous  | - 0.4017      0.2400 *  
City size | - 0.0412   0.1084  
Newspaper  |  0.0838    0.0791 
TV  |  0.0510    0.1165  
Radio  |  0.0505    0.0628  
Internet  |  0.1920    0.0681 *** 
 
Multinomial logistic regression      
n=1471  
legend: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01     
  
  
Candidate| Coef. SE 
Jorge Quiroga (center right) 
Female  |  0.4818    0.2434 **  
Age  |  0.0168    0.0084 **  
Education  |  0.1805    0.0583 ***  
Indigenous  | - 1.0454    0.2520 ***  
City size |  0.3989   0.1253 ***  
Newspaper  | - 0.0295    0.0799  
TV |  0.1861    0.1565 
Radio  | - 0.0955    0.0569 *  
Internet  |  0.0643    0.0706 
Samuel Doria Medina (far right) 
Female  |  0.2255    0.1467 
Age  |  0.0050    0.0053  
Education  |  0.1898    0.0361 ***  
Indigenous  | - 0.8743   0.1493 ***  
City size |  0.24341    0.0707 ***  
Newspaper  |  0.0688    0.0486  
TV  |  0.2303     0.0978 **  
Radio  | - 0.0543    0.0359  
Internet  |  0.0477    0.0433 
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News media consumption is only significant three times. Relative to the baseline 
(center-left) incumbent, getting news via radio was negatively associated with voting for 
the right-leaning candidate, Jorge Quiroga, but not for the far-right candidate, Doria 
Medina. In fact, for Doria Medina, television news consumption was positive and 
significant. Getting news via Internet had a strong positive association with voting for 
the centrist candidate del Granado, whose party had broken a previous allegiance with 
the incumbent Morales’ party. Del Granado’s party represents a non-mainstream strand 
within the Bolivian left.  
In terms of magnitude of effects, a one-unit increase in Internet news 
consumption resulted in a 21% increase in likelihood of voting for del Granado over 
Morales. A one-unit increase in radio news listenership was related to a nine-percent 
reduction in likelihood of voting for Quiroga relative to Morales. And a one-unit 
increase in television news consumption was associated with 25% increase in probability 
of voting for Doria Medina, relative to Morales. The largest magnitude effect was for 
indigenous status, which was associated with a 65% reduction in voting for Quiroga and 
a 60% reduction in voting for Doria Medina. 
As a further test of media significance, I replicated the analysis with centrist del 
Granado as the base category (Table 5.3). In that model, the negative and significant 
effect of radio remains for Quiroga, but the positive and significant effect of television 
for Doria Medina disappears. Internet news consumption was also negative and highly 
significant for both Morales and Doria Medina. The biggest impact in magnitude of 
effect continues to be that of indigenous status, in the positive direction for the 
incumbent and the negative direction for the two right-leaning candidates.  
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Table 5.3: Using centrist del Granado as the base outcome, did media 
consumption matter in the 2014 Bolivian election? 
 
Candidate| Coef. SE 
Fernando Vargas (far left) 
Female  |  0.0106 0.8198 
Age  | - 0.0086 0.0280       
Education  | - 0.4662 0.2400*  
Indigenous  |    0.6967 0.8901   
City size  |  0.4576 0.3975 
Newspaper  |  0.2435 0.2547 
TV |  0.3471 0.6881  
Radio  |  0.1927 0.2795 
Internet  | - 0.2102 0.3037 
Juan “Evo” Morales (center left) 
Female  |  0.1828 0.2388 
Age  | - 0.0149 0.0083* 
Education  | - 0.1965 0.0569***   
Indigenous  |  0.4017 0.2401* 
City size |  0.0412 0.1084 
Newspaper  | - 0.0838 0.0791 
TV  | - 0.0510 0.1165   
Radio  | - 0.0505 0.0628  
Internet  | -  0.1920 0.0681***  
 
Multinomial logistic regression      
n=1471  
legend: *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01     
  
  
Candidate| Coef. SE 
Jorge Quiroga (center right) 
Female  |  0.6646 0.3238**  
Age  |  0.0019 0.0113  
Education  | - 0.0160 0.0772  
Indigenous  | - 0.6437 0.3134* 
City size |  0.4401 0.1594 *** 
Newspaper  | - 0.1133 0.1069 
TV |  0.1351 0.1905 
Radio  | - 0.1460 0.0804* 
Internet  | - 0.1277 0.0921 
Samuel Doria Medina (far right) 
Female  |  0.4083 0.2588 
Age  | - 0.0099 0.0092  
Education  | - 0.0067 0.0621  
Indigenous  | - 0.4726 0.2608* 
City size |  0.2846 0.1208**  
Newspaper  | - 0.0150 0.0859 
TV  |  0.1793 0.1458  
Radio  | - 0.1047 0.0670 
Internet  | -  0.1443 0.0733*** 
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At no point in either multinomial models is newspaper readership 
significant for candidate selection. In fact, regardless of what candidate is used as 
the base category, newspaper readership is never significant for vote choice in 
this survey. This may be an artefact of newspaper readership being quite low in 
Bolivia:  
“Circulation figures are unreliable in the absence of an independent 
auditing system. They are also hard to obtain. It is accepted among 
the professionals that most newspapers, even those that serve the 
large urban centers such as La Paz and Santa Cruz, have a small 
circulation” (Soruco and Pinto 2009, 101 FN 16). 
 
Using other candidates as the base category337, media variables are 
significant in only three instances: radio is positive and significant at the p<0.1 
level for both Morales and del Granado when Quiroga is the base category; 
television is negative and significant for Morales at the p<0.05 level when Doria 
Medina is the base category; and Internet is positive and significant at the p<0.05 
level for del Granado when Doria Medina is the base category. Overall, therefore, 
regardless of how the five candidates are compared to each other, increased news 
media consumption on a particular platform seems of little import in the 2014 
Bolivian presidential election.  
 
Simplifying the model 
Given the difficulty of extrapolating meaning from multinomial logit, I also 
conducted separate logistic regression analysis to determine predictors of left 
voting and predictors of right-leaning voting, considering the strong ideological 
                                                          
337 Coefficients not reported 
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bent of Latin American voting (Colomer 2005). This also allowed for analysis of 
support for the traditional status quo (right-leaning) or support for continued 
change (left-leaning). To determine the predictors of left-leaning voting, two left-
leaning candidates (Vargas and Morales) were coded 1 and the two right-leaning 
candidates (Quiroga and Doria Medina) coded as 0; then, to determine the 
predictors of right-leaning voting, the coding was flipped, with the two right-
leaning candidates coded as 1 and the two left-leaning candidates coded as 0. The 
centrist, del Granado, was coded 0 in both cases. Table 5.4 displays the resulting 
odds ratios for these models:  
Table 5.4: Likelihood of voting for a left- or right-leaning candidate as 
a function of news consumption  
  Left-leaning Right-leaning 
  Odds Ratio Odds Ratio  
Female  0.8222   1.3519 ** 
Age   0.9909  ** 1.0061 
Education 0.8267 *** 1.1849 *** 
Indigenous  2.2514 ***  0.4175 *** 
City size  0.8119 ***  1.3226 *** 
Newspaper  0.9488  1.0370 
TV  0.8440 ** 1.2406 ** 
Radio   1.0461   0.9315 ** 
Internet  0.9237 **  1.0278 
Logistic regression  
n = 1471 
 
A one-unit increase in the frequency of television news viewership was 
associated with a 24% increase in voting for one of the two right-leaning 
candidates and with a 15.7% decrease in voting for one of the left-leaning 
candidates. A one-unit increase in radio listenership was associated with a 7% 
decrease in likelihood of voting for a right-leaning candidate. A one-unit increase 
in Internet news consumption results in an 8% decrease in likelihood of voting 
for a left-leaning candidate. Again, newspaper readership has no impact on vote 
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choice. In terms of meaningfulness, indigenous status was, by far, the biggest 
predictor, with self-declared indigenous persons 125% more likely to vote for a 
left-leaning candidate and almost 60% less likely to express a preference for a 
right-leaning candidate. 
Given the incumbent advantage evidenced by Morales’s lead in the polls, a 
third model examined just the predictors of voting for incumbent Morales (Table 
5.5). Intent to vote for Vargas, del Granado, Quiroga or Doria Medina was coded 
0, with intent to vote for Morales coded 1.  
In that model, traditional demographic markers were significant in their 
expected directions, with younger, less educated, indigenous, rural voters more 
likely to support Morales. As for media, neither newspaper readership nor radio 
listenership had any effect. Television news consumption was negatively 
associated with support for Morales, as expected, with a one-unit increase in 
television news consumption associated with a 16% decrease in likelihood of 
voting for Morales. Getting news via Internet was also negative and significant, 
with a one-unit increase in online news consumption yielding an approximately 
7.5% decrease in expressing one’s intent to vote for the incumbent. Again though, 
the largest predictor of support for Morales was, by far, indigenous status, which 




Table 5.5: Likelihood of voting for the incumbent Morales as a 
function of media consumption 
 Odds Ratio 
Female  0.8300  
Age  0.9908 **  
Education 0.8343 *** 
Indigenous 2.20412 *** 
City size  0.8074 *** 
Newspaper 0.9414  
Television  0.8400 ** 
Radio  1.0407    
Internet 0.9248 **  
Logistic regression 
n = 1471 
 
Discussion 
Gerring defines a case study “as an intensive study of a single unit for the 
purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units” (2004, 342). It is an 
exploratory investigation rather than a causal one, geared more toward theory 
generation than theory testing (Gerring 2004, 346). This chapter presents an 
attempt to extend the theory presented in Chapter Two from political 
engagement to actual vote choice. 
The AmericasBarometer in Bolivia in the mid-2000s disaggregated 
questions about the frequency of consumption of various news media.338 Since 
that time though, the survey has only included one general question about total 
news consumption. This means that, for countries at the lowest levels of 
development, there are no other publicly available surveys that would allow for 
investigation between (disaggregated) news consumption and political 
                                                          
338 Similar analyses on that data shows that, as expected, in a country with compulsory and 
enforced voting, news consumption has no impact on voting. But both radio news consumption 
and getting news via newspaper are positively associated with indices of civic and political 
participation. 
214 
engagement, making the opportunity I was given to insert questions into a survey 
especially relevant for Bolivia and countries like it. I treated this as an 
opportunity to triangulate and extend tests from the previous chapters.  
Unfortunately, in choosing among candidates for Bolivia’s 2014 
presidential election, news media consumption seems to have mattered little. 
Newspaper readership was at no point significant. Television viewership was 
positive and significant for right-leaning candidates and negative and significant 
for left-leaning candidates. But, with almost 78% of the population watching 
television for news daily and over 90% watching it at least weekly, that 
significance may not be meaningful for actual voting returns in an election in 
which one candidate has a strong advantage. Morales’ having rewritten the 
constitution to its advantage just a few years earlier may also be dulling results.  
Radio listenership was at no point positive for vote choice, which is 
surprising given the touted historical importance of Bolivian radio as a 
counterweight to government (O’Connor 1990). The ubiquitous consumption of 
radio news in Bolivia, then, may be less important in the modern age than 
proponents of community radio might hail.  
Most confusing are the results for Internet news consumption. Internet 
news was negative and significant for voting for left-leaning candidates overall 
and for the incumbent specifically. Since voting is compulsory and enforced, 
these findings cannot be directly compared to findings for Internet in the 
previous chapters – when it was always positive for turnout, when significant – 
but it does raise questions, given the regional expectation (in Chapter Three) that 
Internet across the region would be associated with change-oriented activities. 
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After all, the incumbent was the change candidate in this election. Still relatively 
low Internet penetration and clearly low per capita income suggest that the full 
impact of Internet news on politics has not yet penetrated Bolivia. As Internet 
penetration in Bolivia increases beyond major cities, looking at who the 
consumers of online news there are should prove interesting. 
Gainous, Wagner and Abbott (2015) theorize that increased exposure to 
dissonant information on the Internet explains the association they find between 
Internet news consumption and negative attitudes about government and non-
traditional participation. They further show that, in the context of nine Asian 
countries in 2010, Internet news consumption was negatively associated with 
traditional forms of participation. This chapter adds to the scholarly discussion of 
the association between news and political choices, but suggests that consumers 
of community radio and consumers of Internet news may not both be reacting in 




Chapter 6: CONCLUSION 
Before his death in 2017, Colin Seymour-Ure, a scholar on British media 
and politics, pointed out that academics know a lot about the interaction between 
news and politics in a few countries under very specific circumstances, but much 
less about that relationship in other places. My dissertation has endeavored to 
expand that understanding by investigating the importance of media in Latin 
America. I posited that the public uses media reputation, the accumulation of 
years of interactions between the press and government, as a cue about the 
independence of any medium. I expected that consumers of media that criticize 
the status quo would be more likely to engage in activities to change the status 
quo. In doing so, I integrated terminology from very disparate literatures—
political communication, contentious politics and comparative institutions—that 
may be speaking past each other and would benefit from greater interaction. 
My analysis in Chapters Three and Four utilized different models due to 
limitations in their respective data sources. For example, the World Values 
Survey (WVS) does not include an ordinal or otherwise scale-measure of race or 
ethnicity like the AmericasBarometer does. The analysis in Chapter Three was 
also more disaggregated than in Chapter Four, which covered more countries. 
Meanwhile, Chapter Five uses original data to examine an extension of my theory 
in one country. 
In short, my results in Chapters Three, Four, and Five were mixed. 
However, I was able to confirm that the emerging literature about the special 
relationship between political engagement and Internet news consumption holds 
outside of the developed world.  
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Television and radio news consumption 
Significant findings about television were extremely rare, as expected, as it 
is the most regulated media platform and speaks to the median voter, which is 
status quo-reinforcing. It was positive and statistically significant twice – against 
expectations – in Chapter Three, for petitioning in Argentina and Brazil using 
data from the sixth wave of WVS.  Television had a negative relationship, as 
expected, with participation in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay but for different 
behaviors: petitioning in Mexico, boycotting in Ecuador, and demonstrating in 
Peru and Uruguay. The medium was not at all statistically significant in Chapter 
Four, which looked at protest using the AmericasBarometer. 
Overall, these findings sum to suggest that, in modern Latin America, 
television largely does not seem to be associated with change-oriented political 
engagement. People choose entertainment over news on television (e.g., Prior 
2007). Even when asked how they find out about the world and current events, 
people who get their news via television do not seem affected by that news in any 
measurable way. 
There are two complications in interpreting results about television, one 
general and one unique. Firstly, there were not expectations for television for all 
countries. No directional expectation existed for Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras and 
Paraguay. Of those, television was only significant twice, both times in the 
negative direction, for petitioning and demonstrating in Chile. The lack of a 
classification about the reputation of media means that, regardless of the 
medium, any behavioral findings are hard to interpret.  
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The more specific problem with television was the combined measure of 
television and radio news consumption that was used in WVS5. These platforms 
serve very different roles in this region, as manifested in the different 
classifications for television and radio about support for the status quo in a 
majority of the countries.339 
As a result of this platform aggregation, my results for radio in WVS5 were 
equally difficult to interpret. In fact, at no point in the analysis in Chapter Three, 
because of the combined measure am I able to say that findings conform with my 
expectations because the expected impact of radio and television was, for most of 
the region, different. At the minimum, my classification system had a directional 
classification for one platform and no expectation for the other; in some cases, I 
expected these platforms to have opposite categorizations. In sum, I could not 
disentangle the impact of radio from the impact of television with WVS5 data. 
The combined measure in WVS5 and inconsistent reputation codings left 
me I unable to attribute the following findings to television or radio: 
Positive and significant:  Petitioning, boycotting and demonstrating in 
Brazil; Petitioning in Uruguay 
Negative and significant: Demonstrating in Argentina;  
Petitioning in Mexico 
 
There was no expectation for either television or radio news in Chile, yet 
there were multiple findings in Chapter Three: TV news, radio news and 
                                                          
339 The questionnaire for the seventh wave of WVS, which is being fielded right now, has not yet 
been made public. The data, which will be released in 2020, is scheduled to include five more 
countries (Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Venezuela) in Latin America, meaning 
WVS7 will include more than double the coverage of Latin America than WVS5 did. One hopes 
that, having disaggregated the media consumption question in WVS6, the World Values Survey 
secretariat does not return to a combined measure or use a simple overall news consumption 
measure in WVS7. 
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TV/radio news were negative and significant for petitioning in both waves of 
WVS, while TV/radio was positive for demonstrating in WVS5 but TV news was 
negative for demonstrating in WVS6. The lack of a directional expectation also 
makes it impossible to interpret the negative relationship between radio news 
and petitioning in Mexico. In contrast, I can definitively say that findings were 
against expectations in Ecuador and Peru in WVS6. 
The possible importance of radio becomes more apparent in Chapter Four, 
where radio is significantly associated with protesting in seven countries in the 
sample: Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Peru. That 
finding is only against expectations in Ecuador, where the association was 
positive instead of negative, as was expected. In fact, in Chapter Three, only in 
Chile, Mexico and Peru was radio ever significantly associated with engagement 
in a negative direction. In all other instances, it was positive. That speaks to the 
potentially motivating content of radio news overall, which merits more scholarly 
attention.  
The different findings about radio between Chapters Three and Four also 
raise questions. Since radio was positive and significant in both chapters in 
Ecuador, completely against expectations, these results suggest that reputation 
may only capture part of the larger media attentiveness dynamic. While radio was 
also positive and significant for boycotting, demonstrating and striking in 
Argentina in WVS6, the lack of a question about protest in that country in the 
2008 AmericasBarometer makes it impossible for me to compare those results to 
Chapter Four. Radio in Mexico was negative and significant for petitioning in 
WVS6 but positive and significant for protesting in the 2008 AmericasBarometer, 
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which lends credence to the idea that different media may be associated with 
different forms of engagement. Finally, radio was never significant in Colombia, 
Nicaragua or Uruguay in either chapter, despite directional expectations that 
radio’s counter-status quo reputation would be motivating.  
 
Newspapers 
Findings for newspapers were largely against expectations. In about two-
thirds of countries, newspapers were classified as supporting the status quo, 
whereas in the other third there was no evidence in either direction. In no 
country were newspapers classified as against the status quo. However, when 
significant, newspaper readership in both Chapters Three and Four was 
overwhelmingly associated with increased change-oriented political 
participation, even after accounting for education and political interest. This 
again suggests that media reputation may be—likely is—part of a larger dynamic 
at work. 
This is in line with Newton (1999), who found that reading broadsheets in 
England was associated with increased political engagement but reading tabloids 
was not. Daily newspaper readership is a relatively luxury, as it requires both 
high literacy and disposable income. The Target Group Indexes (TGI) for most of 
Latin America show that most newspaper readers still come from higher 
socioeconomic classes (Soong 2000), but that may be changing. The World 
Association of Newspapers and News Publishers reported strong and growing 
sales across the region in the last decade (Economist 2011). Bakker (2012) 
attributes most of the growth to the expansion of free dailies in the region, which 
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are likely not as linked to the government or status quo positions as traditional 
broadsheets and may present ideas quite outside the mainstream. Bakker noted 
that, in areas with low newspaper penetration, free dailies could mobilize a new 
segment of newspaper consumers. If the term “newspapers” combines 
broadcasting and niche business models, which target different audiences, 
looking at aggregate patterns in newspaper readership may, therefore, be less 
informative than doing the same for other media platforms. The measure 
employed in the previous chapters may be too blunt. 
 
Internet news 
Though initially I did not expect to find that Internet news consumption 
mattered much for engagement in Latin America, my results suggest that it 
clearly does. This was especially noticeable in Chapter Three, which employed 
data from the two most recent waves of the World Values Survey. In Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico, Internet was statistically significant for each form of 
political participation at some point. With the exception of the anomalous finding 
for Guatemala in the 2008 AmericasBarometer, Internet news consumption was 
never significant and negative for any form of participation, only positive. And 
the magnitude of the findings was large, with a one-unit increase in Internet news 
consumption having the same impact as a one-unit increase in education or 
interest in politics.  
This is undoubtedly the largest contribution that the dissertation makes to 
the body of literature of media and politics. If there is something different about 
Internet news and if it truly is more mobilizing, then the world should see a 
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notable increase of political messaging and involvement as broadband rolls out to 
more parts of the world.  
There are two potential pitfalls associated with this expectation: first, the 
Internet arguably makes it even easier to avoid news than cable television did 
when it was introduced. So the number of people paying attention to any news at 
all may drop. Second, the Internet’s truly being different in some way for political 
participation might worsen the digital divide both within and across countries. 
Scholars know that some people avoid news and others seek it out, and that those 
who seek out news are more civically engaged (Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster 
2010). To draw an analogy to the Industrial Revolution, which had been 
geographically limited in scope at its inception, will this revolution in technology 
and participation leave substantial portions of the world behind? Within 
countries, will it privilege those who already participate more at the expense of 
those who do not? Either of those has important policy implications for 
governments to consider, as well as normative consequences for those who 
believe in equality.  
The 2012 iteration of the AmericasBarometer included a question about 
what political information respondents have shared on social media.340 The 
question was not repeated in 2014 or 2016, nor was the question about media 
disaggregated in 2012.341 As such, it is not possible with this data to speak to the 
large body of literature that interrogates how citizens use the Internet and why 
                                                          
340 PROT8. And in the last twelve months, have you read or shared political information through 
any social network website such as Twitter or Facebook or Orkut? 
341 GI0. About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers 
or the internet? [Read alternatives]: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) 
Rarely (5) Never 
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the Internet might be special for participation (Dahlgren 2005, Kushin and 
Yamamoto 2010, Rainie et al 2012, Tufekci and Wilson 2012, Xenos, Vromen and 
Loader 2014). In fact, as long as the AmericasBarometers does not disaggregate 
its question about media consumption, it will not be possible to tell whether the 
importance of online news is the people’s ability to direct their own searches or 
whether the social or interactive aspect of online news consumption is more 
important. This may leave scholars of the public sphere hamstrung for data in 
Latin America. 
 
Where does the media matter? 
Comparing the results in Chapters Three and Four, it is hard to make any 
definitive call about where media reputation might matter for political 
engagement and where it might not. This is largely because only a few countries 
includes questions about both news consumption and participation in both 
surveys. Where they did overlap, results were, again, mixed: 
Ecuador: Radio and Internet news consumption in both surveys was 
associated with increased engagement, though the importance of 
the Internet for demonstrating/protesting was not duplicated. 
 Brazil: Newspaper readership was only associated with boycotting in 
WVS6 in Chapter Three; but with protesting in both 2006 and 
2008 in Chapter Four. Internet news consumption was positive and 
significant for all forms of engagement in Chapter Three, but only 
in 2006 in Chapter Four. TV/radio news was widely relevant for 
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engagement in Chapter Three, but not at even one point significant 
in Chapter Four. 
Chile: The Internet was important for all behaviors but Chapter Three, but 
almost no media mattered for protesting in Chapter Four. 
Colombia: Newspaper and Internet news consumption were highly 
significant for every behavior in Chapter Three, but for almost 
nothing in Chapter Four.  
In Uruguay, Peru and Mexico, there were neither enough instances of 
significance nor a clear pattern that I might compare in any meaningful way.  
Overall, with the exception of Ecuador, I cannot definitively say that media 
consumption would definitely matter for political participation in any country. I 
can claim that the relationship between the two appears to be much more 
nuanced than many in comparative politics often consider. And I hope it has 
become clear that media should be an element in more comparative research 
moving forward, as well as that comparative methods might expand the 
geographic reach of political communication research. 
 
Revisiting the theory 
Oddly enough, my finding that, consumption of traditional news did not 
have a large and meaningful impact on is generally in line with the theory 
presented in Chapter Two: that media perceived as promoting status quo values 
(which was the mode in Latin America) will not stimulate consumers to engage 
politically. However, news consumption, especially online, did seem to matter for 
engagement.  
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Are the decisions to consume media that challenges the status quo and to 
act against the status quo two behaviors jointly caused by some set of background 
variables (Matthew Winters, personal correspondence, November 19, 2017)? 
Absent data on personality or genetics, this is a very difficult question to address. 
Incorporating these considerations would also, again, atomize the study of media 
and politics. If nothing else, the media’s acting as a signal about more widely 
spread discontent might still be important as a trigger for action.  
Bimber (1999) asked “Does the Medium Matter?” for how citizens contact 
government officials. At the time, he found significant but small effects. In asking 
if the medium matters for participating, I found similar results. This research 
addresses a dearth made plain by Humphreys (2011), that there are far too few 
large-N comparative studies of media and politics done within political science 
generally and within comparative politics specifically (161). 
 
The odd duck: Bolivia 
Chapter Five stands out because it is not a simple test of the theory in 
Chapter Two but an extension of it. Unlike the other chapters, which do not 
include voting because it is compulsory, Chapter Five zooms directly to candidate 
choice with original data that was collected from a survey fielded almost a decade 
after WVS5 and the 2004 AmericasBarometer. And the findings are especially 
strange. 
Unlike in the previous chapters, television news consumption has an 
impact on voting that is both statistically significant and substantial: a one-unit 
increase in television news consumption was associated with double-digit 
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differences in the probability of voting for candidates. The fact that the Bolivian 
media is well-known to be associated with right-leaning candidates and their 
financial supporters means this could be a reflection of self-sorting. 
Also notable in Bolivia was the non-result for radio. Bolivia, like El 
Salvador and Peru, has a well-documented history of political and community 
radio. In the 2014 election though, radio did not seem to matter for vote choice. 
One wonders if the pervasive use of radio in Bolivia—like television news in other 
countries—might make it impossible to discern any variation among radio users. 
Or, like the newspaper measure in Chapters Three and Four, in a country where 
so many people regularly listen to the radio for news, measuring “radio” 
consumption may be too blunt a measure.  
Bolivia is not included in the next iteration of the World Values Survey, 
but Paraguay and Venezuela are scheduled to be. Both have high daily radio news 
consumption rates – around 40% – but radio is oppositional in Paraguay and 
supportive of the government in Venezuela. In the absence of a Bolivia in that 
survey, those two countries should be interesting test cases for the importance of 
radio on the continent.  
 
Extensions 
There are two logical extensions for the theory and analysis presented 
here. First, I can go smaller and test the theory in more detail within one country, 
such as by looking at media outlets. This is similar to research looking at cable 
news in the United States. Using an outlet’s reputation as a proxy for content 
would allow for more longitudinal analysis. For example, Mexico’s long-standing 
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ruling party lost power in 2000 after 71 years. During that period, television news 
was highly affiliated with the party. The disruption could be arguably treated as 
an intervention, allowing for a closer look at media reputations and participation 
in the form of a natural experiment. 
Going lower on the level analysis may mean focusing within a country as 
well. Mexico has a federal system and it is relatively easy to get data, often even at 
the state level. Does media reputation matter evenly across Mexico or are there 
regional differences? For countries large in area or population, or with notable 
cultural differences, it might be unreasonable to assume equivalent findings 
everywhere. In that case, the approach presented here may be more feasible than 
region-specific content analysis, for example. This extension may be similarly 
feasible in Brazil.  
Secondly, I can go wider by expanding the scope of my inquiry beyond the 
Western Hemisphere. The artificially imposed geographic boundaries of Africa, 
which do not overlap with cultural boundaries, stand in stark contrast to the 
largely natural boundaries in Latin America, which do overlay with culture. Africa 
is also home to 2000 languages, approximately one-third of all languages in the 
world (Felter 2015). There are, therefore, many different hierarchical ways to test 
the importance of media reputation. The longer tenure of African leaders than 
those in Latin America (Economist 2012) also means that there may be stronger 
relationships between media and officials reputed as close to the status quo or 
promoting change.  
 
228 
The state of the Fourth Estate 
Is the press in any given place a watchdog, a lapdog or a guard dog 
(Donohue, Tichenor, and Olien 1995)? This analogy seems especially important 
in a time when press freedom is in retreat worldwide (Reporters Without Borders 
2018). Does the press protect the freedoms of the masses, push the will of the 
government or work for an oligarchy? My dissertation contends that different 
media in any country may—and probably do—fulfill different roles. The original 
classifications (presented in the following appendix) suggested television news in 
most of Latin America to represent status quo values, not those of change, in 
other words with the reputation of a government lapdog. Results presented in the 
previous chapters suggest news on the Internet may fulfill more of the watchdog 
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APPENDIX A: CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
 
This chapter details the classification scheme laid out in Chapter Three for 
each country in the region. For the larger countries in the region – Mexico and 
Brazil, for example – there were multiple scholarly sources, allowing for more 
confidence in classification. For some smaller countries, such as the Dominican 
Republic, there was only one that detailed the specifics of the place, effectively 
rendering a directional coding less likely absent multiple clear references to the 
closeness of politics and media.  
I, therefore, approached the classifications cautiously. I compiled a list of 
every reference I could find about the relationship between media and 
government, as well as about citizen perceptions of that relationship. For 
countries in which there were multiple references – for Colombia, for example, I 
found 24 specific references across multiple sources – I was cautious with 
classifications, only assigning a classification when multiple sources concurred. I 
compared sources by (literally) writing down every reference I found. For Brazil, 
multiple sources referenced using culture via television especially as a means of 
nation-building and, by extension, control or reinforcement of the status quo and 
quashing of ideas outside the mainstream.  
For countries with fewer references, since I was coding using fewer 
sources, I focused on specific details. In Uruguay, for example, the government 
required an oath of loyalty from those wishing to acquire television licenses. Such 
strong evidence, even from one source, was clear justification for classification as 
reinforcing the status quo. 
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When sources were available in both English and another language, I have 
listed the English-language source for ease of replication. That was obviously not 
possible in call cases. The Becerra and Mastrini book, for example, if one of very 
few to detail ownership patterns across the region, making it an invaluable 
resource for finding specific links between the political class and media. 
Country-specific sources are listed where appropriate. Some pieces of 
research covered the whole region.342 Full details of the specifics for the 
                                                          
342 Multi-national sources: 
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classifications – including detailed references mentioned below with page 
numbers – will be available on abcronkhite.com in Fall 2018. 
 
Argentina343 
Broadcast media, especially television, were overtly used as a means of 
socialization by Argentina’s military and democratic leaders (Karush 2012). 
Clarin is the most dominant media group and most media outlets reflect a 
market-based or corporate structure (Becerra and Mastrini 2009). Radio is more 
activist than other media platforms (Silvestri and Vassolo 2009), whilst 
newspapers tend to promote the status quo with little diversity of voices (Fox 
1997, 104; Vialey, Belinche and Tovar 2008, 26). 
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A prominent semiologist went so far as to summarize the situation this 
way:  
The situation in Argentina is one where the relationship between the 
press and politicians is very close. Liberal ideas about press 
independence have not gained much prestige in Argentina. So, even 
though the press proclaims itself the voice of truth, most of us 
acknowledge that the press responds to particular interests and its 
messages are not ours, but rather favor pre-determined elite ideas 
(Schmucler 1979 quoted in Repoll 2010, 38).344 
 
Such a clear statement from an Argentine academic gave a clear indication of how 
the press – in this case newspapers and television specifically – should be 
classified. 
It is television, therefore, that is most associated with government, having 
faced censorship before being nationalized in 1973 (Fox 1997, 104; Vialey, 
Belinche and Tovar 2008, 18). Even in private hands, television remains loyal to 
whatever administration might be in power (Fox 1997, 107). 
 To that end, television is coded as aligned with government and 
newspapers as neutral. There is no data to support any expectation for radio, 
resulting in a neutral categorization. 
 
                                                          
344 Original Spanish: “Tratemos de pensar la situación de los medios de comunicación en la 
Argentina donde, como en pocos países latinoamericanos, la relación medios-políticos ha sido y 
es tan estrecha. Las ideas liberales sobre la autonomía de los medios no han tenido demasiado 
prestigio en la Argentina, y quienes las enarbolaron supieron arrear su estandarte ante 
situaciones de crisis. Esto quiere decir que aunque se hayan repetido con frecuencia grandes 
frases sobre el periodismo como heraldo de la verdad, pocos se escandalizan cuando se verifica 
que los medios responden a intereses particulares y que los mensajes no son neutros, sino que 
favorecen tendencias o concepciones determinadas.” 
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Bolivia345 
Bolivia has a rich radio history (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 78). The first 
commercial station in the country began broadcasting in 1929 (Soruco and Pinto 
2009, 95). The political import of radio can be traced back to at least miners 
strikes starting in 1948, with the miners’ union founding its first network of 25 
radio stations to spread its message in 1952 (Moreira Gomes 2011). There are 
over 40 radio stations with sufficiently large reach to be listed nationally (Grupo 
MediosMedios) and over 800 radio stations across the country (Freedom House 
2007).346 
Community radio goes back decades and has grown in the 21st century. 
Radio Soberanía, run by the cocalero347 union, promoted the causes and 
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mountain region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 291). 
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candidacy of now-President Juan “Evo” Morales (Ledeur 2002, 10); Radio 
Kawsachuan Coca (“long live coca”) was built after Morales was elected to the 
office of the Presidency and occupies one of the largest buildings in that region’s 
commercial center (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 287); and the Venezuelan 
government under Hugo Chavez supported the establishment of new community 
radio stations in Bolivia as part of its Socialist agenda (Waisbord 2013, 134). 
Television and newspapers, on the other hand, are generally associated 
with the business oligarchy, including the politically active Monaterio, Kuljis, 
Rivero, Doria Medina348 and Marinkovic families (Tabbie Saenz, personal 
correspondence, December 13, 2016).349 Those families and the others in the 
mestizo and immigrant oligarchy 
(Becerra and Mastrini 2009, Torrico Villanueva 2008) controlled Bolivian 
politics through most of the 20th century. The Santa Cruz media played a large 
part in the conservative, mainstream opposition to then-candidate Morales in the 
2004 election (Torrico Villanueva 2008, 38). Given the conservative, oligarchic 
history of politics in Bolivia, television and newspaper are coded as promoting 
status quo values of the government (4th branch), with radio acting as a 
watchdog or calling for change (4th estate). 
 
                                                          
348 A 2014 candidate for president 
349 Corroborated by Branko Marinkovic (personal correspondence, December 12, 2016). The 
breakdown of ownership is: Monasterio owns Unitel (television), Klujis Red Uno (television), 
Rivero El Deber (newspaper Santa Cruz), Garafulic Pagina 7 (newspaper La Paz), Duran El 
Mundo (newspaper La Paz), Canelas Los Timpos (newspaper Cochabamba), Marinkovic El Dia 
(newspaper La Paz). Additionally a Venezuelan businessman named Gil holds a large stake in the 
government television stations: PAT, Cadena A and ATB. 
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Brazil350 
The alliance between Brazilian politics and television is well known 
(Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 46; Fox 1997, 53). They are 
extremely close and, like in Argentina, television was employed by governments 
as a means of national socialization under supposedly friendly military control 
(Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 52; Straubhaar 2001, 137). In fact, 
“the structures and practices of the Brazilian television industry are a direct 
result of the submission of the state and the media regulatory bodies to the 
economic elite, broadcasters and politicians, and their political, ideological and 
economic interests” (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 59). Globo’s 
relationship with the government and its self-censorship would provoke one 
executive to “identify Globo with the motto of the nation itself” (Sinclair 1999, 
68). In his book on Brazilian political communication, Porto referred to television 
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in Brazil as “hegemonic” (2007, 106) and to Globo’s coverage of protests as 
presenting the official or government frame of events (2007, 122) – specific and 
clear examples that provide evidence of the closeness of television and politics in 
Brazil. 
Newspapers are also repute as close to government and parties but much 
less so than television (Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 58), in part 
because there is no one newspaper as dominant as TV’s Globo group and many 
newspapers have historically been regionally focused (Becerra and Mastrini 
2009). Radio began with small clubs that were eventually bought out (Guedes-
Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008). It was political only in its early years 
(Guedes-Bailey and Jambeiro Barbosa 2008, 48; Fox 1997, 54). 
Therefore, television is coded as most aligned with Brazilian governments 
historically, with newspapers and radio receiving neutral codings. 
 
Chile351 
Radio in Chile is segmented (Benavides et al 2009) and small (Becerra and 
Mastrini 2009) but is considered the most credible medium by far (Gonzalez-
Rodriguez 2008, 63). There is little community radio and little diversity of voice 
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because there is no public or governments support for small or upstart stations 
(Gonzalez-Rodriguez 2008, 72). 
Until 1973, each party in Chile owned or was affiliated with a newspaper 
(Tironi and Sunkel 2000, 167). And the newspapers have been criticized for not 
taking on the dictatorships more forcefully (Benavides et al 2009). 
Television is effectively a market-focused duopoly more focused on profits 
than politics (Becerra and Mastrini 2009), but with a political-military history. It 
was, in fact, the last military dictatorship that privatized all television, taking it 
out of the hands of the universities that had begun the major stations (Fox 1997, 
125). Television was forced to be apolitical – and not show opposition voices – by 
the military regime (Fox 1997, 126). That reticence renders television to be 
perceived more as an instrument of government than radio, though most 
pressure on it is market pressure. 
The market realities, such as a dependence on advertising (Benavides et al 
2009), and the choice to remain apolitical after the return of democracy yield 
neutral codings for radio and television in Chile. There is simply not enough 
evidence to be certain of any reputation. Historical party ownership yields a 
coding as close to government or promoting the status quo for newspapers.  
 
Colombia352 
The Colombian government, in an attempt to create political parity 
between parties, has effectively created a television duopoly by keeping control 
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over television news and information programs, whilst allowing media 
independence relative to entertainment programming (Fox 1997, 93). Colombian 
television has the highest concentration of ownership in Latin America (Becerra 
and Mastrini 2009) and continues to be seen as politically close to government 
(Arango et al 2009). Journalism in Colombia combines clientelism and low 
regulation (Montoya-Londoño 2014). 
Multiple Colombian newspaper editors have become head of state, so 
much so that politics and newspapers are treated as having a revolving door 
(Bonilla and Narvaez 2008, 79; Montoya-Londoño 2014, 72), a specific 
classification criterion. But those newspapers serve only an elite readership 
(Arango et al 2009). Only radio, including the growing segment of community 
radio (Arango et al 2009), is seen an offering an alternative or even edgy political 
viewpoint (Bonilla and Narvaez 2008, 86-88). Given that the strong and 
documented affiliations between newspapers and television and the political and 
business classes, newspapers and television are coded as promoting status quo 
values and radio as a watchdog. 
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Costa Rica353 
Costa Rica’s media stands out for its lack of political entanglement 
historically. Both television and newspapers are reputed for being conservative, 
but in a libertarian or pro- business way (Sandoval-Garcia 2008, 103). 
Newspapers especially are apolitical (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 111-113). And 
there is very little history of community or political radio, rendering neutral 
classifications for all three platforms. 
 
Dominican Republic354 
Dominican newspapers were vital in the struggle against US occupation in 
the early 20th century (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 197) and enjoyed press freedom in the 
brief democracy before the Trujillo dictatorship (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 210). The 
history of radio in the Dominican Republic goes back to 1924 (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 
212). During the dictatorship, following a new press law in 1944 (Cruz Sanchez 
1997, 249), both newspapers and radio promoted government positions or were 
forced to close (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 225-226). Radio Caribe was so identified with 
the dictatorship that its offices and towers were destroyed by jubilant protesters 
after Trujillo’s death (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 261).  
With the reemergence of democracy, both television and radio stations 
were aligned with political parties and positions; but stations emitting opposition 
voices were forced to close (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 277). Even today, there is little 
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distinction made between publicity and propaganda (Cruz Sanchez 1997, 288), 
suggesting all news is still seen as the voice of government. 
 
Ecuador355  
A near-monopoly accounts for most of Ecuador’s newspaper and television 
media, which tend to exhibit a pro-business more than pro-government 
mentality (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 125). In a country with a high Gini 
coefficient (never below 45 and above 50 for most of the 1990s) and political-
business oligarchy, a pro-business line equates to a pro-status quo line (See 
Walsh 2001 for details). Radio includes more news than other media platforms 
(Jordan Tobar and Panchana Macay 2009). There are a number of small, illegal 
radio stations as well as at least 26 community radio stations (Jordan Tobar and 
Panchana Macay 2009), but all three platforms are seen as close to the political-
business oligarchy. The latest president, left-leaning for the first time in the 
country’s history, has refused to renew licenses and caused strain with the media 
elite (Bachman 2011), but, historically, all traditional platforms in Ecuador are 
seen as aligned with the state. 
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El Salvador356 
The guerrilla opposition in El Salvador’s civil war actively employed radio 
as a means to combat mainstream media, which presented the government’s view 
(Henriquez Consalvi 2010). Newspapers were aligned with the military (Rockwell 
and Janus 2003, 33); and the television oligopoly defends the state’s view 
(Rockwell and Janus 2003, 137). So it was the underground radio that presented 
alternative views (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 40). Henriquez Consalvi (2010)’s 
book is, in fact, a first-hand account by a guerrilla radio “star” of how radio was 
employed by anti-government groups. Since the advent of democracy, the 
diversity of voice in traditional media has grown (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 39), 
but not substantially. Therefore, newspapers and television are coded as aligned 
with the state and radio as adversarial.  
 
Guatemala357 
“Twelve families and two business groups control all television, 
most radio, and all but one newspaper in Guatemala” (Salzman and 
Salzman 2009, 53). 
 
The mainstream Guatemalan press – television and newspapers – like 
many other countries in the region has a pro-business, government-neutral 
stance by most accounts (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 94). Newspaper especially 
produce very little content that goes against government and have been censored 
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nonetheless when they do (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 98), both clear evidence of 
promoting status quo values, by choice or out of necessity. Television is described 
as “bland” and cooperative or acquiescing to government as well (Rockwell and 
Janus 2003, 94, 105). Some media owners participate in politics (Gramajo 2014). 
Radio is the most independent medium – many radio stations were started 
without any kind of licensing (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51) – but it has very 
little reach relative to its television. There is some news presented in Mayan for 
the minority (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 91), but even radio tends to take a very 
corporate stance (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 93). As such, newspapers and 




Honduran newspapers are highly politicized, with each party traditionally 
having its own outlet (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 28). All media platforms are 
controlled by an oligarchy known as the 5 families (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 
18), with television news the most timid (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 131) and 
radio the most credible or important (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 28). The 
political influence of print media is limited by the country’s 25 languages; but 
newspapers are nonetheless coded as most aligned with government, whilst 




Mexico is the most dangerous country in Latin America in which to be a 
journalist, not just in modern times but also historically (Hughes 2008, 147). 
Television especially is aligned with government, both during decades of one-
party rule and in the recent years with two main parties (Gutierrez Rentaria 
2009; Fox 1997, 37), in part since the interests of television owners and 
politicians, though distinct, have often aligned (Sinclair 1999, 38). Radio is 
politically important but there is no history of government involvement (Fox 
1997, 38); and radio is dwarfed by the influence of television (Gutierrez Rentaria 
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2009). Newspapers are less obviously partisan but remain dependent on 
government advertising, rendering them subservient (Hughes 2008, 132). 
The word most often used to describe the relationship between the 
Mexican government and press is collusion, in large part because much political 
advertising in the press is presented as if it were news (Keenan 1997; Orme 1997; 
Villegas 2018), akin to native advertising or content marketing359 in the United 
States. 
Therefore, television and newspapers are coded as promoting the status 
quo, whilst radio is classified as not reputed to be close to government. 
 
Nicaragua360 
Neither newspapers nor television news have traditionally criticized 
government very much (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 72; Wallace-Salinas 2008, 
151). Newspapers have played the role of the opposition at times in the past 
(Wallace-Salinas 2008, 154), but generally are more concerned about market 
forces than political ones. “The Chamorro and Sacassa families … have been 
involved in both media and politics since the nation’s beginning … in 1821” 
(Salzman and Salzman 2009, 52), strong evidence that the media would be 
perceived as promoting the status quo.  
                                                          
359 Native advertising is defined as “advertiser-sponsored content that is designed to appear to the 
user as similar to editorial content” (Howe and Teufel 2014, 79). 
360 Wallace-Salinas, Arturo. 2008. “The media in Nicaragua: an escape valve for a dysfunctional 
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Television is sensationalist to the point of being graphically violent 
(Wallace-Salinas 2008, 162) and is largely seen as apolitical despite a soft 
historical association with government (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 84-85).  
Radio is the most leftwing (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 86), but radio 
presents a diversity of oppositional voices (Rockwell and Janus 2003, 88; 
Wallace-Salinas 2008). For example, the Sandista party founded Radio Ya and 
the station continues to promote the party (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51). 
There is long history of community radio (Wallace-Salinas 2008, 157), important 
in a country with notably low functional literacy despite official literacy statistics 
(Wallace-Salinas 2008, 150). And many radio stations were started without any 
kind of licensing (Salzman and Salzman 2009, 51). 
Therefore, television is coded as aligned with government (very slightly), 
newspapers as neutral and radio as critical. 
 
Panama 
Politics and business are intertwined in Panama (Rockwell and Janus 
2003, 53), with the government selecting editors of newspapers (Rockwell and 
Janus 2003, 55), a codified linkage between newspapers and the status quo. 
Television is also considered a government mouthpiece (Rockwell and Janus 
2003, 56, 63). Radio is seen as offering opposition viewpoints (Rockwell and 
Janus 2003, 56, 67). Therefore, newspapers and television are coded as 4th 




Like Mexico, Paraguay has been ruled by one party for most of its 
existence. Unlike Mexico, despite the newspaper’s editor being from a political 
family (Becerra and Mastrini 2009, 140), the main newspaper in Paraguay took 
on the ruling party and was actually closed by the dictatorship for 5 years 
(Aldana-Amabile 2008). Newspapers have been a constant presence, but the 60% 
Guarani speaking population (Aldana-Amabile 2008, 168) limits the effect of 
print media. Television is seen as graphic and sensationalist (Aldana-Amabile 
2008, 175), with only radio offering a peasant or opposition voice (Aldana-
Amabile 2008, 171).  For this reason, “radio plays a significant social relevance 
role, especially in rural areas” (García Béjar 2009, 184). As such, newspapers are 
coded as neutral, as is television, with radio coded as watchdog. 
 
Peru362 
Peru’s print media has been criticized for underplaying the violence 
multiple administrations have committed against citizens (Aldana-Duran 2008, 
                                                          
361 Sources: 
Aldana-Amabile, Susana. 2008. “The media in Paraguay: from the coverage of political 
democracy to the obsession with violence.” In The Media in Latin America, ed. Jairo Lugo-
Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 167-178. 
García Béjar, Ligia. 2009. “The media in Paraguay: a locked nation in times of change.” In The 
Handbook of Spanish Language Media, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 183-188. 
362 Sources: 
Aldana-Durán, Celia. 2008. “The media in Peru: the challenge of constructing a meaningful 
democracy.” In The Media in Latin America, ed. Jairo Lugo-Ocando. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 179-192. 
Boas, Taylor C. 2005. “Television and Neopopulism in Latin America: Media effects in Brazil and 
Peru.” Latin American Research Review 40(2): 27-49. http://lasa-
4.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol40no2/Boas.pdf (March 23, 2015) 
Protzel, Javier. 2014. “Media Systems and Political Action in Peru.” In Media Systems and 
Communication Policies in Latin America, eds Manuel Alejandro Guerrero and Mireya 
Márquez-Ramírez. Hampshire, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 82-99. 
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183) and for accepting bribes from politicians to compensate for low pay (Aldana-
Duran 2008, 185). Newspapers are nonetheless seen as more legitimate than 
television news, which also accepted bribes (Aldana-Duran 2008, 184) and tax 
breaks and other incentives (Fox 1997, 86-87). Corporate media’s support of the 
Fujimori regime in the 1990s in exchange for subsidies begot a perception of its 
being a government lapdog (Protzel 2014).  
Radio has faced the least government scrutiny or persecution (Aldana-
Duran 2008, 181) and is the most trusted platform (Aldana-Duran 2008, 185), 
with almost 1500 stations (Aldana-Duran 2008, 185), including over 60 
community radio stations (Zeta de Pozo 2009). This gives radio particular 
political power in a country with 93 languages (Aldana-Duran 2008, 195), 
especially in rural areas (Protzel 2014, 93). 
Newspapers and television are therefore coded as aligned with 
government, radio as oppositional. 
 
Uruguay363 
Newspapers are closest to government and highly partisan (Hudson et al 
2009), having been censored repeatedly since 1967 (Fox 1997, 111). Television 
responds to the oligarchy in Uruguay (Hudson et al 2009), but also to military 
influence (Fox 1997, 114) and broadcasters must swear an oath of allegiance by 
law to receive or maintain a license (Fox 1997, 113). Radio is politically important 
                                                          
Zeta de Pozo, Rosa. 2009. “The Media in Peru.” In The Handbook of Spanish Language Media, 
ed. Alan Albarran. New York: Routledge, 125-138. 
363 Hudson, Eileen, Fernando Salas, Lucila Carbaja and Florencia Traibel. 2009. “The Media in 
Uruguay.” In The Handbook of Spanish Language Media, ed. Alan Albarran. New York: 
Routledge, 171-182. 
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and has been going back decades, in part for its long history (Fox 1997, 31) and in 
part for its role in rural mobilization (Hudson et al 2009). Newspapers and 
television are, therefore, coded as aligned with government, radio as watchdog. 
 
Venezuela364 
Politics and media in Venezuela are described as having a “symbiotic 
dependence” on each other (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 201), with Hugo 
Chavez having famously prided himself on orchestrating a “mediated coup” 
(Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 191). Newspapers have traditionally 
downplayed problems (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 202) and television 
and radio licenses been awarded to close political allies (Cañizalez and Lugo-
Ocando 2008, 195). There is a strong government presence in radio (Cañizalez 
and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 198); and media owners have often throughout the 
country’s history run media businesses at a loss to gain influence or favor for 
their other businesses (Cañizalez and Lugo-Ocando 2008, 193). The government 
has been using selective advertising to manipulate media content since the 1970s 
(Fox 1997). The Chavez administration’s decision not to renew television licenses 
in 2007 pushed some media outlets toward the opposition (Cañizalez and Lugo-
                                                          
364 Sources: 
Bisbal, Marcelino. 2007. “Los Medios en Venezuela. ¿Dónde estamos?” Espacio Abierto 16(4). 
http://www2.scielo.org.ve/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1315-
00062007000400001&lng=es (August 14, 2015) 
Cañizalez, Andrés and Jairo Lugo-Ocando. 2008. “The Media in Venezuela: the revolution was 
televised, but no one was really watching.” In The Media in Latin America, ed. Jairo Lugo-
Ocando. New York: McGraw-Hill, 193-210. 
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Ocando 2008, 197), but historically all media in Venezuela are seen as very 
aligned with government. 
 
In summary: 
- = 4th Branch of or aligned with government (meaning no association with 
behavior) 
0 = No expectation can be extrapolated from sources (as of Spring 2017) 
+ = 4th Estate of government or watchdog (translating to an association with 
behavior) 
 
Table A.1: Country classifications 
Country Newspaper Television Radio 
Argentina 0 - 0 
Bolivia - - + 
Brazil 0 - 0 
Chile - 0 0 
Colombia - - + 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 
Dominican Rep. - - - 
Ecuador - - - 
El Salvador - - + 
Guatemala - - 0 
Honduras - 0 0 
Mexico - - 0 
Nicaragua 0 - + 
Panama - - + 
Paraguay 0 0 + 
Peru - - + 
Uruguay - - + 






APPENDIX B: JUSTIFICATION FOR MODELING DECISIONS 
 IN CHAPTER 5 
 
My dissertation explores links between media as a political institution and 
aggregate behavioral patterns in different countries. Consumers of media more 
with reputations for challenging the status quo engage more often and in 
different ways than consumers of mainstream or government-aligned media. The 
original data collected for Chapter 5 of this dissertation do not include any 
measure of ideology or other political affiliation that might serve as an indicator 
of respondents’ existing political preferences. Theoretically, media selection 
based on reputation should precede any current political *decisions, as coming to 
know the reputation of different media is part of socialization. Nonetheless, the 
model required testing to see if another variable (previous vote choice) might be a 
reasonable approximation for ideology. This appendix to the dissertation is 
intended to buttress the decision to exclude previous vote choice from the final 
model in the Chapter Five.  
 
Background 
I was given the opportunity to insert questions about media consumption 
into a privately-funded pre-electoral survey conducted by Equipos Mori across 
Bolivia in mid-2014. Survey administrators fielded a nationally representative 
survey sample, based on the 2012 census, for a total of 2009 possible 
respondents in the first round. Interviews were conducted face-to-face. The 
survey firm reported that total sampling error was estimated at +/- 2.2%, with 
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greatest expected error in the two states (out of nine) with smallest populations 
and most difficult topography (Equipos Mori 2014, 6).365 
I duplicated questions from the fifth World Values Survey, using the 
Spanish-language wording from neighboring Chile, and inserted them into a pre-
electoral survey gauging public sentiment about the state of the country and 
candidates: 
 
People learn what is going on in this country and the world from various 
sources. For each of the following sources, please indicate whether you 
use it to obtain information daily, weekly, monthly, less than monthly or 
never (read out and code one answer for each): 
 
Daily newspaper Mobile phone 
Printed magazines  Email 
TV news  Internet 
Radio news  Talk with friends or colleagues366 
 
Could you please tell me, how do you principally inform yourself about 
what is going on in the country? (Do not read options, mark just one). 
 
TV News Church 
Work colleagues Internet sites (excluding 
newspapers) 
Newspaper Community center 




I’m next going to name various means of communication. For each one, 





                                                          
365 Survey organizers had originally agreed to include my questions in at least three rounds 
planned pre-electoral surveys, yielding a much larger pooled sample. Unfortunately, funding was 
too tight for them to make good on that agreement (Jose Luis Galvez, personal correspondence, 
May 12, 2014). Therefore, the data are from the July 17 – 28 iteration of the survey. 
366 Questions were asked in this order 
367 No order to responses since volunteered only 
368 Questions were asked in this order 
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For the first question, about frequency of media use, survey administrators 
independently chose to modify the question to include “2 to 3 times per week” 
between daily and weekly.369 
Finally, drawing from WVS question 225, respondents were asked “How 
often, if ever, do you use a personal computer?” and “How often, if ever, do you 
use a cell phone?,” with never, occasionally and frequently as possible responses. 
The original World Values question includes “Don’t know what a computer is” as 
a possible response. Survey organizers found this implausible, and suggested the 
question be modified to include “don’t know how to use a computer/cell phone” 
and “don’t have access to a computer/cell phone” instead. 
 
Descriptive statistics 
The sample roughly resembles what one would expect of a sample in 
Bolivia. The median respondent has completed high school and resides in an 
urban area. There are slightly more women in the sample than men; and 
approximately 55% of the sample self-identifies as indigenous. The modal 
response on age – 25 – approximates statistics published by the US government 
(CIA), but the mean and median of the sample skew higher, as the sample is 
limited to eligible voters (mean age 35, median 38.3). 
Since the overall theory is about the importance of media consumption for 
behavior, it is first necessary to make sure that there actually is variation in media 
                                                          
369 I did not learn of this modification until the final results were sent to me. 
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consumption habits, not just so-called news junkies370 consuming a lot of news 
across many platforms and news avoiders371 not consuming on any platform. This 
matters because Ksiazek, Malthouse and Webster (2010) showed that news 
consumption is associated with increased political engagement among both 
groups, but the benefit is higher for news junkies. Therefore, were the Bolivia 
survey sample to be bimodal, with news junkies at one end and news avoiders at 
the other, I could not be confident in pooled results, since Ksiazek, Malthouse 
and Webster showed the two groups cannot be treated as if equal (in their sample 
from the United States).  
Over two-thirds of respondents reported not using electronic means to 
receive news.372 The highest reported correlations were also among news 
consumed via electronic means, as shown in Table A2.1. Though there is no clear 
line for what is high versus what is low covariance (Gill 2006, 368), I am always 
wary of anything approaching or over 0.5.373 With that in mind, only Internet use 
was considered for further analysis; getting news via social media or cell phone, 
as is more common in the developed world, were dropped from the model, as 
over three-quarters of respondents never used either medium. For traditional 
                                                          
370 Most academic definitions are based on Zaller (2003) presentation of the traditional 
journalistic expectation of the public as informed and information-seeking. Zaller does not offer a 
specific definition of a “news junkie” but rather contrasts that abstract expectation of the 
informed citizen versus what he refers to as the “monitorial citizen” who only pays attention to 
politics when necessary. The term “news junkie” is commonly used. As of July 10, 2017, Merriam-
Webster in fact uses “television news junkie” as the example in its more general definition of a 
junkie: “a person who gets an unusual amount of pleasure from or has an unusual amount of 
interest in something.” 
371 Defined as “those who consume relatively little news, spend almost no time watching cable TV 
news channels, and avoid news magazines and news Web sites entirely” (Ksiazek, Malthouse and 
Webster 2010, 552). 
372 Responses to all questions were recoded to set never at 0 uniformly throughout analysis. 
373 No correlations between socio-demographic indicators and media use surpassed 0.38 (positive 
or negative). 
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media, both news and radio are used often for news consumption, but there is 
minimal correlation. The ubiquity of television news exposure, as shown in Table 
A2.2, is in line with findings from other parts of the world (Papathanassopoulos 
et al 2013). Less than one percent of respondents in the Bolivia survey use all 
media platforms daily. 
 
Table B.1: Correlations between media platforms used for news  
 Newspaper TV Radio Cell  Internet Social Media 
Newspaper  ***      
TV 0.2473 ***     
Radio 0.0625 0.0126 ***    
Cell phone 0.1690 0.0992 0.0020 ***   
Internet 0.2968 0.1461 -0.0665 0.4998 ***  
Social Media 0.2414 0.1245 -0.0638 0.7767 0.7767 *** 
 
Table B.2: Respondents’ use of news platforms, in percentages 
(n=2009) 
 Newspaper TV Radio Internet 
Never  34.79% 4.53% 21.40% 68.34% 
Less than monthly 11.35% 1.59% 4.33% 3.09% 
Monthly 14.78% 1.24% 4.33% 4.48% 
Weekly 22.75% 3.78% 9.11% 7.27% 
2-3 times per week 8.81% 11.00% 13.24% 5.03% 
Daily 7.52% 77.85% 47.59% 11.80% 
 
The different constituencies are further illustrated by differences in the 
“average” consumer of each platform. Women use radio and television more than 
men, who use newspapers and Internet. Newspaper readers are relatively older 
and less educated (seemingly correlated issues given widespread illiteracy in the 
mid-20th century) (“Illiteracy Rate Drops to Historic Lows in Bolivia”). The 
average television viewer is more urban and slightly more educated than the 
average radio listener, even though only seven percent of the sample reports 
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watching news on television less than at least once a week and over three-
quarters do so daily. 
  
What influences vote choice? 
I limit the analysis here to what predicts voting for the incumbent. Though 
the 2014 election in Bolivia was multi-party, incumbent Evo Morales went into 
the race hugely popular and expected to win.374 Morales, elected first in 2005 
with over 50% of the votes and reelected in 2009 with almost two-thirds of votes, 
enjoyed generally high popularity throughout his two terms.375 Limiting the 
analysis to a binary outcome allows me to look at what associations might have 
existed between voting for the establishment-backed other candidates versus the 
non-traditional incumbent, which makes sense with a theory about government-
media relationships. In binary situations such as vote choice, statisticians employ 
logistic regression (Moore and Siegel 2013, 264).376 Interpreting the results 
requires transforming result coefficients into odds ratios (Liao 1994). 
I additionally limit the analysis here to outcomes that might be not just 
significant but have explanatory power. Since the 2014 election had five 
candidates, multinomial logistic regression would be the appropriate method to 
consider all of them. But analysis of multinomial logit is pairwise. How media 
consumption might have affected voting for the libertarian candidate versus the 
                                                          
374 Morales did win with almost 60% of votes, more than double his nearest competitor among the 
fractured opposition (Neuman 2014). 
375 Morales’ popularity was as high as 80% at one time (Bastenier 2013) but still at 56% in 
December 2013 (“Evo Morales: Su aprobación sube a 56% tras doble gratificación por Navidad”) 
376 Especially in dichotomous situations, “the binomial logit model offers several advantages” (Fox 
2008, 374). 
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green candidate, relative to some base outcome, is not a meaningful analysis for 
an election in which there was an overwhelming favorite. 
 
Table B.3: What predicts voting for the incumbent? 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Variable  Coefficient (SE)  Coefficient (SE)  Coefficient (SE) 
Female  - 0.3030(0.0925)** - 0.2657 (0.0954)** - 0.2789 (0.0964)** 
Age - 0.0090 (0.0031)** - 0.0113 (0.0032)*** - 0.0131 (0.0034)*** 
Education - 0.1927 (0.0206)*** - 0.15446 (0.0219)***  0.1370 (0.0246)*** 
Indigenous status    0.7356 (0.0963)*** - 0.0950 (0.0076)*** 
City size   - 0.1588 (0.0413)*** - 0.1355 (0.0434)** 
Newspaper readership   - 0.0220 (0.0327) 
TV news consumption   - 0.0358 (0.0240) 
Radio news use      0.0648 (0.0240)** 
Internet news use     - 0.0391 (0.0312) 
n  2009  1975  1975 
Logistic Regression  
 
 
Expanding the model step-by-step helps avoid overfitting. I first expand 
the model to include measures of indigenous status, which has been a politically 
salient issue in Bolivia since the turn of the century, and urbanization. 
McFadden’s R-squared increases when this addition is made (from 0.035 [df=4] 
to 0.080 [df=16]). The addition of media variables further increases the 
explanatory power of the model377 (McFadden’s log likelihood 0.084 [df=10]) 
with only city size losing significance slightly when media are added.378 This is 
                                                          
377 Models were also run with a number of interaction terms, particularly for education and 
urbanization relative to each media platform. There was no increase in explanatory power so I 
opted for the simpler model (Achen 1982). 
378 Bartlett (2014) details how McFadden’s R-squared is often quite low, in one simulation in 
which the probability of the binary outcome was set almost all the way to 1 even yielding a log 
likelihood of 0.13.  
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presumably because of the moderate correlation of urbanization with newspaper, 
television and Internet news consumption (0.32, 0.28 and 0.23 respectively).  
Most political scientists would at this point note the omission of some 
measure of political interest from the model, given the overwhelming evidence of 
the stability of measures of political interest (Prior 2010) and its importance as 
an antecedent for political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Ketter 1996), political 
engagement (Strömbäck and Shehata 2010) and aligning preferences with voting 
choices (Rau and Redlawsk 1997). Voting is compulsory and enforced in Bolivia; 
and election are always held on a Sunday on which no traffic is allowed to 
circulate nor businesses379 to open until after voting has finished. So, interested 
in politics or not, citizens must turn out to vote. 
Nonetheless, the model seems to provide support to the theory that media 
consumption platform matters for supporting a non-traditional political 
candidate in Bolivia. The low usage of the Internet at the time of the survey might 
explain why getting news via radio increases the likelihood of voting for the 
incumbent by over six percent, but there is no meaningful increase from the other 
watchdog entity, the Internet. If most Internet news in Bolivia is from sites linked 
to mainstream television and newspaper outlets380, that relationship could also 
partially explain the non-finding.    
                                                          
379 Other than those such as hospitals and nursing homes that must remain open for public safety, 
of course. Carrying arms and selling alcohol is also prohibited (“Bolivia Announces Special Rules 
for Election Day”). 
380 Olmstead, Mitchell and Rosenstiel (2011) use Nielsen ratings data to show that, in the US for 
example, two-thirds of the top 25 Internet news sites are linked to what they call “legacy news 
organizations”. This overlap is not uncommon. In countries with healthy online public spheres, 
the Internet largely acts as a counterweight to legacy sites. The limited Internet news use in 
Bolivia at the time of the survey may be indicative of a still underdeveloped online public sphere 




Party identification is not a strong predictor in Bolivia, as parties change 
and reorganize frequently. Therefore, left-right ideology is generally used a 
predictor of political affinity. The Equipos Mori July 2014 survey did not ask 
about ideology, however, leaving a potentially important gap in drawing 
inferences because there is no clear measure of respondents’ pre-existing political 
leanings or beliefs.  In the absence of ideology or other predictors of political 
leaning and considering Morales’ strong performance in the previous two 
elections, previous vote choice was the survey question that could best 
approximate respondents’ pre-existing political beliefs. 
Previous vote choice is not an exact overlay of ideology though, as the 
former is a moment in time – which could be influenced by any number of 
election-specific factors – but the latter a persistent over-time tendency. One 
means to test the validity of the measure before adding it into the final model – 
which would have the unfortunate side effect of reducing the number of 
respondents to the model by almost half – is to examine if the sample for the 
measure generates the same expected population as the base model. The logistic 
regression presented in Chapter X (Model 3) was:  
Voting for the incumbent = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education level + 
β4Indigenous status + β5City size + β6Newspaper use + β7Television news 
use+ β8Radio news use + β9Internet news use+ ε (Model 3) 
 
This appendix modifies the model to test if how respondents voted in the 2009 
presidential election affected 2014 vote choice (Model 4): 
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Voting for the incumbent = α + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Education level + 
β4Indigenous status + β5City size + β6Newspaper use + β7Television news use+ 
β8Radio news use + β9Internet news use + β10Voting record + ε (Model 4) 
 
I define respondents who had not supported Morales as anyone who had 
voted for any candidate other than Morales or had voted blanco381  in the 
previous election. Those who were too young to vote or who had not voted, 
despite being compulsory and enforced in Bolivia, were dropped from the 
forthcoming analysis, as their previous vote choice and/or feeling about Morales 
could not be inferred from the available data. This reduces the n to 1088.382 
Before continuing, I examine the descriptive statistics of the subset of data 
of interest in this appendix: 
 
                                                          
381 Blank voting is a phenomenon unique to countries with compulsory voting and has been most 
studied in Latin America, the only area of the world in which compulsory voting is the dominant 
system (Electoral Commission 2006, 24). Voto blanco or voto bronca in Spanish – voto em 
blanco in Portuguese – is treated in cross-cultural studies and by the media as a means of 
expressing displeasure with the administration without the risk that actually voting for the 
opposition might entail. It occurs even in developed nations with compulsory voting like 
Australia, but has been most studied by Latin American specialists, since that is the only area of 
the world dominated by compulsory voting. Blank voting gained such popularity under the 
dictatorships of the twentieth century that, even now with free and fair elections, since voting is 
still compulsory in most Latin American countries, blank voting continues as a means to express 
displeasure with the slate of candidates or parties. In 2001 in Argentina, for example, total blank 
and null votes amounted to over 20% of the electorate (“Voto bronca: una protesta muy fuerte 
que triunfó en la Capital y Santa Fe”). In the 2009 Mexican election, the media reported that 
casting a blank vote was an anonymous means of expressing that “the whole political system 
stinks” (Grillo 2009) or “voting for nothing is better than backing the politicians currently 
running the country” (Lacey 2009). 
382 326 respondents were not old enough to vote in the 2009 election. 107 did not vote. 30 said 
they considered their vote a secret. 276 respondents said they did not know or did not respond 
(collapsed in the survey into one category). 
323 
Table B.4: Descriptive statistics  
  Model 3    Model 4 
Variable Min Max Mean S.D.  Min Max Mean S.D.  
Age 18 92 38.30 15.54 18 92 41.53 14.45 
Education 1 10 5.04 2.44 1 10 4.89 2.44 
City Size 0 3 1.79 1.20 0 3 1.72 1.23 
Newspaper 0 5 1.82 1.65 0 5 1.81 1.65 
TV 0 5 4.49 1.22 0 5 4.5 1.22 
Radio 0 5 3.31 2.02 0 5 3.62 1.92 
Internet 0 5 1.13 1.83 0 5 0.91 1.67 
 
Figure B.1: Proportional frequency distribution of respondent age 
 
Over half of the population in Bolivia is below 25 years old (52% according 
to a 2016 estimate) with a media age of 24 (CIA 2017). Approximately another 
third of the population is between 25 and 54, leaving only 11% of the population 
over 55. The skewed distribution in age in the sample is in line with expectations 
about the country overall.  
 




Scale: 1 no studies; 2 incomplete primary school; 3 complete primary school; 4 
incomplete secondary school; 5 complete secondary school; 6 introductory 
technical school; 7 advanced technical school; 8 some college; 9 university 
degree; 10 advanced degree 
  
Most Bolivian young persons now complete secondary school, but less 
than 70 percent did so 25 years ago (World Bank 2016). As such, there remains a 
chunk of the population with very little education, a chunk that has a primary or 
secondary education and very few with college or postgraduate degrees.  
 
Figure B.3: Frequency distribution of city size (urbanization) 
 
The most rural areas are coded 0. State capitals are the largest cities in the 
states, coded 3. Approximately two-thirds of the population lived in urban areas 
in 2015 (CIA 2017), which explains the skew in the sample.  
Statistical analysis is straightforward in many cases when data are 
distributed normally, allowing for assumptions about mean and variance (Fox 
2008, 382). But there is no reason to expect a normal distribution of news 
consumption, making it especially important to examine descriptive statistics. 
This non-normal distribution happens because news consumption is habitual – 
with 76% of adults in a recent survey noting that they always turn to the same 
news outlets (Mitchell et al 2016). Television is ubiquitous worldwide; and 
newspapers and Internet service are expensive in developing countries, which 
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would diminish mass use of those media. The lopsided distributions are, 
therefore, reasonable. The heavy use of radio makes sense in a developing 
country with a long tradition of radio, such as Bolivia.  
 
Figures B.4 – B.7: Frequency distribution of news consumption by 
media platform 
Scale: Frequency of using the media platform for news consumption, scaled from 
never (0) to daily (5) 
 
Figure B.4: Newspaper readership  
  
 
Figure B.5: TV news consumption  
 
 




Figure B.7: Internet news use 
 
 
Table B.5: Descriptive statistics  
 Model 3 Model 4  
Variable Yes No Yes No 
Female 1021 988 538 550 
Indigenous 1090 885 667 421 
Voted for Incumbent in This Election? 1035 974 741 347 
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election?   831 257 
 
Figure B.8: Distribution by gender  
 
 






Men outnumber women at birth in Bolivia, but, as in most places, women outlive 
men. The almost equal distribution by gender in the sample, therefore, seems 
reasonable.  
Over two-thirds of Bolivians identify as mestizo, with at least 44% 
indicating that they consider themselves part of some indigenous group (CIA 
2017). In some cases, the percentage self-declaring as indigenous is as high as 
two-thirds of the population. 
 
Figure B.10: Voted Morales in 2014  
 
 
Figure B.11: Voted Morales in 2009
  
 
Morales was elected in 2009 with 63% of valid votes (Wurgaft 2009).383 Morales 
would go on to win the 2014 election with approximately 60% of valid votes 
                                                          
383 Incorrectly filed, damaged and “blank” votes are usually not reported in election results.  
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(Montero and Shoichet 2009). The histogram in Figure B.11 shows an 
approximately 80/20 split though. 
 
Re-running the model 
Re-running the model (Table B.6) suggests that previous voting record is 
quite important as a predictor of 2014 vote choice. In the amended model, voting 
record is highly statistically significant – increasing the likelihood of voting for 
Morales in 2014 more than ten-fold – and reduces slightly the predictive power of 
education and urbanization (though both remain significant). Further, from a 
theoretical perspective, the inclusion of voting record in the model results in the 
negative association between the consumption of television news and voting for 
the incumbent becoming significant at the p<.10 level. As the television industry 
in Bolivia is reputed for its association with traditional political parties in 
opposition to Morales, that finding would actually lend strength to the chapter’s 
results, as consumption of media repute as close to the government historically 




 Model 3  Model 4 
Parameter Coefficient (SE) OR Coefficient (SE) OR   
Female - 0.2550 (0.1420)˙ 0.7749 - 0.1592 (0.5737) 0.8529 
Age - 0.0078 (0.0055) 0.9922 - 0.0075 (0.0061) 0.9925 
Education - 0.1695 (0.0348)*** 0.8441 - 0.1143 (0.0395)** 0.8920 
Indigenous  0.7485 (0.1410)*** 2.1138  0.7184 (0.1590)*** 2.0511 
Urban - 0.1704 (0.0724)** 0.8434 -  0.1709 (0.0700)* 0.8429 
Newspaper - 0.0614 (0.0468) 0.9405 - 0.0770 (0.0527) 0.8497 
TV - 0.1212 (0.0749) 0.8859 - 0.1628 (0.0838)˙ 0.9259 
Radio  0.0140 (0.0360) 1.0141  0.0108 (0.0400) 1.0109 
Internet - 0.0433 (0.0471) 0.9577 - 0.0431 (0.0539) 0.9577 
Voting history     2.3150 (0.1750)*** 10.1246 




Component-plus-residual plots are a simple way to visualize differences 
between voters. Figures B.13 through B.17 show who voted for the incumbent 
(above the fit line) versus who voted against him (below the fit line). On all 
variables, there appears to be much more heterogeneity among those who voted 
against incumbent Morales, as shown by the long tails below the fit line. This is 
important because non-normal or non-systemmatically distribution of errors are 
indications of poor model fit. Large y-axis datapoints indicate that, though the 
model may be useful, it could be a quite poor fit in some cases (Statwing). 
In this survey, those supporting Morales seem to be a larger, more 
homogenous voting bloc. This means that looking at the full sample without 
disaggregating it masks heterogeneity among those who voted against him. This 
heterogeneity among those who voted against Morales makes intuitive sense in 
country and time during which the opposition was not unified and the incumbent 
was facing challengers on both his ideological left and right.  
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Figure B.12: C-R plot of age  
  
 
Figure B.13: C-R plot of education 
  
 




Figure B.15: C-R plot of newspaper use
 
 
Figure B.16: C-R plot of TV news   
 
 
Figure B.17: C-R plot of radio news 
 
 
None of the component-residual plots show unexpected clustering on the 
X-axis or a non-linear relationship; and all plots suggest monotone relationships. 
Comparing the fit lines across the figures shows very little variation from 
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linearity, except among the extremely small group of respondents who never or 
very rarely view television news, as evidenced by the curvature in that line. 
 
Gauging the efficiency of the model 
Collinearity among variables renders confidence intervals large and lowers 
the power of hypothesis testing (Fox 2008, 307). Strong collinearity can, in fact, 
increase variance so much as to make predictors useless as they become 
indistinguishable from chance. The variable inflation factor (VIF) provides an 
index that measures how much the variance of a coefficient might be increased 
due to collinearity. Testing for VIF, none of the confidence intervals approach 
two384, which would suggest collinearity: female (1.027), age (1.136), education 
(1.262), indigenous status (1.021), city size (1.078), newspaper (1.118), television 
(1.048), radio (1.017), Internet (1.215), and voting record (1.010). 
In addition to problems from collinearity, data points far from the fit line 
can also render a model inefficient or even incorrect. In ordinary least squares 
regression, “outliers” are observations so influential that they change the 
coefficients. While “outliers” are an inappropriate concept for logistic regression 
(Fox and Weisberg 2002, 317), there are influential points that can similarly 
change the odds ratios. Gauging the influence of these points is akin to 
calculating Cook’s Distance in least-squares regression, which measures the 
discrepancy and leverage of outliers (Fox 2008, 250 and 413). Plotting the 
influential points (Figure B.18) suggests there are some that might be skewing the 
                                                          
384 An index of 2 would mean that the standard error, which is used to construct the confidence 
interval, were 1.44 times (the square root of 2), as large as it would be if the factors are 
uncorrelated. 
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result – that is, without these respondents, the odds ratios and substantive 
interpretations of the statistical results could be different. 
 
Figure B.18: Bubble plot of influential points 
 
 
Specifically, analysis suggests that 67 data points may be overly influential. The 
descriptive statistics for those respondents are: 
 
Table B.7: Descriptive statistics of influential persons 
Variable Min Max Median Mean S.D.   
Age 23 85 40 43.45 16.12 
Education 1 10 4 4.9 2.96 
City Size 0 3 1 1.27 1.29 
Paper 0 5 1 1.78 1.86 
TV 0 5 5 4.18 1.54 
Radio 0 5 4 2.96 2.23 
Internet 0 5 0 1.08 1.84 
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Figure B.20: Frequency distribution of educational attainment by 
overly influential respondents 
 
 
The bimodal nature of the educational backgrounds of overly influential persons 
suggests that opposition to the incumbent in the 2014 election was mix of 
persons with only a primary education and those with some college education. 
 




Figures B.22 – B.25: Frequency distribution of news consumption of 
overly influential respondents 
Scale: Frequency of using the platform for news, scaled from never (0) to daily (5) 
 
Figure B.22: Newspaper use   
 
 








Figure B.25: Internet news 
 
 
Table B.8: Descriptive statistics of influential persons  
Variable Yes No 
Female 32 35 
Indigenous Status 10 48 
Voted for Incumbent in This Election? 40 27 
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election? 46 21 
 
Figure B.26: Gender of overly influential respondents 
 
 




Figure B.28: 2014 voting intent of overly influential persons 
 
 
Figure B.29: 2009 voting record of overly influential respondents 
 
 
These influential respondents are more rural, consume less television and 
radio news, and consume more Internet news than the rest of the sample (as 
depicted in Figures B.1 through B.11). As Figures B.28 and B.29 show, overly 
influential respondents also seem to have voted for the incumbent in 2009 but 
not 2014, suggesting they might be dragging down any obvious incumbent effect. 
Removing those respondents should, therefore, provide an even more accurate 
test of the importance of previous vote choice in Bolivia’s 2014 election.  
Of the remaining 1021 respondents: 
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Table B.9: Descriptive statistics of subset without influential points 
Variable Min Max Median Mean S.D.   
Age 23 92 38 41.4 14.33 
Education 1 10 5 4.89 2.47 
City Size 0 3 2 1.75 1.22 
Paper 0 5 2 1.82 1.63 
TV 0 5 5 4.52 1.21 
Radio 0 5 3 3.66 1.89 
Internet 0 5 0 0.9 1.66 
 
Figure B.30: Proportional frequency distribution of age of subset 
without overly influential respondents 
 
 
Figure B.31: Frequency distribution of educational attainment within 








Figures B.33 – B.36: Frequency distribution of news consumption in 
subset without influential persons 
Scale: Frequency of using the platform for news, scaled from never (0) to daily (5) 
  
Figure B.33: Newspaper use    
 
 





Figure B.35: Radio news use    
 
 
Figure B.36: Internet new use 
 
 
Table B.10: Descriptive statistics of subset without influential points  
Variable Yes No 
Female 506 515 
Indigenous Status 627 394 
Voted for Incumbent in This Election? 722 299 
Voted for Incumbent in Last Election? 785 236 
 

















The descriptive statistics for this subset mirror the reduced dataset used in 
model 2.  Re-running the model without the influential respondents yields the 
following result: 
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Table B.11: Model 4 without influential points 
Parameter Coefficient (SE) Odds Ratio 
Female - 0.0606 (1960) 0.7749  
Age - 0.0060 (0.0077) 0.9922   
Education - 0.2265 (0.0495)*** 0.8441  
Indigenous  1.3091 (0.2008)*** 2.1138   
Urban - 0.4663 (0.0928)*** 0.8434  
Newspaper - 0.0601 (0.0648) 0.9405  
TV - 0.3805 (0.1413)** 0.8859  
Radio - 0.0596 (0.0502) 1.0141  
Internet - 0.0457 (0.0656) 0.9577  
Voting Record  3.4953 (0.2397)*** 32.9612    
Intercept  2.2203 (0.8371)**     
n=1021 
Significance codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘˙’  
 
In this run of the model, the importance of voting record increases more 
than three-fold. Relative to the theory in the dissertation, consumption of 
television news becomes more significant and, though not significant, the sign for 
consumption of radio news shifts to negative. Given Morales’ history with 
cocalero radio385 and the theoretical expectation that consumers of non-
traditional media would be more likely to support non-traditional parties in any 
given country, this is a very non-intuitive result, despite no indication of poor 
model fit.386 
 
                                                          
385 Radio Soberanía, run by the cocalero union, promoted the causes and candidacy of Morales 
from his beginnings in the 1980s and 1990s as a grassroots coca leader (Ledebur 2002, 10). 
Cocalero is defied by Oxford dictionaries as “one who dedicates him or herself to the growing of 
coca,” the raw material for cocaine, but also a stimulant grown and chewed for centuries by 
workers in the mountain region between Bolivia and Peru (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014, 
291). 
386 Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit test shows p = 0.16. 
343 
Resampling as a test of the model 
Resampling with replacement allows one to generate bootstrapped 
samples, from which you can generate statistics of the bootstrapped samples. 
These bootstrapped sample statistics give you the distribution in which the ‘true’ 
population statistic lies, and this distribution will give you the rough confidence 
interval of the sample statistics.  Resampling with replacement allows one to test 
the confidence intervals of a dataset and understand better the sampling 
distribution. “The process of finding confidence intervals directly via resampling 
is called bootstrapping” (Kaplan 2009, 251). 
Over a large number, regressions with bootstrapped samples will yield 
distributions of estimated coefficients that will center encompass those 
regression coefficients generated by the original sample data. In other words, 
bootstrapped samples can yield confidence intervals for sample statistics, and 
regression with bootstrapped samples can yield confidence intervals for the 
coefficients with the sample data. Bootstrapping the confidence intervals can 
increase confidence in results if the sampling distribution is not necessarily 
normally distributed (Albright 2015) since the only assumption that 
nonparametric bootstrapping assumes is that the sample distribution is a good 
approximation of the population distribution. Further, since regular statistical 
inference tends to overstate confidence intervals, this method generates a more 
conservative confidence interval (Fox 2008, 602). 
For finding confidence intervals “5000 trials is enough to give reliable 
results” (Kaplan 2009, 265). The Law of Large Numbers means that more 
simulations should come closer to the true statistics; so I bootstrap 10,000 times. 
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I include different types of confidence intervals (normal, percentile, bias-
corrected) that might account for the possibility that the data may be non-
Gaussian (Fox 2008, 595-599).387 The bias corrected method offers the 
advantages of the other models without the disadvantages associated with 
asymmetric distributions388 in the percentile method (Carpenter and Bithell 
2000, 1152-1153). 
Table B.12 shows the confidence intervals from bootstrapping on the 
subset of data without overly influential points. The confidence intervals on the 
parameters of interest that were significant in the model run – education, 
indigenous status, urban/rural divide and voting record – do not contain zero, 
increasing confidence that the p-values are meaningfully significant, not just 
statistical artifacts. The confidence intervals on the non-significant variables do 
contain zero, adding strength to the conclusion that they are not significant. For 
television, which has a highly skewed distribution (since most people watch some 
television news daily) and which had shown up as weakly significant in model 4, 
the different confidence intervals recommended for bootstrapping with non-
normal data yield results contradictory. The percentile method is the only 
method that yields confidence intervals that do not cross zero, but can be “overly 
optimistic” (Albright 2015). Since the normal and bias-corrected confidence 
intervals both contain zero, labeling the variable as not significant is the 
conservative choice.   
                                                          
387 See Weiss 2003 for overview of the bootstrap confidence interval options in R 
388 The bias-corrected method “attempts to shift and scale the percentile bootstrap confidence 
interval to compensate for bias” (Weiss 2003). 
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Surprisingly though, all types of the confidence intervals for the overall 
model – constructed as all the indices together389, not disaggregated to look at 
each variable, as above, and which in this iteration includes previous vote choices 
– include zero. That result calls into question the utility of the model including 
voting record itself for me. 
Arguably more importantly, though the bootstrapped confidence intervals 
for the significant predictor variables do not contain zero, the coefficients from 
running the model without the overly influential points are outside of the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals.  That suggests that, in the original model run, 
the confidence intervals were not as tight as would be desirable.  
 
Table B.12: Bootstrapping results for model 4 without overly influential 
points 
 2.5% lower bound 97.5% higher bound 
Confidence Intervals: Gender 
Normal -0.47 0.15 
Percentile -0.48 0.15 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.48 0.15 
Confidence Intervals: Age 
Normal -0.02 0.004 
Percentile -0.02 0.004 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.02 0.004 
Confidence Intervals: Education*** 
Normal -0.19 -0.03 
Percentile -0.2 -0.04 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.2 -0.03 
Confidence Intervals: Indigenous Status*** 
Normal 0.40 1.02 
Percentile 0.41 1.04 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval 0.40 1.02 
Confidence Intervals: City Size*** 
Normal -0.31 -0.03 
Percentile -0.31 -0.03 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.31 -0.03 
                                                          
389 R code section on “#conf intervals,” almost at the end of the full code, shows how this was 
done 
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Table B.12 (cont): Bootstrapping results for model 4 without overly 
influential points 
Confidence Intervals: Paper 
Normal -0.18 0.02 
Percentile -0.18 0.02 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.18 0.02 
Confidence Intervals: Television** 
Normal -0.33 0.01 
Percentile -0.35 -0.004 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.34 0.007 
Confidence Intervals: Radio 
Normal -0.07 0.09 
Percentile -0.07 0.09 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.07 0.09 
Confidence Intervals: Internet 
Normal -0.15 0.06 
Percentile -0.15 0.06 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.15 0.06 
Confidence Intervals: Record*** 
Normal 1.94 2.63 
Percentile 2.01 2.71 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval 1.94 2.63 
Confidence Intervals: Whole Model 
Normal -0.26 1.94 
Percentile -0.21 2.03 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.22 2.01 
 
There are then, so far, at least four problems with including voting record 
as an indication of how a respondent might vote in the 2014 election: it cuts the 
sample size from 2009 to 1088; 6.2% of the subsample are overly influential 
respondents (versus just 11 points of 2009, or 0.5%, in the sample, shown in 
figure B.41); the bootstrapped confidence intervals on the model without overly 
influential points contain zero; and the coefficients without the overly influential 
points are outside of the bootstrapped confidence intervals, meaning they are 
arguably not significant. 
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Figure B.41: Bubble plot of 11 influential points in original model in 
Chapter 5   
 
 
Given the variety of problems with including any measure of political 
leaning, I opted to run bootstrap confidence intervals on the original model from 
Chapter 5. Those results are in table B.13.  
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Table B.13: Bootstrapping results for model based on full sample in 
Chapter 5 
 2.5% lower bound 97.5% higher bound 
Confidence Intervals: Gender** 
Normal -0.5756 -0.0478 
Percentile -0.5814 -0.0488 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.5769 -0.0440 
Confidence Intervals: Age*** 
Normal -0.0228 -0.0048 
Percentile -0.0234 -0.0052 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.0231 -0.0050 
Confidence Intervals: Education*** 
Normal -0.2047 -0.0745 
Percentile -0.2101 -0.0802 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.2057 -0.0762 
Confidence Intervals: Indigenous Status*** 
Normal 0.3787 0.9174 
Percentile 0.3920 0.9312 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval 0.3759 0.9176 
Confidence Intervals: City Size** 
Normal -0.2403 -0.0024 
Percentile -0.2435 -0.0060 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.2423 -0.0043 
Confidence Intervals: Paper 
Normal -0.1229 0.0558 
Percentile -0.1297 0.0568 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.1296 0.0568 
Confidence Intervals: Television 
Normal -0.1483 0.0883 
Percentile -0.1553 0.0842 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.1546 0.0851 
Confidence Intervals: Radio** 
Normal 0.0258 0.1625 
Percentile 0.0274 0.1622 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval 0.0265 0.1616 
Confidence Intervals: Internet 
Normal -0.1691 0.0030 
Percentile -0.1707 0.0019 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval -0.1695 0.0025 
Confidence Intervals: Whole Model 
Normal 0.0740 2.501 
Percentile 0.797 2.554 
Bias Corrected Accelerated Interval 0.758 2.512 
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For the original model, the bootstrapped confidence intervals for the 
predictor variables that were significant in the original model (gender, age, 
education, indigenous status, city size and radio news listenership) do not 
contain zero, suggesting with greater likelihood that these predictors are truly 
significant. In addition, the original coefficients are contained within the 
bootstrapped confidence intervals. That increases my confidence in that model as 
well as in the decision to exclude previous vote choice as a proxy for ideology in 
the chapter. 
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# Who are “average”  
# Finding modal respondent for each media platform 
AvgX<-(sex*10000000000)+(age*100000000)+(edu*1000000)+(indig*10000)+(capital*100)+(media platform X) 
mfv(AvgX)[1] 
 



























































# Model without overly influential points 




# Hosmer-Lemeshow  


















# Confidence intervals 
boot.ci(logit.boot, type= "all", index=2) 
boot.ci(logit.boot, type="all") 
 
# Original model 
data<-data[i,] 
m4<-glm(prez~ gender+age+edu+indig+estrato+paper+tv+radio+internet, data=data, family=binomial(link= "logit")) 
coefficients(m4) 
} 
exp(coef(m4)) 
 
